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PREFACE 
The idea for this thesis came from James J. 
Dougherty's The Politics of Wartime Aid: American Economic 
Assistance to France and French West Africa 1940-1946. In 
Dougherty's book the chapter on "Arab Nationalism 
and the United States" struck me because of the problems the 
North African invasion caused American policy makers by 
raising the hopes of the North Africans for independence. I 
looked up some of Dougherty's references in the National 
Archives in Washington only to discover that a story 
unfolded in the despatches from Hooker Doolittle, Paul 
O'Neill, and Marcel Malige. 
Not only was the story interesting, but the strong 
differences of opinion about the United States policy toward 
the Tunisian nationalists were similar to those over policy 
toward Vietnam and Nicaragua. In all three cases there was 
a reluctance by the policy makers in Washington to heed the 
advice of the diplomats most knowledgeable about those areas 
and to ignore the basic concerns of the people living there. 
Instead local concerns have been subordinated to global 
ones. 
I would especially like to thank my adviser, Dr. 
Bernard Burke, for his help and encouragement. He went 
beyond the call of duty in reading and re-reading many rough 
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drafts of the thesis. Dr. Jon Mandaville let me sit in on 
his class on Islamic Civilization and gave me some valuable 
insight into the North African world. I am grateful to the 
other members of my committee, Dr. Charles Le Guin and Dr. 
Michael Reardon, for their suggestions about the thesis. 
In talking with Paul O'Neill, I learned of things such 
as the outpouring of emotion in Tunisia at the time of 
Roosevelt's death, that were not to be found in the 
Archives. Marcel Malige was kind enough to write 
answering my questions and describing his impressions of 
Bourguiba. 
Doolittle's daughter, Katya Coon (Mrs. Maurice Coon), 
spent a day with me at her home in Marshfield, 
Massachusetts and gave me material that was otherwise 
unavailable. Her sister, Natasha Van Deusen (Mrs. E.R. Van 
Deusen), filled me in on her recollections of Doolittle's 
meetings with Bourguiba in Alexandria. Katya Coon's 
daughter, Elena Prentice, who lives in Paris, contacted 
people for me to meet or talk with who had been in Tunisia 
during the war. 
Sabine Vauclain arranged for my husband and me to 
exchange our house for Yves and Andr~e Haas' apartment in 
Paris making it possible for me to do research at the 
Biblioth\que Nationale and at the Minist\re des Affaires 
'trang\res. AndrJe Haas, whose first husband was killed at 
Toulon fighting with the Free French, introduced me to 
Suzanne Broche, whose husband had also been with the Free 
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French and had been killed in the fighting at Bir Hakeim. 
Madame Broche, who had grown up in Tunisia, shared with me 
her memories of the war years in Tunisia, especailly those 
under German occupation. Yves Haas, another former Free 
French fighter, explained how there were very few Frenchmen 
joining the de Gaulle forces at the beginning. Tamara 
Kinski, whose family had immigrated to France from Tiflis, 
Georgia at the time of the October Revolution, remembered 
seeing Hooker Doolittle in Egypt with his wife, who had also 
come from Tiflis. Tamara's father, a member of the French 
Foreign Legion, was killed fighting with the Free French at 
El Alamein. Tamara helped me to understand differences in 
French politics and offered to introduce me to Madame Mast, 
who was unfortunately away from Paris. 
Estelle de Montgoflier of Avignon, France, whose 
parents were French doctors in Tunisia, described many 
aspects of Tunisian culture. Woods Vest helped find the 
addresses of Katya Coon and Marcel Malige. 
Stuart Gates of Portland, who knew Doolittle in 
Tangiers, found two pictures of himself and Doolittle when 
they were both living in Tangiers which he had reproduced 
for me, one of which is included. 
My brother, Allen Staley, and his wife, Etheleen, let 
me stay in their house while I worked at the Hyde Park 
library and my brother had many useful suggestions about 
writing the thesis. My daughter and her husband, Martha and 
Carter Wormeley, let me combine visiting with them and doing 
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research at the Archives and Library of Congress. Sally 
Marks, Kathy Nicastro, and John Taylor were helpful at the 
Archives and have subsequently found documents for me. My 
husband, John, has helped me with making the thesis more 
readable and has let the thesis take precedence over other 
activities. 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
PREFACE . . . . . . . . 
















Notes . . . . . . 
OPERATION TORCH 
Notes . . . . . 
GIRAUD-DE GAULLE CONFLICT 
Notes . . . . 
RECALL OF DOOLITTLE 
Notes . . . . . . 






















LIST OF FIGURES 
FIGURE PAGE 
1. Hooker Doolittle and Stuart Gates of Portland, 
Oregon leaving the Anglican Church in Tangier . . ix 
2. Map of North Africa. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . x 
Figure 1. Hooker Doolittle and Stuart Gates of Portland , Or egon , 









































































































































A conflict arose in Tunisia during World War II among 
State Department representatives over the United States 
response to the Tunisian independence movement. Hooker 
Doolittle, the American Consul General in Tunis, was aware 
of and sensitive to Tunisian nationalism. He reported it in 
numerous letters to the State Department. Robert Murphy, 
Civil Affairs Officer on General Dwight Eisenhower's staff, 
on the other hand, thought any recognition by the United 
States of nationalist desires of the North Africans would 
jeopardize relations with the French. 
Eisenhower backed Murphy because French cooperation 
had been important not only in preparation for the North 
African invasion, but afterwards for its administration. 
Eisenhower wanted the French to administer the area in order 
not to tie up his forces in the responsibilities of an 
occupation army. Anticipating the landing of the Allied 
Expeditionary Force in France, Eisenhower was well aware 
that French cooperation would be equally important there. 
For the French, humiliated by their recent defeat, it 
was important to hold on to their Empire, for it along with 
their navy and the unoccupied portion of the mainland was 
what remained to them to use as bargaini ng chips with the 
Germans . Later when German defeat seemed probable, they 
needed the Empire to regain their great power status . 
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After United States and British troop s had landed in 
North Africa and driven the Germans out , the French resorted 
to harsh and repressive measures against the North Africans 
to regain the u pper hand . In Tunisia they went so far as to 
depose the Bey . They claimed he had collaborated with the 
Axis , but the real reason was his support of nationalist 
goals . 
Doolittle, aware of the injustice of this step as 
well as the French mistreatment of the Tunisians, urged 
the State Departmen t to intervene with the French and 
attempt to influence them not to depose the Bey and to 
ameliorate their treatment of t he Tunisians . He realized 
that American prestige which had been high with the North 
Africans at the beginning of the war was suffering from 
these French actions. The North Africans we re holding the 
United States accountable as allies of the French . In some 
cases the French were saying that they were carrying out 
repressive measures at the reque st o f the Anglo -American 
command . Doolittl e , furthermore, thought the United States 
should uphold the pr inciples of the Atlantic Charter , or as 
his daughter said in an intervie w, he thought America should 
stand for something . 
Unfortunately for all c once r ned , Mu rphy saw only the 
French position. He ha d wo rk ed in France be f o r e t he war . In 
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preparation for the North African invasion, he had worked 
with members of the military and other French in North 
Africa. By his own admission, he knew nothing about the 
North Africans. He only knew that any suspicion of American 
encouragement for North African goals of independence upset 
the French. 
It was because Doolittle had upset the French by his 
Tunisian sympathies that Murphy asked the State Department 
for his recall. Doolittle's position was not without 
supporters in the State Department. Among these was Edward 
Stettinius, who was serving as Acting Secretary of State at 
the time. Stettinius and others thought that Doolittle's 
point of view was of sufficient importance to the United 
States that President Roosevelt should hear it. Thus it was 
that Doolittle had an interview with the President. Unlike 
Murphy, Roosevelt was sympathetic with the North Africans, 
but no policy changes resulted from the interview. If 
anybody could have effected a change in United States 
policy, it was the President, but he declined to do so. 
Undoubtedly he did not intervene because he wanted to back 
up Eisenhower. Also, Roosevelt had appointed Murphy as his 
personal representative to report directly to him. Having 
initially by-passed the State Department and relied on 
Murphy for political advice about North Africa, Roosevelt 
probably did not want to oppose Murphy's decision in the 
Doolittle dispute. 
Furthermore, the Doolittle matter came to his 
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attention at a time when he was preoccupied with another 
controversy - that between General Charles de Gaulle and 
Henri Giraud. Roosevelt had been troubled by this dispute 
since the landings and at the time of Doolittle's recall it 
was at one of its crisis points. With Giraud's eventual 
elimination from the political picture, the de Gaulle-Giraud 
conflict was settled, but not the conflict between Roosevelt 
and de Gaulle. This would last until Roosevelt's death. Its 
consequences on French-American relations have probably 
lasted until today. Ignoring North African concerns has 
produced consequences that are less well known, but have 
been important ever since. Americans lost some good will and 
were seen as partisans of French colonialism. Could the 
United States have done any differently under the 
circumstances? To understand how American actions evolved in 
Tunisia, it is necessary to look at American relations 
toward the French from the beginning of the war. 
CHAPTER II 
FALL OF FRANCE 
The fall of France brought about changes in French 
leadership. One of the American responses to this new 
leadership was an increased interest in North Africa. 
On May 14, 1940 the Germans broke through the French 
lines at Sedan. The invasion was not unexpected since both 
France and England had declared war on Germany on September 
3, 1939 after the latter had attacked Poland. Even with 
British help, however, French troops were no match for the 
well prepared Germans with their heavy tanks and dive 
bombers. French Premier Paul Reynaud and his recently 
appointed Under-Secretary of State for War, Charles de 
Gaulle, were determined to continue fighting, but there were 
others in the military and government that considered the 
French position hopeless and thought the French should seek 
an armistice. Among these were Marshal Henri Pltain, the new 
Minister of War, and General Maxim Weygand, who had been 
called from his post in Syria on May 19 to take charge of 
the faltering French army. There was little Weygand could do 
to reverse the situation. Part of the French and British 
forces were trappec at Dunkirk and had to be evacuated 
across the chanenl in a dramatic rescue operation. The 
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British and French navy as well as numerous small boats 
brought two hundred and sixty thousand British and ninety 
thousand French to England. With his troops severely 
reduced, Weygand was unable to withstand the German advance 
toward Paris. To make matters worse, the Italians declared 
war on France June 11 crossing the Italo-French frontier in 
the south. This "stab in the back" was bitterly resented by 
the French and would later cause problems for the Italians 
in Tunisia. 
Reynaud pleaded with both Winston Churchill and 
Franklin Roosevelt for help. The latter could offer only 
material and moral support as Congress alone could declare 
war, and it was not prepared to do so at that time. As for 
Churchill, Reynaud beseeched him to send more planes. On 
June 9 Reynaud expressed to United States Ambassador to 
France William Bullitt his disappointment with the English: 
in spite of eleven telegrams and seven personal 
telephone conversations he had been unable to 
persuade Churchill to put into the present battle 
more than one fourth of the British pursuit 
planes. (1) 
Churchill, anticipating the need for planes for England's 
own defense, felt that he could not send more. 
Churchill's refusal to send more planes reinforced the 
position of those like Pitain and Weygand who wanted an 
armistice. Pltain told Bullitt that he thought England would 
allow Germany to defeat France and then make a compromise 
peace. (2) Reynaud, however, had promised Churchill that as 
long as he remained premier, "France would fight to the 
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bitter end." (3) He felt honor bound to the pledge both 
countries had jointly made in March not to sign a separate 
armistice or peace without the prior consent of the 
other. ( 4) Nevertheless, on June 13 when Churchi 11 came to 
Tours to which the government had retreated when the Germans 
reached the outskirts of Paris, Reynaud asked him what the 
English reaction would be should France be forced to ask for 
peace terms. Churchill replied: 
We shall not heap reproaches on an unfortunate ally 
and if we are victorious, we assume the unconditional 
obligation to raise France from her ruins. (5) 
As sympathetic as Churchill's response was, he could not 
answer for his government. After his return to England and 
consultation with the cabinet, Churchill sent a proposal to 
the French, that the two countries form a union. Having had 
to move farther south to Bordeaux on June 14, the French 
cabinet was in too great a state of confusion to consider 
seriously this innovative and generous offer. While it 
rejected this proposal, there were those who wanted to hold 
out in a "Breton redoubt" while others favored moving the 
government to North Africa. The majority, however, wanted an 
armistice. Lacking the support of the cabinet in his 
determination to fight on, Reynaud stepped down on June 17 
in favor of PJtain, who immediately sought peace terms with 
the Germans. A ship carrying a group of French deputies, 
including Pierre M~ndes-France, actually sailed for Morocco. 
Unfortunately by the time they landed, the government in 
France had changed and they were put under arrest on their 
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arrival. 
General August NogJes, Resident General of Morocco and 
Commander-in-Chief of the North African troops, wanted to 
continue the fight. He sent a message to Weygand urging him 
not to stop lest France "lose forever the esteem and 
confidence of the indigenous people." (6) He himself was 
ready to continue the fight and was ready to enter into 
dissidence if he was authorized. In a cable to Petain he 
warned that if France did not defend North Africa, she would 
have trouble maintaining her authority "for one doesn't 
govern in scorn." (7) Weygand found the idea of continuing 
the fighting "absurd" and "odious". (8) In Tunisia, too, 
according to Charles Heisler, the American consul there, the 
French had wished to continue the struggle. When Marcel 
Peyrouton, the Resident General there, accepted the 
armistice, it was not popular. Nor were the British popular 
as the French in Tunisia thought they had not aided France 
sufficiently. (9) 
P'tain at 84 was known as the hero of Verdun. While 
there were questions whether this tribute was deserved, 
there were even more about his treatment of Reynaud and 
other members of the previous administration who were 
arrested and imprisoned. The new cabinet needed a scapegoat 
for the defeat and what was more natural than to blame the 
previous cabinet. In letters to p/tain from prison, copies 
of which managed to go to Roosevelt, Reynaud questioned 
Pdtain about why he was accusing him, Reynaud, of being 
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responsible for losing the war when it was really P/tain who 
had vetoed his plan of using tanks. Reynaud reminded P/tain 
that he had for years "tried to open the eyes of Parliament 
to the deadly peril that threatened our country." (10) 
While Reynaud and others were unjustly accused, there 
was a tendency throughout France to blame the Third Republic 
with its parliamentary type government and ever changing 
premiers for the national disgrace. This climate of opinion 
seemed to call for a more authoritarian government. On July 
10 the Chamber of Deputies gave full powers to P/tain and 
made him the head of the French State. This new 
authoritarian government instituted what was called the 
"national revolution", with the slogan "work, family and 
country". The national revolution was a revolution from the 
top with all power coming from the state. Above all it 
represented a shift to the right bringing to power an 
element in France that was both nationalistic and intolerant 
of minorities. Freemasons, Jews, and socialists were looked 
upon with suspicion. This aspect of French politics had been 
seen before in the persecution of Dreyfus and has been seen 
since in the recent gains of the National Front in the 1984 
election for the European Parliament. 
While Vichy was characterized by internal 
authoritarianism, externally it was characterized by its 
collaboration with Adolph Hitler. By the armistice terms 
Hitler had left France with a semblance of sovereignty. 
Though Germany occupied three-fifths of France, the 
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southeastern part was left free and established itself at 
the spa town of Vichy whose hotels were used for government 
offices. Hitler also allowed France to keep her fleet, her 
colonies and to maintain an armistice army. A France that 
seemed sovereign saved Germany from the job of total 
occupation and of keeping order in its rear during the 
contemplated assault on England. 
While there were those in P~ain's government such as 
Weygand who were fiercely anti-German, there were others who 
thought that France's future lay with the Germans. Among 
these were a group of French financiers and industrialists 
called the Banque Worms whose business interests would best 
be served by a German victory. Organized into a political 
pressure group, the Banque Worms took its name from the 
parent organization Worms et Cie., a banking house which had 
long standing German connections through its heavy industry 
interests. This group wanted complete political and economic 
collaboration with Germany and to encourage a negotiated 
peace between Germany and England should the opportunity 
occur. Instead of operating as a party, it insinuated its 
members into the most important political positions. Two 
members of the group who held posts in the Vichy government 
were Paul Baudouin, Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Pierre 
Pucheu, Minister of the Interior. (11) 
Pierre Laval, a former deputy and one time prime 
minister, came into the government without portfolio. 
According to Weygand, he persuaded Pltain not to make Laval 
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foreign minister because of his hatred of the British. Soon, 
however, Laval, an astute politician, became the dominant 
member of the cabinet with the title of vice-premier and 
exerted a strong and, as Weygand called it, "pernicious" 
influence on Pitain. (12) While Laval was above all for 
France, he preferred her destiny to be linked with Germany 
rather than with the Anglo-Saxon countries. He expected 
Germany to win the war and hoped that France would be a 
favored part of the new German order. To insure her post-war 
position, she needed to co-operate with Hitler during the 
war. In a talk on July 30, 1940 with Robert Murphy, the 
United States chargl d'affaires, Laval said that a German 
had quoted the Axis representative at Paris as saying that 
the Germans did not expect to crush France, but they planned 
a European federation of states in which France 
will play an important role compatible with its 
dignity and tradition. (13) 
And further: 
speaking personally and off the record, he [Laval) 
said he had announced it before and did not 
hesitate again to say 'that he hoped ardently that 
the English would be defeated.' (14) 
In pursuit of his policy Laval arranged a meeting between 
Hitler and PJtain to discuss closer French-German 
cooperation against England at Montoire-sur-Loire on October 
31 and November 1, 1940. As a result of this meeting, Hitler 
left it up to the French to defend themselves against the 
English in North Africa. In spite of Laval's success in 
arranging this meeting, Pltain was dissatisfied with him and 
dismissed him from his cabinet in December. Laval treated 
PJtain with disdain. Pjtain feared that Laval intended to 
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make him a figurehead and make himself head of state. (15) 
PJtain now showed increasing confidence in Admiral 
Francois Darlan, his Minister of Marine, who by February was 
appointed vice-premier and "heir apparent" to the 
Marshal. (16) Darlan probably hated the British as much as 
Laval if not more. As a navy man Darlan resented the 
limitation that had been put on the French navy at the 
Washington Naval Conference in 1922 when France had been 
allotted the same number of ships as Italy, below that of 
England, America, or even Japan. In case he might have 
overlooked this slight, he could never forgive the British 
for the Mers-el-Kebir incident. A large part of the French 
navy in order to escape from the Germans had fled to the 
port of Mers-el-Kebir in Algeria. In spite of assurances 
from Darlan that the fleet would be scuttled rather than be 
allowed to fall into German hands, the British were not 
completely convinced. Feeling they could not risk such an 
eventuality, the British on July 3, 1940 sent an ultimatum 
to the French admiral in charge of the ships at 
Mers-el-Kebir demanding that the fleet proceed either to 
Britain, the West Indies, or to a United States port to be 
interned. When the French admiral refused, the British 
opened fire on the ships putting many out of commission and 
killing over one thousand Frenchmen. 
This incident reinforced the anglophobia of Darlan and 
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of the French navy. It did not help any French feeling 
toward their former ally, and it particularly embittered the 
French in North Africa, some of whom had watched the ships 
burning from the nearby city of Oran. The damage done to 
French-British relations by Mers-el-Kebir was enormous. The 
French cabinet was so angry that Foreign Minister Baudouin 
even wanted France to join Germany in the war against 
England. {17) While Pitain restrained the cabinet from 
taking this step, it did break diplomatic relations with 
Britain two days later. Pdtain attributed Mers-el-Kebir "to 
the snap judgment of 'Winston Churchill who is capable of 
almost any rash act when drunk as he frequently is.'" {18) 
Hating the British need not, however, have meant 
actively pursuing the policy of collaboration which Darlan 
embarked upon. Like Laval, Darlan was confident that the 
Germans would "win the war and establish a new order in 
Europe." {19) Darlan envisioned a new continental system in 
which France would be a naval and imperial power. He thought 
a German victory which would weaken England would help bring 
this about. {20) Darlan's policy of collaboration culminated 
in May 1941 with the signing of what were called the Paris 
Protocols, which gave the Germans the use of Syrian 
airfields, the use of Bizerte in Tunis for General Erwin 
Rommel's Afrika Corps and a future submarine base at 
Dakar. {21) Unlike Laval, who never wavered from his 
pro-German stance, Darlan, considered an opportunist, would 
later switch his allegiance. He preferred to be on the 
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winning side. When Germany invaded Russia in June 1941, he 
probably realized that a German victory was less certain. 
At the time of the armistice there was one member of 
Reynaud's cabinet whose allegiance was beyond question. 
Charles de Gaulle, who had just been promoted to General, 
was bitterly opposed to the armistice. Later he managed to 
escape to England and there he appealed to other Frenchmen 
to join him to continue the fight against the Germans. At 
that time de Gaulle was relatively unknown, though during 
the 1930's he had written a book advocating the use of tanks 
as an important element in French military strategy. While 
Premier Reynaud had favored the idea, he had not been able 
to bring the rest of the government to implement the 
proposal. It was said that Hitler made use of de Gaulle's 
ideas in modernizing the German army. During the Nazi 
invasion de Gaulle had fought well in the north of France 
and had been commended by Weygand for his efforts there. On 
meeting him Bullitt wrote Roosevelt that this general, who 
had two weeks before been a colonel in the tank corps, had 
"showed great initiative and courage in stemming the German 
advance on Paris." (22) He found that he was a young man who 
appeared "vigorous and intelligent." (23) He was thus known 
as a sound military thinker and a good soldier, but he did 
not have the prestige of heroes of the first World War such 
as Pdtain and Weygand. The PJtain government, considering 
him a traitor for breaking with them and leaving for 
England, condemned him to death in absentia by a military 
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tribunal August 2, 1940. 
While Churchill decided to support de Gaulle, who was 
the only Frenchman rallying others to the side of Britain, 
very few French leaders who had left France joined de Gaulle 
at this time. Some of the soldiers who had been evacuated at 
Dunkirk stayed on and became part of the Free French 
Divisions while gradually others came from France and the 
colonies. Eventually the Free French had two divisions, one 
of which fought alongside the British in Libya against 
Rommel while the other went to Syria before going to North 
Africa. 
With the British radio at his disposal, de Gaulle was 
able to encourage the mainland French and gained stature 
with them. Slowly a resistance developed in France with many 
members who looked toward de Gaulle as their leader. He also 
won the adherence of several of the colonies including Chad 
and the Cameroons. 
In North Africa, however, de Gaulle was looked on with 
distrust. He was seen as too closely connected with the 
British, the perpetrators of Mers-el-Kebir. His movement was 
even thought to serve as a screen for British imperial 
ambitions. This suspicion was strengthened when de Gaulle 
and the British joined forces in September 1940 in an 
attempt to take over Dakar. The British wanted Dakar in 
order to protect British shipping. Although de Gaulle 
thought the Dakar garrison would rally to him, instead they 
put up a stiff resistance resulting in French killing 
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French. The attackers were turned back. Not only was the 
invasion a failure, it increased anti-British hatred among 
the French. It also increased their distrust of de Gaulle 
and the Free French. One of the causes of the defeat seemed 
to have been that the Free French had talked about it in 
London too openly. From that time on, Churchill considered 
them "leaky" and was hesitant to inform them of any plans in 
advance. This was true of both the North African invasion as 
well as that of the European continent. 
A similar situation occurred ten months later in June 
1941 when the Free French and British attacked Syria to 
prevent Darlan from turning over Syrian airfields to the 
Germans. Again there were French fighting French, which did 
not endear de Gaulle to the French in North Africa. 
Weygand used these attacks by de Gaulle to extract 
more troops from Hitler in order to build up the armistice 
army. The French military officers in North Africa were 
determined to keep both the British and Germans out of this 
area. To allow either to enter would bring reprisals from 
the other. It was because Hitler had been so impressed by 
the French defense at Dakar that he had agreed to the 
meeting at Montoire. 
For his part it was because of Montoire that de Gaulle 
in October made a declaration at Brazzaville that Vichy was 
no longer legitimate. De Gaulle thought that the 
collaboration of Vichy with the enemy had been officially 
proclaimed at that meeting. (24) He took upon himself the 
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responsibility of looking after the interests of France. He 
promised to give an accounting "to the sovereign 
people ... when liberty was regained." (25) Having started 
as a purely military movement, de Gaulle's Free French had 
become a political one as well. 
While relations between de Gaulle and Churchill were 
often difficult, they endured for the length of the war. 
Churchill not only wanted these Frenchmen fighting alongside 
the British, he wanted the strong post-war France that de 
Gaulle envisioned. A strong France, of course, meant to both 
men a France with her empire intact. 
President Franklin Roosevelt and Secretary of State 
Cordell Hull had quite different ideas about de Gaulle and 
the ultimate disposition of the French Empire. As for de 
Gaulle, the United States could not recognize his movement 
so long as it continued to maintain relations with Vichy. 
Besides, in the summer of 1940 de Gaulle was still an 
unknown quantity. De Gaulle made sure that he did not remain 
unknown, but his ways of asserting himself and his movement 
often resulted in his alienating not just Roosevelt and 
Hull, but even Churchill. 
Underlying personality clashes and difficulties over 
recognition were fundamental differences between Roosevelt 
and Hull on the one hand and Churchill and de Gaulle on the 
other over the question of colonialism. While more has been 
written about Roosevelt's differences with Churchill on this 
question, de Gaulle shared the latter's belief in Empire and 
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was considered by Roosevelt and Hull to be an ally of 
Churchill on this point. A major goal of the foreign policy 
of de Gaulle as well as of the Vichy French after the defeat 
of 1940 was to maintain the French Empire. Roosevelt could 
not forgive the French for failing to resist the Germans in 
Europe and the Japanese in Indochina. He felt France did not 
deserve to have colonies such as Indochina returned or to 
play a great power role in the post war world. 
While Roosevelt had not always been anti-imperialist, 
by 1928 he had come to the conclusion that a new world based 
on self-determination was needed. In Foreign Affairs he 
wrote: 
The time has come when we must accept not only 
certain facts but many new principles of a higher 
law, a new and better standard in international 
relations. We are exceedingly jealous of our own 
sovereignty and it is only right that we should 
respect a similar feeling among other nations. (26) 
By the time he became president in 1933, his 
anti-colonialism was well established and never altered 
until his death. 
There were political as well as humanitarian reasons 
for his stand. With the outbreak of the war and American aid 
to Great Britain, Roosevelt realized the American public 
needed to be reassured that aid to the British was not for 
the purpose of perpetuating the British Empire. Roosevelt 
arranged to meet with Churchill to discuss aid and at the 
same time clarify for American public opinion the principles 
at stake in the war. Out of their meeting at Argentia, 
Newfoundland in August 1941 came the Atlantic Charter, which 
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stressed the humanitarian goals of the war. Article III 
pledged respect for the right of all people to choose their 
form of government. While Churchill gave his assent 
grudgingly, differences in interpretation of the Atlantic 
Charter between the two heads of state surf aced shortly 
after the meeting. Roosevelt was never successful in 
changing Churchill's views about Empire. This was apparent 
in the latter's remark in 1945, "I did not become Prime 
Minister to preside at the liquidation of the British 
Empire." (27) 
Cordell Hull's anti-imperialism also went back a long 
way. As a Congressman from Tennessee, he had become a 
student of tariffs and his ideas on tariffs had led him from 
the national to the international sphere. He became an 
exponent of free trade and as early as 1914 was opposed to 
the idea of preferential trade or the empire system. In his 
Memoirs he wrote: "Back in my Congressional years I had 
stood against imperialism and colonial expansion." (28) Even 
before the United States entered the war, Hull, as Secretary 
of State, felt the United States would be confronted with 
the need to establish a stable world order. In those days 
of non-belligerence he appointed a committee in the State 
Department to analyze the post-war consequences of the 
policies of the warring nations. After the United States 
entered the war, the committee turned to planning for a 
post-war organization that would maintain peace by 
collective security rather than the balance of power. 
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Although Roosevelt and Hull were at least as distant 
from Vichy as from de Gaulle in terms of their views on 
imperialism and a world order, they devoted much more effort 
to getting along with the former than they did with the 
latter. The American president and his secretary of state 
had some specific objectives they thought could be achieved 
by this policy. Above all they wanted to keep the French 
fleet and Empire from falling into German hands. As a 
former Under-Secretary of the Navy during World War I, 
Roosevelt was particularly sensitive to naval problems. As 
early as May 26, 1940, he had instructed Ambassador Bullitt 
to tell Reynaud that the United States 
considered retention of the French fleet 
vital to the reconstitution of France and 
her colonies and to control of the oceans 
and to getting less harsh peace terms. (29) 
Churchill was given the same message about the English 
fleet. Both Churchill and Reynaud promised that the fleets 
would never be surrendered. According to Weygand, there was 
never any question on the part of the French of 
relinquishing either fleet or colonies to the Germans. The 
ministers had agreed that armistice negotiations would be 
broken off if the Germans demanded surrender of the fleet or 
any part of the overseas territories. (30) 
In spite of these reassurances the United States 
remained concerned. With the armistice there was only the 
British fleet between America and Germany. It was known 
that British land defenses were weak, and there was even a 
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question of whether the British fleet could withstand the 
Germans. This depended to some extent on the French. If 
the Germans were able to use the French fleet, England would 
have even less of a chance, thereby affecting United States 
security. Bullitt wrote Roosevelt 
I believe as strongly as I have ever 
believed anything that you will be 
unable to protect the United States 
from German attack unless you have the 
cooperation of the French and British 
fleets. (31) 
On June 17 Admiral Darlan was told that if the fleet was 
surrendered to Germany, "France will permanently lose the 
friendship and good will of the government of the United 
States." (32) On June 23, several hours before the signing 
of the armistice, Darlan gave orders, which he renewed the 
next day, that the fleet would remain French or perish. (33) 
Still Roosevelt continued to worry about the fleet. 
P/tain's meeting with Hitler at Montoire raised questions 
about how trustworthy the Vichy government was. After that 
meeting Roosevelt sent a strong statement to Pitain saying 
that he saw no justification for France to help Germany 
against Britain, her former ally, and warned P'tain against 
permitting Germany to use the fleet. Any such agreement: 
would permanently remove any chance that we 
would aid the French people in their 
distress and in these conditions we would 
make no effort to exercise our influence in 
insuring France the retention of her 
overseas possessions. (34) 
Roosevelt, of course, was putting himself in a contradictory 
position in promising help in the return of the French 
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colonies. 
Besides the United States government's desire to keep 
the French fleet and colonies out of German hands, it had 
other reasons for continuing the Vichy policy. There were 
humanitarian reasons. The United States wanted the French 
people to know it was still their friend and give them hope 
of eventual Nazi defeat. Furthermore, the United States had 
an important listening post for obtaining word of what the 
Nazis might be doing. As Churchill was to describe it later, 
"the position of the Americans at Vichy gave us a window on 
that courtyard that otherwise would not have existed." (35) 
Also the United States hoped to influence the Vichy 
government not to collaborate with the Germans. To carry 
out this task Roosevelt sought an ambassador to France in 
the fall of 1940 who could talk to Pdtain since Bullitt had 
returned to the United States after the armistice. 
Roosevelt's first choice was General John Pershing, 
who had fought alongside Pe{ain in World war I. When 
Pershing could not accept the appointment because of ill 
health, Roosevelt asked Admiral William Leahy, former Chief 
of Naval Operations. Roosevelt thought that Leahy as a 
former Navy man could gain the respect of P/tain and have 
some influence with Admiral Darlan. In a letter to Leahy 
outlining American policy toward France, Roosevelt asked the 
new ambassador "to cultivate as close relations with Marshal 
PJtain as may be possible." (36) Roosevelt feared that 
Pjtain had been unaware of what Laval had been doing as 
23 
vice-premier and that it might be the same with his 
replacement. Roosevelt asked Leahy to bring any acts not in 
the interest of the United States to PJtain's attention. 
(37) At the same time Leahy was to keep Pltain informed of 
the support the United States was giving the British. Leahy 
was to remind the French naval officers that to allow 
Germany the use of the French fleet or naval bases would 
forfeit the friendship of the United States. ( 3 8) As 
for the children in unoccupied France, the United States 
would be favorable to sending medical supplies and milk if 
it were assured it would not assist Germany. (39) Finally, 
in view of the French effort to stay in authority in North 
Africa, Leahy was to offer assistance to help improve the 
economic situation there. 
There were several reasons Roosevelt was interested 
in North Africa. The port of Dakar was the closest point in 
Africa to the western hemisphere and he did not want to see 
it in German hands. He had also heard that there was an army 
there which might be brought back into the fight against the 
Axis. Embassy reports from France about a trip the American 
naval attach/ had made to North Africa had come to his 
attention. The naval attach/ had found that the French 
military establishment in North Africa was far stronger than 
had been expected. Furthermore, these military men had not 
lost their fighting spirit. While they had accepted the 
German armistice and had sworn allegiance to Marshal Pdtain, 
they expected to defend the African empire in spite of the 
24 
/ collapse of the mother country. The naval attache told the 
American diplomats in France, "If France is going to fight 
again anywhere in this war, I believe North Africa will be 
the place." (40) 
After reading these reports about North Africa, 
Roosevelt summoned Robert Murphy, charg/ d'affaires at 
Vichy, to the United States. Murphy had been a career 
foreign service officer since 1917 and had been counselor of 
the United States Embassy in Paris at the time of the 
armistice. In his hour long conversation with Murphy at the 
White House, Roosevelt expressed the belief that North 
Africa was the most likely place French troops might be 
brought back into the war against the Germans. Roosevelt 
asked Murphy to return to Vichy and work to obtain 
permission to make a thorough inspection tour of North 
Africa. According to Murphy, 
The French African policy of the United States 
Government thus became the President's personal 
policy. He initiated it, he kept it going and 
he resisted pressures against it, until in the 
autumn of 1942 French North Africa became the 
first major battle ground where Americans 
fought Germans. (41) 
One of the reasons Roosevelt thought there might well 
be anti-German action in North Africa was because Weygand 
had been made Delegate General there by the Vichy 
government. As a French World war I hero, Roosevelt could 
not believe Weygand would indefinitely tolerate French 
subservience to Germany. Roosevelt thought that the fact 
that Murphy was a Roman Catholic would help in his dealings 
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with Weygand. Roosevelt suggested to Murphy, "You might even 
go to church with Weygand." (42) As Murphy left the White 
House, Roosevelt told him to communicate anything of special 
interest about North Africa directly to him and not to 
bother with the State Department. Thus, Murphy became one of 
Roosevelt's "personal representatives". Roosevelt was known 
for establishing personal contacts like this which 
short-circuited the bureaucracy. 
The United States realized that the best approach to 
Weygand would be economic. Upon his return to Vichy, Murphy 
obtained permission to tour French Africa in December of 
1940. One of the first things he did was pay his respects to 
General Weygand at Dakar, where the latter was on an 
inspection tour. Murphy found that North Africa was in real 
economic distress. Because of the British blockade there was 
a shortage of gasoline, cotton fabrics, and food, including 
green tea liked by the North Africans. Weygand believed 
consumer goods were urgently needed as an incentive to North 
African cooperation in defense of the area and to make them 
less susceptible to German propaganda. For their part the 
Germans hoped that Morocco would have a nationalist 
revolution and that the North Africans would ask for German 
protection. (43) 
The United States was receptive to sending supplies, 
but it was necessary to obtain permission from the British 
to go through the blockade. The British were reluctant to 
grant this fearing that supplies to North Africa would only 
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help the Nazis. They particularly were concerned that goods 
might be transshipped to Germany. Ostensibly to placate the 
British, the Americans requested that American observers 
inspect all shipments. This was agreed to by the French. 
Thus the Murphy-Weygand Accord signed on February 26, 1941 
permitted the use of French funds frozen in the United 
States to buy nonstrategic goods and ship them to North 
Africa. To see that nothing was transshiped to the Germans, 
twelve American control officers, serving as vice-consuls, 
were to supervise the distribution. While the job of these 
men, according to the Accord, was to supervise the 
shipments, everyone knew, even Pltain and Weygand, that 
these Americans really would be intelligence agents. (44) 
They could observe the activities of the Axis powers, could 
note conditions of the North Africans, look at the depth of 
port facilities, landing locations and roads, and make 
contacts. Weygand made another concession, demonstrating his 
confidence in the United States, which was to allow the 
vice-consuls to use secret codes and to employ couriers 
carrying locked pouches. 
The War Department was asked to find twelve officers 
who would be reassigned to the State Department. Since army 
officers could be convicted, if caught, and tried as spies, 
it was decided that they should resign from the army before 
assuming their new posts. Mainly from the New York area, 
these vice-consuls were chosen on the basis of their 
knowledge of France and the French language. They started 
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arriving in April 1941 and by December all twelve were at 
their posts. Murphy was assigned to North Africa as a sort 
of High Commissioner with the job of maintaining contacts, 
particularly with Weygand. He was also to supervise the 
vice-consuls. 
The vice-consuls would soon come under the new 
intelligence organization created by William Donovan, known 
since childhood as "Wild Bill''. Donovan had impressed upon 
Roosevelt the need to consolidate the Military and Naval 
Intelligence under a coordinator of Strategic Information 
who would be responsible directly to the President. This 
service, besides analyzing and interpreting material, was 
also to direct psychological warfare. (45) In July 1941 the 
Office of Coordinator of Information (COI - later changed to 
Office of Strategic Services, or OSS) was set up under 
Donovan. It was in charge of establishing a secret 
intelligence service as well as with the organization of 
special operations. One of the first tasks of the new COI 
was to station an assistant naval attach~ in North Africa to 
unify the actvities of the vice-consuls and stimulate 
efforts in selection of "local agents of information." (46) 
The man picked for this job was Marine Colonel William Eddy 
and he was assigned as naval attache' to Tangier. 
Overall relief to North Africa from the United States 
was never enough to help her ailing economy. Economic aid 
was an on-and-off affair, subjected to the American carrot-
and-stick policy toward Vichy. The United States threatened 
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to stop aid several times when it suspected collaboration 
with Germany and in some cases actually did. In the spring 
of 1941 with Hitler marching into Yugoslavia and Greece, on 
the offensive in Libya (where the Germans had gone to help 
the Italians fight against the English), and threatening 
Syria and Lebanon, Darlan was ready to make concessions. 
Leahy reported to Washington that the trend of French policy 
was toward greater collaboration. Even the people outside of 
the ''small but influential collaborationist circle" 
anticipated a German victory. Many believed that the French, 
by helping the Germans now, could obtain more generous peace 
terms later. (47) As mentioned earlier, Darlan by the Paris 
Protocols of May had offered bases in Syria and North 
Africa, including facilities in Tunisia, to the Germans. 
Petain even announced closer collaboration with Hitler in a 
radio broadcast. (48) Leahy wrote that it was evident that 
the Marshal was "going the full distance in collaboration 
with Hitler." (49) Leahy thought that the only way to keep 
France from complete control by Germany was a "definite 
setback to the German program by application of superior 
force to some important point and before it was too 
late." (50) He wrote, "Today the vulnerable spot is North 
Africa." (51) 
In response to Darlan's collaborationist policy, 
President Roosevelt said in a radio address he could 
hardly believe that the present government 
of France could be brought to lend itself 
to a plan of voluntary alliance implied or 
otherwise which would apparently deliver up 
France and its colonial Empire. (52) 
In a letter to Leahy, Roosevelt wrote 
the efforts of Admiral Darlan and others of 
the Government to increase collaboration 
with Germany has [sic] definitely compromised 
our program of assistance to France. (53) 
He added that flour shipments would stop unless there was 
a "positive resistance to German demands." (54) 
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Because of Weygand's resistance, the Paris protocols 
were not put into effect. Weygand flew to Paris in June for 
a meeting in which he took a firm stand against any further 
collaboration. He insisted on the maintenance of the status 
quo in North Africa, resistance to any foreign penetration 
there, and no action against the de Gaulle forces in North 
Africa. He was backed in his position by Admiral Esteva, the 
Resident General of Tunisia, who had also flown to Paris for 
the meeting. Afterwards it was rumored in Tunisia, according 
to the American consul there, that Esteva might be replaced 
because he had backed Weygand. (55) 
Darlan was now becoming impatient with Weygand. He 
felt Weygand was pushing North Africa, with American 
encouragement, toward increasing independence from Vichy. 
Darlan feared that Weygand's premature dealings with the 
United States would result in a German occupation of French 
North Africa. By November Darlan succeeded in having Weygand 
recalled. German pressure may have played a part. The 
Germans were suspicious of Weygand's contacts with the 
Americans and they may have known about a remark Weygand had 
made while having lunch with Pe1tain and others at Vichy of 
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his wish to see the Germans beaten by the Russians. (56) 
Because of Weygand's recall, the United States 
seriously considered stopping its aid. Leahy considered the 
"jelly fish" reaction of the Pjtain government justification 
for stopping all assistance to France as well as his own 
recall. Weygand urged that it be continued, however, 
telling Murphy that nothing had changed in French policy by 
his departure. (57) Weygand thought the aid program gave 
France the opportunity to have an economic and political 
relation with the United States, which he believed would be 
an arbiter at the end of the war. If Germany could penetrate 
French North Africa, it would be able to inflict its will 
upon France "without the possibility of a reaction." (58) 
Murphy too thought that cancellation of the accord 
would deprive the United States of advantages such as 
maintaining representatives in the area. Murphy tried to 
persuade the State Department there were many other 
Frenchmen in North Africa with whom he could work. P/tain 
assured Roosevelt that Weygand's departure had not changed 
French policy. 
What saved the supply program was the Japanese attack 
on Pearl Harbor and the entry of the United States in the 
war. When Churchill came to Washington at Christmas to 
discuss strategy with Roosevelt, the idea of attacking North 
Africa was seriously considered. At that time it was feared 
that Hitler might attempt to strike at North Africa through 
Spain or attempt to use Tunisia to supply General Erwin 
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Rommel's troops, which were then on the defensive in Libya. 
An allied invasion would forestall this possibility as well 
as relieve the pressure on the British in Egypt. In fact 
Roosevelt and Churchill decided to approach Weygand, now in 
retirement, to see if he would return to North Africa 
secretly to rally the French Army to the side of an Anglo-
American expeditionary force they hoped to send there. Out 
of loyalty to P/tain, Weygand refused. 
As already pointed out, de Gaulle was not considered 
to take the leadership in North Africa against the Germans 
because of the anti-de Gaullist sentiment there. But there 
were other reasons as well. The Free French movement 
appeared to be in a state of confusion. While they had an 
informal representation in the United States, they were not 
joined by many prominent Frenchmen such as Mencfes-France 
living in the United States and some of the French in 
America backed Pitain. According to William Donovan, the 
whole Free French movement was in a ''deplorable condition" 
and he suggested that Roosevelt discuss with Churchill the 
idea of getting another leader out of France such as Edouard 
Herriot to take it over. (59) If on December 23, when 
Donovan wrote his memo, he questioned de Gaulle's leadership 
ability, events of December 24 would cause Roosevelt and 
Hull to distrust it from then on. 
While Roosevelt and Churchill were celebratng 
Christmas eve, the Free French forces under Admiral /mile 
Musilier took over the French islands of St. Pierre and 
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Miquelon off Newfoundland. St. Pierre was of concern because 
of its wireless transmitting station. Both Canada and the 
United States had been discussing what to do to keep it from 
enemy hands, when de Gaulle occupied it without consulting 
the American government. Muselier, who carried out de 
Gaulle's order, told the American consul on St. Pierre that 
de Gaulle's order was that of a dictator and he was sure 
that he had not even consulted the Free French at London. 
While Muselier would see the action through, he planned to 
resign on his return to London as a protest against the 
unilateral order given by de Gaulle. (60) From this time on 
Roosevelt and Hull worried about de Gaulle's dictatorial 
tendencies. At the time Hull feared de Gaulle's actions 
would jeopardize the whole Vichy policy "which we have been 
nursing for a considerable period." (61) Leahy cabled that 
Darlan was saying that the Germans would use it as an excuse 
to move troops into Africa to protect it from similar 
invasions. (62) 
While Hull worried about the effects the St. Pierre 
and Miquelon incident would have on the Vichy policy, other 
Americans now questioned this policy. Hull in his fury 
referred to the "so called Free French." The press, of 
course, picked up this remark and raised questions about the 
Vichy policy. Because of Hull's intense antipathy toward de 
Gaulle, he lost support both from the American people and 
his own president. The public were now concerned about the 
State Department's ready acceptance of Vichy. (63) Roosevelt 
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increasingly became his own secretary of state and 
eliminated Hull from important French matters. In North 
Africa he relied on Robert Murphy as his personal emissary. 
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Although plans for a North African invasion had been 
set aside in December 1941, the United States still had a 
keen interest in North Africa. Two vice-consuls destined for 
Tunisia would arrive by the spring of that year. They would 
discover a country that in the midst of centuries of foreign 
domination had known periods of independence. Though Tunisia 
had lost this independence when it became a French 
protectorate in 1881, it was not long before a nationalist 
movement aroused hopes for renewed autonomy. Since 
theoretically a protectorate was an independent regency 
under French protection rather than a colony, the 
nationalists were complaining that the French had made 
Tunisia a colony under the guise of a protectorate. After 
the French debacle of 1940, a new Bey, who came to power in 
1942 and identified with the nationalists, had dared to ask 
the French for Tunisian autonomy as laid out in the original 
Treaty of Bardo. While the French were desperately clinging 
to what remnants they had left of their own past glory, the 
Bey was attempting to capitalize on French weakness to 




The Tunisian nationalists could look back on a rich 
and interesting history. Tunisia, originally inhabited by 
Berbers, knew many invaders starting with the Phoenicians, 
who settled along the coast and founded the important 
trading city of Carthage. The Romans followed the 
Phoenicians and made Tunisia a province in 146 B.C. Tunisia, 
rich in wheat, olive oil, and minerals, was a prosperous 
part of the Empire. Carthage became the second city of the 
Latin part of the Empire and with men such as Augustine 
played an important part in the history of Latin 
Christianity. From Roman times, Tunisia has existed as a 
self-conscious cultural unit and has differentiated itself 
from the surrounding regions. 
With the Arab invasions of the seventh century the 
Latin language and Christian faith disappeared. The Berbers 
of the mountains, who had never really been Christianized or 
Latinized, accepted the Moslems. Following the Moslem 
conquest, Tunisia was dominated at different times by 
Norman, Moroccan, Spanish, and Turkish rulers. The Turks 
arrived in 1525 and ruled in the name of the Ottoman Empire, 
but were too weak to maintain real control after 1600. By 
1705 Tunisia was virtually independent under hereditary 
regents from whom the Beys of the World War II period were 
descended. (1) 
Under the early Beys Tunis had a reputation for 
turning its head when pirate ships came into the harbor. 
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Though the European powers occasionally managed to check 
piracy by treaty, piracy continued until the nineteenth 
century and provided public revenue for Tunis. During that 
century, the Tunisian people won reforms from the Bey and in 
1861 he gave them a Constitution, though by 1864 it was 
suspended. 
In the scramble for colonies by the European powers 
in the nineteenth century, both the Italians and French 
wanted Tunisia. There were actually more Italian settlers 
there than French, but at the Congress of Berlin in 1878 
Great Britain and Germany agreed to concede Tunisia to 
France. Great Britain had been willing to give France a 
"free hand" in Tunisia in exchange for French acquiescence 
to British annexation of Cyprus. Germany under Chancellor 
Otto von Bismarck saw in France's interest in Tunisia a way 
of taking its recently defeated neighbor's mind off revenge. 
The British Ambassador in Berlin expressed the Chancellor's 
attitude: 
He is in great spirits since the French have gone 
into the Tunis trap, which he baited for them 
during the Congress, and chuckles over the 
security Germany will enjoy from a diminished 
Army in France with increased occupation in 
Africa. ( 2) 
Under the pretext of punishing some native tribes in 
1881, a French force crossed the Algerian frontier, advanced 
toward the capital, Tunis, and forced the Bey to accept the 
French protectorate. The Treaty of Bardo was signed May 12 f 
1881. While this treaty maintained the nominal sovereignty 
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of the Bey, the Treaty of Marsa of 1883 did away with any 
real Tunisian independence. French rule steadily encroached 
on native power. 
The Italians felt Bismarck had slighted them by 
awarding Tunisia to the French. Nevertheless, they retained 
the special privileges the Bey had granted them in the form 
of capitulatory rights in 1868. They could hold Italian 
citizenship, maintain their own schools and practice all 
professions without the benefit of a French diploma. (3) 
Under the protectorate Tunisia was administered by a 
French and a Tunisian section. The French section was 
headed by a Resident General who exercised supreme control 
over the Protectorate's administrative services. He served 
as Foreign Minister and as president of a Council of 
Ministers which included three Tunisians. The Resident 
General was assisted by a French delegate, a French military 
cabinet and a French civil cabinet. For administrative 
purposes Tunisia was divided into five regions, each of 
which was further subdivided into nineteen controles civils, 
each administered by a French controleur. (4) 
The Tunisian section of the government was headed by 
the Bey. Assisting him were three native ministers: a Prime 
Minister aided by a French Director General of the Interior; 
a Minister of Justice aided by a French Director of Tunisian 
Justice, and a Minister of the Pen. Administratively Tunisia 
was divided into thirty six caidats under native caids who 
held administrative, judicial and financial powers. Each 
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caidat was subdivided into shaykhates, 604 in all, each 
under the authority of a shaikh. The Grand Council which 
voted the budget consisted of both a French and Tunisian 
section. ( 5) 
Authority ultimately lay with the French; the Bey had 
become in effect a puppet. All decrees of the Bey had to be 
promulgated by the Resident General who also prepared the 
Beylical decrees. As French historian Charles-Andr/ Julien 
put it: 
In Tunisia, however, the higher French 
officials have gradually substituted their own 
authority for that of the Tunisian ministers 
while the controleurs civils have absorbed the 
power of the ca1ds and the French gendarmerie 
has replaced the native spahis. (6) 
In spite of the fact that the Bey had become a French 
puppet, Tunisian allegiance was to the Bey. 
Until 1912 Tunisia was the quietest country in North 
Africa. The Moslem leaders of the religious community, known 
as the Old Turbans, followed a policy of cooperation with 
the French. This changed in 1912 when Abd el-Aziz Tha'alibi 
founded the Young Tunisians. Modeled after the Young Turks 
and influenced by western liberalism, they called for an 
extension of rights and liberties equal to those of 
Europeans. They were opposed by the Old Turbans until 1919 
when the French wanted to use some habous (religious) land 
for colonization. The Old Turbans opposed this and 
reconciled themselves with the Young Tunisians. (7) 
In 1919 a delegation of Young Tunisians and Old 
Turbans presented their claims at the Paris Peace 
43 
Conference. Their hopes had been raised by Woodrow Wilson's 
ideas of self-determination for all peoples. They were 
bitterly disappointed when they met an unyielding attitude 
on the part of Georges Clemenceau. ( 8) 
Under Shaikh Tha'alabi the Destour (meaning 
constitution) Party was founded in 1920 calling for a 
constitution under which the Bey and his dynasty would 
retain leadership of the country. By 1922 tension between 
Naceur Bey, who supported the Destour program, and the 
French came to a head when the Bey threatened to resign 
unless the Destour demands were met by the French. While the 
French granted some reforms, the Destour were not satisfied. 
With the failure of the French to meet their demands Shaikh 
Tha'alibi went into exile. The French then began repressive 
measures. The discouraged Destourians calmed down their 
activities and waited for a more favorable climate, which 
came in the thirties. ( 9) 
Led by Habib Bourguiba, a lawyer, and Mahmoud Materi, 
a doctor, a group of young nationalists broke away from the 
Destour and began a new party, the Neo-Destour, in 1934 
which was more militant and had broader appeal. Bourguiba 
insisted that only continual pressure would make France give 
up Tunisia. Whereas the older Destour was aristocratic and 
upper middle class in its outlook, the Neo-Destour was a 
liberal constitutionalist group whose leadership thought it 
important to integrate the masses into the party. The 
Neo-Destour were successful in winning public support. The 
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French responded to increased Neo-Destourian activity by 
sending Bourguiba and Materi into exile in the Sahara in 
1934. (10) 
When the Popular Front came to power in 1936, it was 
more tolerant of nationalist aspirations and Bourguiba and 
Materi were allowed to return. By 1937 the Neo-Destour had 
gained ascendancy over the Destour and Bourguiba took the 
opportunity to organize a campaign which sought to obtain 
Tunisian independence through negotiation and persuasion 
while also maintaining friendly relations with France. 
Premier Leon Blum's promise of independence to Syria had 
raised the hopes of the Tunisians. When the Popular Front 
fell, the French policy stiffened causing Bourguiba to begin 
a campaign of civil disobedience. Demonstrations and riots 
followed. On April 29, 1938 the French killed 122 
demonstrators. Both the Destour and the Neo-Destour were 
banned while Bourguiba was arrested and sent to prison in 
Marseille. (11) 
Though the Neo-Destour's leader was in prison, it, 
along with the Destour, continued to be the focus for 
nationalist ambitions. The success of the Neo-Destour in 
winning mass support has been attributed in part to the 
homogeneity of the Tunisian society. According to Carl Leon 
Brown, as far back as pre-Protectorate days 
. Tunisia was blessed with a relatively 
homogenous population with a long tradition 
of living together and of considering itself 
a single society. There was one national 
language, Arabic (only a few thousand Berber-
speaking inhabitants remained at this time), 
and except for a fairly well integrated Jewish 
community, a single national religion, Islam. 
Furthermore, Tunisian Moslems ... were not 
split into opposing sects; nearly all Tunisian 
Moslems belonged to the orthodox Sunni 
community. (12) 
At the time of World War II ninety percent of the 
population was Moslem out of a total population of just 
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under 2,500,000. While the Moslems were predominantly Berber 
mixed with Arab, only one percent spoke Berber. There were 
60,000 Jews, mainly Tunisian, but with a few European 
refugees. The Jewish community had long been a part of 
Tunisian society. Though religiously separated, they were 
quite close to the Moslem majority, playing an important 
role in the economic life of the country. Of the Europeans 
there were about 108,000 French, roughly the same number of 
Italians, and a smattering of Maltese, Greeks, and 
Spaniards. ( 13) 
The make up of the population played an important 
role in political and economic affairs. The economic 
structure tended to divide along ethnic lines. Agriculture 
was the principal means of subsistence and most of the 
Moslems were involved in agriculture either as workers or as 
the owners of the largest percentage of the approximately 
19,000,000 olive trees in Tunisia. While Moslerns owned some 
vineyards, they were primarily in the hands of the French 
and Italians. In general the Europeans were the owners of 
the large, modernized farms. In the northern region the 
French owned over ninety percent of the European-owned land. 
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In contrast to the French immigrants who went to 
Algeria and were roughly a cross section of the French 
population, those who went to Tunisia were a more favored 
group, partly because French immigrants in the nineteenth 
century were required to buy some land. Frenchmen were also 
merchants and held most of the goverment posts. The 
Italians, who came mainly from Sicily and Sardinia, worked 
as miners, masons, agricultural workers, and artisans. While 
they were also the owners of small vineyards, generally they 
were quite poor. Tunisian Jews were primarily in 
merchandising and in skilled labor with a small percentage 
in the professions. 
Except for the mining of phosphates, there was very 
little industry. It was said that the French discouraged 
native industry to avoid competition with the mother 
country. On the whole the economy was developed by and for 
the French. Where the traditional peasant agriculture had 
been self-sufficient, the colonial economy was oriented 
toward producing raw materials for the French and consuming 
the products of French industry. The Tunisians played a 
subservient role in the development. "Tunisians were like 
guests in their own houses." (14) 
Despite the hornogenous population, there were some 
underlying tensions between the different groups, which were 
exacerbated by the war. The French, as the colonizers, were 
disliked by the Tunisians. The Tunisians resented the 
Italians too because as manual workers they tended to take 
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jobs from them. As for the Jews there was some anti-Jewish 
bias which, according to Carl Brown, may have stemmed partly 
from the fact that the Jews tended to assimilate the French 
language and culture faster than the Tunisians and even 
desired to become part of the French community instead of 
being under beylical authority. (15) 
With the outbreak of the war, the French were in a 
more vulnerable position. The Tunisians, seeing that the 
French had been beaten, had hope for their own independence. 
But bad as the French were, the Tunisians preferred them to 
the Italians, whom they knew had designs on Tunisia. They 
also knew that the Italians treated the Libyans poorly. The 
kind of racial discrimation against the Jews introduced by 
the Vichy government during the war was quite alien to the 
Tunisians and was violently objected to by the Bey. In fact 
carrying out the policy was a job that even the French 
Resident General disliked and one that caused him 
difficulties with the Tunisians. 
Under the Vichy regime the French administration in 
Tunisia became more authoritarian. Masonic lodges were 
forbidden while the press, radio, and publc meetings were 
prohibited for the Tunisians. Official discrimination 
against the Jews in Tunisia started with the Vichy 
anti-Jewish statue of November 30, 1940, which excluded them 
from the teaching professions, all liberal professions, and 
from the publishing and film industries. Sequestration of 
Jewish property was authorized and registration of all Jews 
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was required. They were forbidden to own any property except 
that in which they lived and were prohibited from collecting 
debts. Jewish doctors and lawyers were limited in their 
practice. ( 16) 
The man who was responsible for enforcing these new 
laws was Admiral Jean Pierre Esteva, who had been appointed 
Resident General because of his naval connections with 
Admiral Darlan, and had arrived in Tunis in July 1940. Soon 
after his arrival Esteva made a radio address in which he 
pointed out his wish for a "rebirth of the concept of 
family." (17) Besides promoting Pe{ain's ideas, he 
replaced a great many bureaucrats, but not all because, as 
he wrote Darlan, recruiting locally was difficult. (18) 
As for the Jews, Esteva appeared to want to convince 
Vichy that he was doing his best to follow its orders 
while at the same time going slowly in carrying out those 
orders so as not to upset the Tunisian population. Esteva 
convoked the Jewish community and informed them that he 
wanted to end abuses such as "usury, unwholesome speculation 
and hoarding". (19) Starting in 1940 a certain number of 
Jews had their merchandise confiscated and sold for the 
profit of the state. Esteva also fined them substantially. 
Writing to reassure Darlan, Esteva reported that his 
repression against the Jews had not ceased, but that it was 
important to recognize that since time immemorial Tunisia 
had lived thanks only to the Jews. During World War I 
supplies had been assured only because of their 
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intervention. Since the non-Jews were not always honest or 
capable, Esteva had had to tolerate Jewish trading. Esteva 
feared that, if he suppressed all the Jews, other 
individuals would replace them who would be without scruples 
and "who would skin their contemporaries." Further 
we musn't forget that when the Moslems are 
on good terms with the Jews which often 
happens, the Moslems don't hesitate to tell 
the Jews that the persecution comes from us 
and from the Germans and that for them 
they desire to live in harmony with their 
Jewish brothers. (20) 
Esteva recommended that the French act with firmness toward 
the Jews, but not fall into systematic and blind 
persecution. (21) 
It was into this situation of overt harmony and 
latent antagonisms that Hooker Doolittle came when he 
arrived in Tunis in the spring of 1941 as the American 
Consul General. Doolittle, a native of New York state and a 
graduate of Cornell University, had gone into the foreign 
service after a brief stint in business. His first post was 
in Tiflis in Russian Georgia. There he met his wife, 
Victoria, the daughter of a Russian army officer. 
Before his assignment in Tunisia, Doolittle had served in 
Morocco and knew both Arabic and French. 
The vice-consuls, John Utter and Harry Woodruff, also 
arrived in the spring of 1941. They were responsible for 
verifying the employment of the merchandise received from 
America, assuring that it was used in the Regency and not 
sent to France or Tripolitania. According to Esteva, they 
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were often seen at the ports or talking with a certain 
number of bureaucrats or circulating in the country. On 
their observation trips into the Tunisian countryside, they 
found that the natives were desperately poor. There was a 
serious shortage of both food and clothing. Doolittle, who 
sometimes accompanied the vice-consuls, wrote that "most 
Arabs did not ever get a really good meal" and because of 
the lack of cloth, they were "miserably clad." (22) In the 
area that Doolittle visited, the Tunisians had gone to the 
office of the caid to obtain releases for purchases of small 
consignments of American cotton goods which had just been 
received. 
Esteva himself was keenly aware of the need for 
clothing. Tunisian authorities as well as the colons were 
coming to him to tell him that the women and children in the 
country lacked clothes and were practically nude. On his own 
trips into the countryside, he had seen men and children 
dressed in rags while the women hid refusing, out of 
modesty, to go out except at night. In writing Darlan, he 
said they needed millions of tons of cotton goods and not 
the two or three hundred tons that arrived from America or 
France. (23) 
Doolittle and the vice-consuls noted the Tunisian 
contempt for the Italians. They found that it was due partly 
to the fact that Italian workers who migrated to Tunisia 
were hard working and desperately poor. While French 
immigrants tended to create enterprises which employed 
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natives, Italians displaced native labor by doing the same 
work and doing it more effectively. 
Doolittle and the vice-consuls also noted the 
Tunisian dislike of the French. As Woodruff wrote, "They are 
the conquerors and as such have incurred a constant 
underlying hostility." (24) Doolittle found that 
"the mainspring of Arab psychology is their anti-French 
feeling." (25) Throughout the Protectorate the Tunisians 
stressed to the consul and vice-consuls the need for 
independence or greater self-government. The Tunisians 
resented not being able to develop their own industries 
because of pressure from French manufactures. They also 
resented not having positions in the administration as well 
as the fact that the French bureaucrats were "mostly 
mediocre'' and often "enriched themselves while in 
service." (26) While the French were aware of the discontent 
and had attempted to placate the Tunisians in minor ways, 
Doolittle found 
they fail to get to the crux of the matter 
which is the complete subservience of the Arab 
population to their French masters and the 
resolute exclusion of all Arabs from any 
economic and political life of the country. (27) 
Further 
The so-called Tunisian or Beylical Government 
with its 'Possessor of the Kingdom', Ministers, 
Caids, and Cadis [Islamic Judge], each of 
which has a French controller at his side to 
divide the profits derived from spoliation of 
the 'fellah' is a complete mockery and is only 
permitted to exist as window-dressing and such 
weight it may have in deluding the masses of the 
people. That this delusion fails to delude is 
apparent from the contemptuous manner in which 
nearly all Arabs, high and low, refer to their 
'Sovereign Prince' and his satellites. (28) 
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Considering the Tunisian discontent with the French, 
it was not surprising that German war propaganda was having 
its effect on them. Because the Germans had conquered the 
French, the Tunisians were receptive to what they said. 
Radio Ankara also influenced the Tunisians. When Radio 
Ankara was pro-German, the Tunisians felt that way and when 
Ankara swung toward Britain they followed. Doolittle thought 
the British radio might counteract this German propaganda by 
letting it be known that Britain intended, if such 
intentions existed, to help the Tunisian people obtain their 
independence. Doolittle realized this might be political 
dynamite but believed it was a question which needed to be 
confronted some time or other. Of course, the British had 
no such intention. Not only would the British evade this 
question, but, as it would turn out, so would Doolittle's 
own government. 
At that time Doolittle and the consuls found American 
prestige high among the French and Tunisians. Both groups 
wanted more information about American aid. Because of Axis 
jamming of foreign radio stations, they were not getting the 
facts about aid. Vice-Consul Utter thought that the Tunisian 
population should know what the United States was doing and 
that it was solicitous of their welfare. The consul and 
vice-consuls emphasized the value of American 
representation. Of all the powers the United States enjoyed 
the greatest prestige in the Near East because the Tunisians 
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believed the United States had no political aspirations and 
was the only disinterested power to which they could turn. 
Doolittle thought the implications of this position were so 
great that serious consideration should be given to 
developing American connections in the Middle East. (29) 
In an effort to develop connections with the French 
army officers, Doolittle and the vice-consuls had invited 
many of them and their families to consular functions. 
Disturbed by this, Esteva wrote to both Weygand and Darlan 
asking that officers be forbidden from accepting these 
invitations. Esteva thought this was necessary "to remedy 
the inconveniences which could result from French officers 
having contact with members of the American consular 
corps." (30) Since the United States had not entered the war 
at this point, Esteva must have feared that the Americans 
might undermine Vichy authority. 
Though Doolittle was not especially impressed with the 
nationalists when he first arrived, he gradually came to 
have many contacts with them. As time went by he became an 
advocate of their cause. His despatches tended to refer 
often to the Tunisians and nationalists and less frequently 
to the French. When he did mention the latter, it was often 
disparagingly. 
If Esteva and the French administration did not want 
French officers to have contacts with Americans, they wanted 
even less for Tunisians to have contacts with them. For 
this reason Doolittle did as thorough an investisation of 
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the strength of the Neo-Destour as possible "without 
arousing too much interest in French administrative 
circles." (31) He found that there was little cohesion among 
party members except for the general anti-French resentment. 
Because Bourguiba and the principal leaders of the party 
were still in prison in Marseille, the head of this movement 
was "apparently effectively lopped off.'' (32) Bourguiba's 
lieutenants who were still free were finding it hard to 
agree among themselves. Nevertheless, the party still had 
many adherents organized into what the French settlers 
referred to as "cells". The Neo-Destour put pressure on the 
Tunisians to join the party. Various methods were used such 
as refusing to marry or bury them until the proposed member 
signed on the dotted line. (33) 
Doolittle learned that the Neo-Destour had split from 
the Destour because of the latter's growing conservatism. 
The Neo-Destour was composed primarily of younger men 
without much previous standing or wealth. They "wish to 
sweep away all the old fogies now blocking their route to 
power and glory." (34) Doolittle thought "they would 
cooperate gladly with any power other than the Italians who 
wanted to take a crack at their French masters." (35) Some 
of the party members had expressed the wish for American 
assistance and guidance, but judging by the past history of 
the country, Doolittle thought the Tunisians would tire "of 
even the most disinterested assistance which tried to 
instill a really efficient and honest administration." (36) 
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Doolittle's assessment of the Neo-Destour was that they 
"represented no political value," were "a source of 
trouble," and had little future as a ''democratic 
parliamentarian movement." (37) Doolittle's assessment would 
prove to be quite wrong for the Neo-Destour would be the 
party that in the future led the country to independence. 
The old Tunisian families, who tended to belong to 
the Destour, feared the loss of their privileges with the 
rise of the Neo-Destour. For these families, who before the 
French protectorate were similar to a feudal aristocracy, 
furnished the protectorate with most of the high Tunisian 
dignitaries, including caids and shaiks, allowed to exercise 
administrative functions. 
The leader of the Destour, Shaikh Tha'alibi, requested 
an interview with Doolittle in October 1941. Doolittle, who 
went to his home, described Tha'albi as a "magnificent ruin 
of a man about sixty years of age." (38) The Shaikh told 
Doolittle that the Tunisians were now convinced that a 
British victory was inevitable in the war. They had 
concluded this because of the German invasion of Russia 
among other things. Originally they had believed that 
Germany would definitely win, but the Russian campaign which 
seemed to be going nowhere fast, as well as the visibly 
growing strength of the British as relayed by Tunisian 
sources in the Near East, had caused a great change in 
thinking. Doolittle found it significant that this was an 
"apparent change of heart away from the pro-German attitude 
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reported by all observers in May and June to the pro-British 
sympathy now manifested." (39) 
The Shaikh's purpose in wanting to see Doolittle was 
to put before the governments of the United States and 
Britain the plight of the Tunisians and learn how they could 
help in hastening the British victory as well as to find out 
what support the Tunisians could expect at the peace 
settlement in their goal of independence or at least more 
autonomy in administering their own country. (40) 
The Shaikh said they had been approached by the de 
Gaulle forces, but had refused to see them as this would 
mean exchanging one group of Frenchmen for another. The 
Destour would prefer first an American protectorate and 
secondly a British and finally continuation of French rule 
if it could be drastically modified in its purpose and 
manner. Since this resembled too closely a conspiracy, 
Doolittle indicated this was out of the question. Besides, 
the United States had no political ambitions in foreign 
countries. Nor would he or the American government consider 
steps against the French. Doolittle suggested that the 
Tunisians settle their differences with the French and at 
the same time educate their young men to take their place in 
a modern world they hoped to occupy. The Shaikh said they 
had tried to come to an agreement with the French for a 
greater share of the administration of the country and in 
return the leaders had been exiled. Furthermore, there was 
no chance of their young men being given facilities for 
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obtaining an education. (41) 
World War II set in motion with renewed vigor the 
longings for independence in Tunisia as well as many other 
countries under colonial domination. It was a force that the 
French tried desperately to stem. The predicament for the 
Americans was how to keep the friendship of the French 
without turning their backs on legitimate Tunisian 
aspirations. The predicament soon caused serious differences 
among the American diplomats. 
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With the United States officially in the war, 
Doolittle took a more active role in assisting the war 
effort and counteracting the Germans. Whereas he had been 
primarily an observer of the Tunisian nationalists in 1941, 
he now saw them as potentially useful allies and was more 
receptive to their proposals. His ideas of working with the 
Tunisians were forwarded from the State Department to 
Donovan, who looked upon them favorably, but they brought 
Doolittle into head-on conflict with Robert Murphy. 
Differences about working with the Tunisians existed not 
only between Murphy and Doolittle, but between the State 
Department and the Coordinator of Information (later OSS). 
The COI was interested in working with the North Africans 
while the State Department was afraid of upsetting the 
French. 
In the winter of 1942 Darlan's policy of 
collaboration was particularly noticeable in Tunisia. In 
December 1941 Darlan had concluded an agreement with the 
Axis powers at Turin to ship five hundred tons a day of Axis 
material on French ships from Marseille to Tunis and across 
Tunisia to General Erwin Rommel's forces in Libya. In 
62 
exchange the Italians had promised to urge the Germans to 
release French prisoners and to move the line separating 
occupied and unoccupied France northward. (1) Leahy, who had 
learned about this from an informer, questioned Darlan about 
the shipments. Darlan admitted that he had agreed to permit 
two hundred tons of supplies each week and a total of five 
hundred Italian motor trucks to be shipped in French vessels 
to Tunis in order to keep the Germans from seizing 
Bizerte. (2) Vice-Consuls Utter and Woodruff on trips out of 
Tunis reported that used Italian trucks were going from 
Tunis to Gabes to be forwarded to Libya. Gasoline from 
Algeria was also being sent to Libya where it was 
transferred to German and Italian tank trucks. (3) Moreover, 
the Resident General was requisitioning supplies from the 
local Tunisians to be sent to Libya. 
While the Americans were upset about these supplies 
to Libya, Esteva in his despatches showed his disquiet at 
the Americans' knowledge of them. He wrote Darlan that 
everyone had seen trucks of a "particular color" carrying 
gasoline from Algeria and Northwest Tunisia toward Gabes. 
There were numerous trucks and a great deal of unaccustomed 
movement. The witnesses of these transports were making 
comments which were being spread around and which nobody had 
the power to stop. (4) Furthermore, Esteva told Darlan that 
sending supplies to Libya was causing serious discontent 
among the Tunisians. ( 5) 
In Washington Assistant Secretary of State, Sumner 
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Welles, protested to the French Ambassador that this was the 
most serious situation which had arisen between the two 
governments and if not checked, a friendly United States 
policy toward Vichy would not continue. (6) Roosevelt 
threatened to recall Leahy for counsel unless assurances 
were given that no military aid would go to the Axis and 
that French ships would not be sent to aid in Axis acts of 
aggression. When the assurances requested were not 
forthcoming, Leahy thought he should be called home and he 
was instructed to that effect, but then Roosevelt decided 
that he should stay writing: 
Not only is our presence in France and 
North Africa the last bridgehead to Europe 
but it likewise helps to hold the Iberian 
Peninsula in 1 ine. ( 7) 
The United States, however, stopped aid to French North 
Africa until March when Darlan finally assured Roosevelt 
that he had stopped shipments with the exception of food 
supplies and trucks which would shortly be delivered. For 
his part, Esteva, calling on Robert Murphy on his way to 
Vichy, reassured him that the supplies going to Libya via 
Tunisia were not important and urged friendly cooperation 
between France and the United States. ( 8) 
By this time Colonel William Eddy, the recently 
appointed representative of the Coordinator of Information 
(C.O.I.), was in Tangier under the cover of naval attach~ 
Born in Syria of missionary parents, he had served as head 
of the English Department of Cairo University and spoke 
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Arabic fluently. Eddy worked with the C.O.I. recruits as 
well as with Murphy, Doolittle, and the vice-consuls, some 
of whom were also C.O.I. staff members. 
In French North Africa Eddy was to make French and 
North African contacts who could gather intelligence if 
United States representatives should have to leave the area. 
He was also to supply resistance groups which would operate 
by sabotage as well as by organized armed resistance. Eddy 
found that there was already a well organized resistance 
group in Algeria, a smaller one in Morocco, and various 
sabotage and guerrilla groups in Tunisia, though no 
organized military resistance. (9) 
In talking with the Tunisian leaders, Doolittle 
was pursuing the kind of activity that was being done in 
Morocco by the C.O.I. representatives, Gordon Browne and 
Carleton Coon. These two had spent time among the Riffians, 
Berbers living in the Rif mountains of northern Morocco. 
When Coon, an anthropology professor at Harvard, was 
recruited by the C.O.I. in November 1941, his interviewers 
told him that the Germans planned to drive through Spain 
from Vichy France and then to conquer Morocco, reinforcing 
Rommel and taking over the whole Middle East. A "rejuvenated 
Riffian army", recovering from the humiliation of their lost 
independence in 1926, might check this advance. Coon's 
diplomatic cover was as assistant to the American consul in 
Tangier, J. Rives Childs. He and Browne, another C.O.I. man, 
who had been appointed vice-consul, worked with the Riffian 
leaders to set up a resistance. C.O.I. agents worked in 
North Africa independently of the State Department even 
though they often had diplomatic cover as assistants or 
vice-consuls. Most of the time the Consular Corps did not 
know what the C.O.I. was doing. 
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Doolittle, who had been asked by Shaikh Tha'alibi in 
October 1941 about setting up an autonomous state under 
American or British protection, was approached again by 
Tunisian leaders. With the United States now in the war they 
must have considered it a favorable time to discuss the idea 
of driving out the French. If their services were of 
interest and if they were given arms, they would fight 
against the Axis. They would also encourage pro-United 
Nations sentiment among the Tunisians. In exchange they 
wanted a guarantee of independence and gave Doolittle a copy 
of a plan of the kind of government they hoped for. Should 
the United States accept their offer, he thought their 
organization could provide some twenty-five thousand 
men. {851S.00/199) 
Though Doolittle reported that these conversations 
with the Tunisians had "reached an interesting stage," they 
were already beginning to back away. Their interest in 
helping the United Nations depended on how the British 
forces were doing in Libya. British losses in January of 
1942 and British inability to hold Rommel's army were 
causing the Tunisians to lose esteem for the British and to 
withdraw from "the basis of understanding" Doolittle was 
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reaching with them. {11) 
As for as the French, Doolittle found their policy a 
mystery. Although they privately expressed pro-United 
Nations sentiments, every public act was positively 
pro-Axis. He had concluded that no help could be expected 
from the French. While support for the Tunisian cause would 
mean breaking with the French, the sympathy it would 
generate for the United States in the Islamic world would be 
great. ( 12) 
In February Doolittle went to Tangier to discuss with 
Eddy ways of stopping the Axis shipments to Libya. On his 
return he wrote Eddy that the protests and publicity by 
British and American radio must have had their effect as he 
had learned that Vichy had stopped the shipments destined 
for Libya by way of Tunisia. He had also learned that five 
ships due to arrive had been cancelled. According to a 
friend in the local French government, Vichy had ordered 
this traffic stopped. 
Doolittle suggested enlisting the cooperation of the 
Tunisians to stop shipments to Libya of goods originating in 
Tunisia. He proposed a scheme to bribe members of the Bey's 
family so they would depose the Bey's pro-French Prime 
Minister and replace him with a pro-American and pro-British 
one. ( 13) 
To understand how this would work, Doolittle described 
to Eddy the political set up. The Bey had a French Resident 
General as his counselor and Minister of Foreign Affairs. 
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Laws and decrees were prepared by the Resident General and 
presented to the Bey for his signature before they were put 
into effect. Usually these laws were given to the Bey on 
Thursday and promulgated the next day. This allowed no time 
for the Bey to consider. Technically the Bey's Prime 
Minister should have the time to counsel him about which 
bills to sign. 
Doolittle proposed bribing members of the Bey's family 
to influence him to change Prime Ministers. Doolittle 
believed that the new Prime Minister could advise the Bey to 
wait a week before signing the laws and decress. During that 
week Doolittle then expected the Bey's family to convince 
him to withhold his signature from decrees harmful to the 
United Nations. In particular, this method could be used to 
stop a great deal of the supplies going to Libya "as it 
would be impossible to gouge them out of the local Tunisian 
producers without the Bey's assent." (14) 
While Eddy received approval from Donovan and wrote 
Doolittle that $25,000 had been made available for the 
"palace revolution," Murphy and the State Department lost no 
time in squelching it. Murphy wrote Doolittle that he didn't 
believe he had authorization from the American government 
for pursuing these talks with the Tunisians. Furthermore, he 
thought the French knew about them and, if he continued 
them, might ask for his recall. (15) 
In writing to Wallace Murray, Chief of the Division of 
Near Eastern Affairs, about this scheme as well as about 
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Doolittle's earlier letter recounting his talk with Tunisian 
leaders, Murphy noted that Doolittle had "become sold on the 
notion that it is possible to build up in North Africa an 
Arab movement, antagonistic to the French, which could be 
useful to the Allied cause." (16) 
As Murphy understood it, United States policy was to 
be mainly concerned with winning over the French military 
and civilians so that they might possibly resume hostilities 
against the Axis in North Africa. He was convinced that 
working with the Tunisians with the idea of eliminating the 
French from the area would incur French hostility. Murphy 
believed that if French elements could be persuaded to 
resume hostilities with American support "the Arabs would 
then be faced with a powerful fait accompli" (17) with the 
possiblity that the Americans could then take advantage of 
whatever help they would be willing to give provided the 
United States took care of their economic needs. Murphy 
said: "However, I do not pose in any degree as being well 
informed on the Arab question." (18) 
Paul Alling of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs 
agreed with Murphy and wrote Doolittle "that the Department 
would consider any attempt to turn the Arab population 
against the French as dangerous in the highest degree." (19) 
United States policy in North Africa was based upon building 
up the confidence of the French, particularly the military. 
Though the sentiments of the Tunisians were of some concern, 
the position of the French was what mattered to the State 
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Department. While an Arab organization would be useful 
to the United States if its main purpose were to oppose the 
Axis, the Department was strongly opposed to any support of 
any movement that would sponsor a revolution against the 
French Protectorate. Alling wrote a memorandum on April 7 to 
Assistant Secretary of State Adolf Berle and Under-Secretary 
of State Sumner Welles explaining that the same problem had 
I 
come up in Tangier and the charge d'affaires there, J. Rives 
Childs, had concluded that the very existence of the United 
States consular service in North Africa would be in jeopardy 
if the French thought American officers were encouraging the 
North Africans to seek redress of their grievances. (20) 
Childs, of course, was worried about the kind of activity 
Coon and Browne were involved in with the natives. 
A confusing situation was already emerging. On the 
one hand Eddy's C.O.I. was actively working with the 
natives, while Murphy and the State Department were opposing 
it. To add to the confusion, Childs did not know what the 
real nature of Coon's work was. (21) In fact, according to 
Coon, whose brother was married to Doolittle's daughter, 
Katya, Doolittle was not in on what the C.O.I. was doing 
either. (22) 
Doolittle replied to Alling that he agreed that the 
French were more important "to us than the disorganized Arab 
mass." ( 23) As far as the "palace revolution", it was only 
that and not an attempt to turn the Tunisian population 
against the French. Besides the Tunisians had already turned 
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against the French. Doolittle had "yet to meet more than one 
or two who have the slightest kind word for the French 
colonial administration." (24) Nevertheless, he had 
counselled the Tunisians not to attempt any violent measures 
as these would gain them no sympathy from the Americans or 
the British. The "palace revolution" was proposed at a time 
when French supplies were going to Libya and the idea was to 
replace the present Prime Minister by one more sympathetic 
to the United Nations cause so he could influence the Bey to 
oppose "stripping his subjects for the benefit of the 
Italians." (25) In the meantime shipments had practically 
stopped, and, as Doolittle wrote Murphy, the "palace 
revolution" was beginning to happen of its own accord. (26) 
The Bey had been upset when thirty-five Destourians, 
who had been in prison locally since 1938 (the same time 
Bourguiba was sent to France to prison), were given harsh 
sentences. He asked his Prime Minister to intercede and, 
when the latter failed to do so, the Bey fell into such a 
rage that he passed out and was unconscious for three hours. 
Doolittle thought changes were beginning to happen so that 
the Prime Minister would be replaced. (27) 
Murphy had good reason not to want to upset the 
French for he and the vice-consuls had made many contacts 
with anti-Axis French groups. A member of one of these 
groups, called the Group of Five, was Jacques 
Lemaigre-Dubreuil, an industrialist married to a peanut oil 
heiress. He was a right winger and a partner of the Banque 
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Worms. Because of his right wing connections, he was above 
suspicion and allowed to travel freely between North Africa 
and the mainland. Lemaigre-Dubreuil and his group, who were 
anti-German, wanted to establish a French African 
provisional government that would be independent of 
metropolitan France. Their plan was to cut all 
communications with mainland France. They were looking for a 
leader as well as for arms from the United States. Both Eddy 
and Murphy wanted to supply arms to this group, but Donovan 
refused because he considered their demands for arms 
excessive. For the most part, the men with whom Murphy was 
working were part of the military with conservative or even 
royalist sympathies. ( 28) 
In April when Murphy and Eddy were beseeching 
Washington for these supplies, they stressed the possibility 
of a German landing in North Africa. While this never 
materialized, another ominous development occurred when 
PJtain, under German pressure, brought Laval back as vice-
premier of the Council of Ministers in April 1942. There 
were various suppositions about the reason for this. In 
North Africa Murphy heard it was because the Germans wished 
to protect their rear as they fought the Russians. (29) 
Another possible explanation was that the Germans did not 
trust Darlan, who remained as commander-in-chief of all 
land, sea, and air forces. 
As early as February a member of the French foreign 
off ice had told Leahy that the anti-Americanism of Darlan 
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had been changing because of recent demands by the Germans. 
Leahy, himself, attributed the change in attitude to the 
German trouble with Russia, believing Darlan would "shift 
from side to side with the changing fortunes of war." (30) 
As a matter of fact on April 14, just as Laval was being 
brought back in Vichy, Murphy had dinner in Algiers with 
Darlan's son, Alain, and Admiral Raymond Finard, who had 
taken over some of Weygand's functions upon the latter's 
recall. From them Murphy learned that Darlan and P/tain were 
convinced of an American victory and wanted to be on the 
United Nations side as they thought, Murphy reported, the 
United States stood for the restoration of the French 
Empire. (31) This belief on the part of the French 
authorities may have come from the communications from 
Roosevelt when he was urging them to withhold their fleet 
from the Germans if they wanted United States help in 
regaining their overseas possessions. It could also have 
come from State Department representatives in France. In his 
memo to Berle and Welles of April 7, Alling had referred to 
"our announced desire to have the French preserve the status 
quo of their existing colonies." (32) 
The return of Laval caused an outburst of indignation 
from the United States. Aid was stopped and Leahy was 
recalled, though diplomatic relations weren't broken. As 
Hull told the French Ambassador in Washington, since Laval 
had openly and publicly announced as his 
policy intimate cooperation between France and 
Germany obviously the United States could not 
maintain the same kind of relations with the 
government of Laval as with the preceeding 
governments. ( 3 3) 
Even before his recall Leahy in a letter to Welles 
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had questioned whether the United States was following the 
right course in supporting the Marshal and whether it might 
not be better to support the dissidents. (34) Welles replied 
that the United State was supporting the Free French in 
areas they controlled while at the same time trying to keep 
Vichy from giving away the French fleet or making its 
territory available for Axis military operations. (35) 
While Leahy believed that Laval was willing to go as 
far as practicable in collaborating with Germany and aiding 
in the defeat of Bolshevism, at the same time he wanted to 
maintain good relations with the United States. Foreign 
Secretary Anthony Eden observed to Freeman Matthews, the 
American chargJ d'affaires in London, that he believed Laval 
still hoped to play the role of "mediator" between Germany 
and the United States and to play an important part in the 
establishment of the German New Order to obtain a fairly 
favorable position in it for himself and France. Eden 
continued 
I have good reason to know Laval very well 
indeed and regard him as a typical French 
deputy. He views the whole international 
political scene from the point of view of 
getting two polticians of opposite views 
into the same lobby. (36) 
In France Laval's return meant harsh measures against 
the Jews and conscription of French labor for work in 
Germany. In North Africa a visit in February by Interior 
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Minister Pucheu was viewed by some of Murphy's contacts as a 
step toward incorporation of French North Africa in a scheme 
of active collaboration with the Axis. (37) 
Though Pucheu's visit to Tunisia was greeted with 
indifference by the populace and even some incidents such as 
cries of "vive Weygand", closer collaboration was evident 
even before Laval's return. There was a new Prefect of 
Police, a Monsieur Philip, accountable only to Vichy, and 
four or five hundred new special police from France, who had 
introduced "veritable Gestapo methods ... including 
tortures of various kinds." The condemnation of the thirty-
five Destourians had been based on evidence secured by these 
means. (38) The new police had even gone so far as to 
approach Doolittle's chauffeur to report on his movements 
and visitors. Being a Tunisian, the chauffeur was worried 
what the police would do to him for not complying. (39) 
Since December 1941 the French press in Tunisia had 
been stringently controlled. The press was magnifying 
British inefficiency and leaving the impression that France 
had no help except from Germany, "on condition, of course, 
of furnishing workmen for German war factories and becoming 
a source of raw material for those same factories." By 
jamming radio stations the Germans were keeping any news 
from American and British radio from the French people. With 
so little unbiased news, many people were concluding that 
Laval was the only person able to save France. (40) 
There was nothing that the Americans could do to 
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counteract this propaganda except by word of mouth and by 
passing out copies of American and British speeches. Of 
course, this could endanger those found to possess them. 
Increasing the power of the short wave radio, Doolittle 
thought, would be useful. 
While the French government in Tunisia was becoming 
more collaborationist, the Beylical government was becoming 
more nationalistic. With the old Bey's death and the 
investiture of Monce£ Bey in June 1942, changes occurred in 
Tunisia that were to have repercussions far beyond what 
might have been anticipated. Monce£, who was over seventy, 
upset the old comfortable relation between the Residency and 
Beylical Court, or as Doolittle described it: 
After having been for many years like the 
interlocking parts of a well oiled universal 
joint the French and Tunisian Administrations 
are now tending to separate and run, if not on 
opposite, at least on parallel lines. (41) 
At the time the French were not in a position to counter 
this trend, but before a year passed they were able to make 
a dJmarche that would affect not only the Bey and the 
Tunisians, but cause differences among the American 
diplomats. 
According to Doolittle, the new Bey planned to be the 
"champion of his people" unlike the former Bey, who was 
primarily concerned with "squeezing what he could from the 
French Administration in return for his conformity with 
their ideas." (42) Moncef was very popular and wherever his 
carriage appeared, he was surrounded by what Doolittle 
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called "cheering crowds of Arabs" (43) and what Esteva 
called "a cortege of half-starved urchins." (44) The 
Tunisians would even knock off the hats of Frenchmen passing 
by who failed to show the proper reverence. Moncef was 
determined to regain his sovereignty as set forth in the 
early treaty of the Protectorate. According to Doolittle, it 
had become almost a "mania" with him. (45) 
While Doolittle understood the Bey was prepared to be 
friendly with the Americans, this was difficult because of 
the jealousy of the French Administration which tried to 
keep all foreigners away from the Bey and his counselors. It 
was not too long, however, before Doolittle managed to 
establish friendly relations with the Bey by selling the 
Bey's son an Oldsmobile car that he had acquired from the 
previous consul and by attending some marriages in the 
Beylical family. Because the car was sold at a very low 
price, the Bey felt Doolittle had almost made a gift of 
it. (46) 
While relations between Doolittle and the Bey were 
good, those between the Bey and the Resident General became 
increasingly strained. The first difficulties arose over 
the application of the anti-Jewish laws. The Bey succeeded 
in persuading the Residency to postpone publication of the 
decree prohibiting Jewish doctors from practicing, but then 
in revenge the Residency soon published a list which stopped 
from practicing all Jewish doctors who had anything to do 
with the Beylical family. (47) 
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Shortly thereafter the Bey gave an interview to a 
Tunisian newspaper in which he said "he wished to see all 
his subjects treated equally without any distinction." (48) 
When the censors eliminated the words "without any 
distinction", the Bey made such a commotion that the article 
was reprinted in full with the phrase inserted. According to 
Doolittle, this did away with the French claims that the 
anti-Semitic laws had been applied in Tunisia "as a sop to 
the Arabs." (49) Consulate members had not met any Tunisians 
who approved of these laws. 
The Bey proceeded to upbraid Admiral Esteva for 
having eliminated all his personal Jewish doctors from the 
list of Jews allowed to practice in Tunis. Three out of four 
of the Bey's personal physicians were Jewish. He told the 
Resident that if something were not done about it, he was 
ready to fly to France and see Marshal Pjtain. As Doolittle 
expressed the Bey's sentiments: 
If the French at German instigation insisted 
on anti-semitism, let them do it in France not 
here in Tunisia where for him all Tunisians were 
alike whether Jews or Moslems. (50) 
When a Tunisian general who acted as a liaison officer 
between the Resident and the Bey tried to get the Bey "to 
lower his tone," (51) the Bey was so furious that he called 
him a traitor, had him taken from the palace, saying he 
never wished to see him again. 
Esteva was caught between carrying out Vichy orders 
on the Jewish question and pacifying the Bey. He wired Laval 
that the Jewish doctors were indispensable to the Europeans 
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as well as the Tunisians. Not a single Jewish doctor would 
be excluded if he agreed to the wishes of the people. He had 
limited to twenty-three those who could practice without 
restrictions, but he was going to be obliged to allow others 
to "exercise their art." (52) The Bey and his entourage had 
demanded a half dozen of these doctors and Esteva had 
allowed it, not just to be agreeable, but because it would 
be useful to most of the population. (53) A three month 
postponement of the decree prohibiting Jewish doctors from 
practicing finally settled that problem. 
Moncef Bey, however, continued "to add gray hairs to 
the overburdened head of Admiral Esteva", as Doolittle put 
it. (54) Moncef who was sympathetic to the nationalist cause 
became its exponent. Moncef 's principal counselor was his 
brother, Hussein, who was closely linked to the Destourians. 
According to Esteva, though Moncef was on the throne, 
Hussein had the brains. Whether or not this was true, both 
brothers wanted to resume the policy of their father, Naceur 
Bey, of twenty years before which meant asking France for a 
program of reforms. Hussein believed that the time had come 
to give the educated youth a place in the administration as 
well as in all political, economic and social activity. (55) 
The Bey gave Esteva a letter for Marshal P/tain along 
with a sealed packet of demands on the French Government. 
Among these were the creation of a system of Franco-Tunisian 
primary schools, imposition of quotas on Tunisian raw 
materials to be exported, reduction of the number of French 
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functionaries, and equality in number, grade, and salary 
between French and Tunisians, and reestablishment of the 
civil and administrative powers of the caids by the 
suppression of the Franco-Musulman Agreement of 1892. At 
the beginning of the protectorate until 1892, the 
caids had been the real administrators. (56) 
In writing Laval, Esteva remarked that because of the 
fall of France, the French no longer had the same freedom of 
action as with Naceur Bey. Esteva thought the French had 
little choice but to agree to take progressive steps toward 
granting Tunisians access to jobs in the 
administration. (57) 
P£tain, however, gave Moncef Bey little satisfaction, 
writing him that tradition in the Protectorate had taken on 
the force of law. He continued: 
Admiral Esteva has a heavy task, especially 
now. The former Bey thanked him many times in 
terms which showed the friendly esteem in 
which he held him. Your Highness should in turn 
witness toward him the same sentiments. (58) 
Nevertheless, Esteva, who made a "hurried trip to 
Vichy" (59) because of his difficulties with the Bey, was 
authorized to accede to some of his demands, though not to 
suppression of the 1892 agreement. 
While Esteva blamed the Destourians for being the 
ones in the Bey's entourage counselling him to change the 
status of the Protectorate, he reported that most of the 
Destourians were supported by ''our parties of the extreme 
left, by the Free Masons and by the Jews'' (60) - the 
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traditional enemies of the French right. 
As for the Americans, Esteva wrote that "the 
protagonists of Tunisian independence" (61) had been in 
contact with them. He reported, however, that when the Bey 
and Hussein had sent a Tunisian to the American Embassy to 
ask the American consul to come see them to have a secret 
conversation with them, Doolittle had replied that he would 
reflect. Esteva learned that Doolittle expected to ask the 
Resident General to arrange an interview with the Bey. 
Esteva concluded by stating that "he begins to be 
circumspect." (62) Obviously both Doolittle and Esteva had 
to tread a careful line. For Esteva it was between the 
Tunisians and Vichy while for Doolittle the line was between 
the French and Tunisians. 
Though the demands did not seem unreasonable, 
Doolittle felt the Tunisians were not prepared to be 
"directors of a budget, allocators of raw materials, or 
members of the council of administration of a large 
company." (63) In Doolittle's opinion the French educated 
Tunisians had lost their own traditions, but had not fully 
grasped those of the Europeans. As a consequence they felt 
like Europeans with the Tunisians, and like Tunisians with 
the Europeans. Many turned to alcohol and most of the 
younger ones were spoiled. Their fathers, however, hung on 
to "too much of the Arab tradition to be able to compete in 
a capitalistic and imperialistic world." (64) 
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Difficulties between the Bey and Resident General 
became even worse during Ramadan at a ceremony at which the 
Bey received European notables and asked many provocative 
questions of the French. To Philip, Prefect of Police, he 
asked where were the Tunisians in the police administration. 
To the Director of Public Instruction he said that he hoped 
in the future there would be no more French lye/es, but only 
Franco-Tunisian schools. (65) 
After the ceremony the Bey left for his special train 
to return to his palace at La Marsa. At the station there 
was an honor guard of Tunisian troops under a French officer 
who performed so well that the Bey sent his adjudant to give 
the officer a thousand francs and the soldiers four 
thousand. When the officer said he couldn't accept tips, the 
Bey said this wasn't a tip, but a reward for their good 
appearance. ( 6 6) 
This incident just increased the Bey's dislike of 
Esteva to the point that he gave the Residency a telegram 
for Marshal Pe"tain asking for the recall of Admiral Esteva 
as Resident General. Admiral Esteva had visibly aged from 
all of this. He had always had a slight nervous tic, but now 
it was causing his head to wave "from side to side in a 
manner which aroused pity." (67) The state of tension 
between the French and the Tunisians had reached an 
explosion point. 
It was obvious to Doolittle that the French were 
"losing their grip on the Arabs." (68) Even the French 
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police had been forced to relax their harshness. Doolittle 
thought it not surprising when Axis radio propaganda was 
pointing out to the Tunisians that, since "the French 
themselves were a protected nation, the Arabs should get 
their protection direct from the source without any 
intermediary." (69) 
The Italians were all too ready to take advantage of 
the troubles between the Bey and the French. Through their 
broadcasts, they were assuming the attitude of the "great 
friend of all Islam." (70) Doolittle reported that they were 
"watching the situation like hawks and would be prompt to 
intervene if any disorders should occur." (71) 
In the summer of 1942 Doolittle had received from a 
confidential source a copy of Italian plans for Tunisia once 
victory had put them in charge there. Doolittle forwarded a 
copy of the document to the State Department with 
suggestions of how it could be used as counter propaganda by 
having copies made for distribution to Tunisian leaders. 
Doolittle thought that letting the Tunisians see what the 
Italians planned for Tunisia would have the effect of 
turning them against the Axis. The State Department 
forwarded the idea on to the Off ice of Strategic Services 
who were interested in the project and provided $2500 for 
it. (72) 
Just as the situation between the Bey and Resident 
General was about to explode, another explosion occurred 
involving all of North Africa - the American and British 
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landing. Problems between the Bey and Protectorate were not 
over, only postponed for six months. 
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Chapter V 
OPERATION TORCH 
By July of 1942 the United Nations renewed plans for 
the North African invasion. Because the Russians urgently 
needed the relief a second front would afford, President 
Roosevelt had promised one to Stalin before the end of the 
year. While both General George Marshall, Chief of Staff of 
the Army, and Henry Stimson, Secretary of War, preferred a 
direct cross-channel attack, Churchill, hoping to relieve 
pressure on Egypt where Rommel was advancing, opposed this 
and proposed invading North Africa instead. Tobruk in Libya 
had fallen to the Germans in June, a serious setback to the 
British. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, meeting in London, 
decided on July 24, 1942, on the North African invasion 
given the operation name "Torch". On learning of the 
decision, Roosevelt wired that the landing be made no later 
than October 30, 1942. The British insisted that the supreme 
commander be an American, and General Eisenhower was chosen 
for this position. The British had, also, insisted that the 
expedition be led by United States troops, even though 
British troops would be used, because of their hope that 
Americans would meet with less resistance. Churchill even 
wrote Roosevelt that the British might wear American 
uniforms. 
We have plenty of troops highly trained for 
landing. If convenient, they can wear your 
uniform. They will be proud to do so. (1) 
89 
The invasion ran the risk of bad weather en route and 
it ran the risk of submarine interception. The main risks, 
however, were the responses of the French and of the 
Spanish. Of utmost concern was how the French military in 
North Africa would react. Robert Murphy, in a talk with FDR 
at Hyde Park on September 4, 1942, found that the President 
was keenly aware of the delicate situation which would 
result from sending American troops into the colonies of an 
avowedly neutral government with which the United States had 
friendly relations. In light of stated American principle, 
it would be hard to establish a case for landing in French 
Africa without the approval of the Vichy government. Without 
the consent of Pitain's government, the United States could 
expect a military landing to be resisted with force by some 
of the French military who had sworn allegiance to Pt:ftain. 
Murphy pointed out to FDR that there were only two 
possibilities for overcoming French resistance. One was to 
send United Nations troops and equipment vastly superior to 
that of the French forces already there. The second was to 
persuade the French military by diplomatic means that 
victory over the Nazis would result from working with the 
United States and that loyalty to France was more important 
than loyalty to Pitain. The first alternative was out. As 
Eisenhower wrote to his aide, Captain Harry C. Butcher: 
However, study had conclusively shown that it 
was impossible to build up a force of 
sufficient strength to make tactical 
considerations the governing ones in 
undertaking this operation . . . measured 
purely from a military standpoint the risks of 
the projected operation were so great as to 
condemn it if military factors alone were 
considered. ( 2) 
Both FDR and Eisenhower were aware that the second 
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alternative was the only feasible one. Eisenhower continued 
to Butcher: 
Consequently, the whole campaign had to be 
considered as depending entirely upon 
political factors - - that is, upon the 
accuracy with which our political leaders 
could foresee the reactions of the French 
and Spanish armies in North Africa to 
this landing. (3) 
Eisenhower went on to describe to Butcher that the American 
Chiefs of Staff, around the middle of August, had proposed 
attacking only at Casablanca and Oran in order to secure the 
land-line of communication running between these two in 
order to decrease the dependence on Gibraltar. However, 
should the French resist, so much damage could be done to 
this route as to prevent its use for some months. Thus 
Eisenhower reemphasized the need for French co-operation: 
This fact again brought to the fore the 
certainty that success depends upon 
non-resistance on the part of the French 
Army. ( 4) 
The President named Murphy the sole agent in charge 
of political maneuvers in North Africa, and he was given the 
task of persuading the French Army not to resist the 
landing. Once the invasion took place, he would act as 
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Operating Executive head of the Civil Affairs Section and 
Advisor for Civil Affairs under General Eisenhower. Murphy 
was to contact members of the French military whom he 
considered reliable, inform them of a contemplated American 
landing, and try to obtain their assistance. After 
preparations were made by those French aiding the Americans, 
at least twenty-four hours notice would be given them. (5) 
He was to give the French the assurance that the 
administration of the colonies would remain in French hands. 
Another risk and unknown factor was what the Spanish 
would do. In fact, General Mark Clark, Eisenhower's Deputy 
Commander, wrote that, "There was, perhaps, more worry about 
the Spaniards than the French." (6) Should Franco decide to 
intervene because of Spanish interests in Morocco and 
sympathy with Hitler, Spanish troops might easily take over 
Gibraltar, which Eisenhower had chosen for his temporary 
headquarters. 
Not the least of the worries was what the Germans 
might do. Did they have enough troops to deflect to North 
Africa? Throughout the months preceeding the landing, there 
were constant rumors that the Germans were about to send 
forces to North Africa. This added pressure for speed on the 
part of those planning the invasion. 
In planning "Torch" Eisenhower needed to find a 
French leader around whom the French military would rally. 
He considered the possibility of using de Gaulle, but he 
feared that de Gaulle's presence in the initial landing 
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would cause the opposition of the French garrisons. The 
consuls and vice-consuls in North Africa reported that the 
regular French army corps considered de Gaulle a disloyal 
soldier. His standing with the resistance elements of the 
civilian population was quite different, but the first 
priority was winning over the armed services. (7) In fact, 
Roosevelt insisted that de Gaulle and the Free French not be 
told in advance of the invasion for fear they would not keep 
it secret. As Churchill wrote Roosevelt on September 3, 
"Free French have got inkling and are leaky." (8) 
The logical leader would have been General Weygand, 
then living in retirement in the south of France. Weygand, 
however, refused out of loyalty to Pe{ain when asked by an 
American representative to go back to North Africa and 
assume command there with full American military support. 
Although anti-German, Weygand was opposed to any dissident 
action against P/tain. While Weygand had refused, another 
military man had come to the attention of the Americans. 
Back in May 1942, Murphy had learned about General 
Henri Giraud from the Governor of Algiers, Yves Chatel, who 
had just returned from Vichy where he had lunched with 
Petain and Giraud. Giraud, a man in his late sixties, had 
recently escaped from a German prison, the fortress 
K~nigstein, "by climbing down an improvised ladder some 150 
feet." (9) Reporting on the luncheon, Murphy wrote Cordell 
Hull: "Chatel says Giraud is as ardently anti-German as 
ever. He also said that Giraud would be glad to work with 
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the Americans." (10) 
Besides Chatel's recommendation of Giraud, the 
Americans had other evidence of Giraud's loyalty to the 
United Nations side. The Co-ordinator of Information had 
received a copy of a letter that Giraud had written his 
children from prison encouraging them to remain faithful to 
France and to do all in their power to hasten its 
deliverance from the Germans. To some extent the decision to 
approach Giraud was based on this letter, a copy of which 
Donovan had sent to Roosevelt. (11) 
Murphy managed to contact Giraud with the help of 
Lemaigre-Dubreuil. The latter, on one of his trips to the 
mainland, met with the general in Lyon and found that he was 
already making plans for the day when the United States 
would invade France. He agreed to lead if the Americans met 
several conditions. One of these was that a French officer 
be in over all command and by this he meant, of course, 
himself. Another condition was that an invasion of mainland 
France take place at the same time. Giraud also wanted 
Lemaigre-Dubreuil on his return to Algiers to contact his 
old friend, General Charles Mast, Chief of Staff of the 
French XIX Corps in Algeria, and ask him to serve as his 
representative in North Africa. Mast had been instrumental 
through the French intelligence service, the Deuxi~me 
Bureau, for arranging Giraud's escape from Germany. 
At a meeting at Eisenhower's hide-away, Telegraph 
Cottage, outside London on September 16-17, Eisenhower and 
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Murphy decided that on his return to North Africa, Murphy 
suggest to Mast that he send a message to Giraud that the 
United States was now able to take action on a substantial 
scale and ask whether he was willing to act. Should Giraud 
decide to come, the question of French command in North 
Africa would have to be settled. Giraud's friends "had 
always made the point that the command in North Africa must 
be French. On this point Eisenhower said that the question 
of command must wait." (12) 
Murphy may have mentioned at Telegraph Cottage that 
he had also been getting feelers from Admiral Darlan about 
joining the United Nations side. Back as far as August 1941 
Darlan had told Admiral Leahy, at that time the American 
Ambassador to Vichy, to talk to him when the United States 
would be able to send five hundred thousand men and several 
thousand tanks and planes to Marseille. (13) Leahy, as has 
been mentioned, considered Darlan an opportunist who 
"endeavored to walk a tightrope between the warring 
parties." (14) After Darlan's replacement by Laval in April 
1942 as vice-premier, William Donovan suspected that 
Darlan's ardour for the P/tain government might have cooled 
and considered enlisting his help for the United Nations. In 
a memo to FDR he asked: 
Would you think it fantastic, and if not, is 
it feasible to have someone who is close at 
Vichy talk with Darlan? His nose must be 
greatly out of joint at this moment. (15) 
As a matter of fact it was at that time that Darlan made an 
overture to the United States through Admiral Raymond Flnard 
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and his son, Alain, to Murphy. Then, in the middle of 
October, a friend of Darlan's urgently requested a secret 
interview with Murphy. Murphy learned that Darlan was 
considering joining the United States side. Darlan's 
representative asked if 1) the United States would be 
willing to co-operate with Darlan and 2) if so, would it be 
able to do so quickly on a large scale here and/or in 
Europe. In reporting this message to the War Department, 
Murphy urged that the United States encourage Darlan and 
stated that he believed this would be "reconcilable with 
eventual co-operation with Giraud." (16) In reply Leahy, now 
Roosevelt's Chief of Staff, wired Murphy that he should make 
any arrangement with Darlan that would assist the military 
operations. (17) Leahy told Murphy: 
Inform your contact we also have information 
that Germany contemplates occupation of 
African Colonies and it is our opinion that 
Darlan should resist aggression by Axis 
with Army and Navy in which event America 
will provide at once large scale military 
material, and economic aid in the colonies. (18) 
In a cable to Marshall on the same day, October 17, about 
the Darlan proposition, Eisenhower wired: 
Giraud to be recognized as our principle 
collaborator on the French side, with the 
proposal that he accept the position 
immediately of French Governor of all French 
North Africa, responsible for all French 
civil and military affairs, and whose 
position will be supported and protected by 
the Allied Forces. Giraud to be requested to 
make proper contacts with Darlan and to 
accept him as Commander-in-Chief of French 
military affairs, and/or naval forces in 
North Africa or in some similar position 
that will be attractive to Darlan. (19) 
In this same cable Ike told Marshall that he was sending 
Mark Clark and four assistants on a secret mission by 
submarine to Algiers to meet with Mast no later than 
October 21. 
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Mast had requested the meeting and had specifically 
brought up the question of command. In a telegram to the War 
Department, Murphy said: "This is a question I have dreaded 
because of French susceptibilities." (20) Mast insisted that 
French command would be necessary, since the French forces 
knew the terrain. Murphy asked the War Department if they 
had "a happy formula for this delicate point." (21) Mast, 
also, brought up Giraud's idea which was "dear to his heart" 
that a simultaneous attack on southern France be made. 
Finally, Mast had heard that Darlan was seeking to climb on 
the bandwagon, but in his opinion Darlan could not be 
trusted. Mast asserted that "Giraud's command will give us 
entry practically without firing a shot." (22) This last 
assertion would turn out to be quite wrong and would play a 
significant part in Darlan being given the leadership. 
The meeting that Mast had requested took place on 
October 22 with a good deal of drama. The place chosen was a 
private house at Cherchell on the Algerian coast 150 
kilometers west of Algiers. The servants of the owner had 
tipped off the police that something was happening. When the 
police arrived, looking for smugglers, the Americans had to 
hide quickly in the wine cellar. When they left the 
conference for the submarine which had brought them, the 
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waves were so high that the "entire group was thrown into 
the sea and money, equipment and clothes were practically 
all lost." (23) While Clark obtained much useful information 
from Mast, such as details of troop locations, batteries, 
and installations, the question of command was troublesome 
and left unresolved. In writing Marshall about the 
conference, Eisenhower said, "I will have to ride a rather 
slippery rail on this matter. " (24) Furthermore, the 
opportunity the Americans "had hoped for of getting Giraud 
and Darlan together on the proposition went glimmering." 
(25) Mast, Eisenhower wrote, "believes that Darlan is not to 
be trusted and that Giraud will have nothing to do wlth 
Darlan." (26) 
Because of the need for secrecy it was decided not to 
tell the French when the invasion would take place, only 
that they would be given four days advance notice. Murphy 
wired the War Department: 
At the conference no indication of our 
intentions regarding date of operation was 
supplied and French officers were left with the 
impression that at least several weeks would 
intervene. (27) 
Since the date of the landing was now scheduled for 
November 8, Murphy found that Giraud could not leave France 
in time to be in Algiers for it and requested a delay. The 
request was refused because convoys had already left the 
United States, and could not be turned back. 
Besides being in touch with the French military 
leaders, Murphy was hoping to obtain the cooperation of the 
98 
French and North Africans by stepping up shipments of 
economic aid. While aid had stopped when Laval returned, it 
had been resumed in June. With the invasion imminent, Murphy 
believed it was crucial for the success of the landing. He 
wrote to the State Department: 
I believe the Department will appreciate 
without much comment from me the 
propaganda value of the arrival of 
these ships in Algiers from New York 
loaded with American goods for the 
benefit of this area. (28) 
When Murphy was in Washington in late September after his 
meeting with Eisenhower at Telegraph Cottage, he pleaded for 
supplies for North Africa to arrive before the landing. 
While Roosevelt did everything he could to see that they 
arrived and Leahy said aid was to be sent with out any quid 
pro quo, simply to gain French friendship, the Board of 
Economic Warfare did not get them there in time. Since they 
could not be let in on the plans of the invasion, it was 
hard to convince them of the urgency of the need. 
Furthermore, they feared the supplies would fall into Nazi 
hands and were reluctant to ship them at all even with "an 
order from FDR in his own handwriting." (29) 
Besides economic aid, diplomatic preparations for the 
invasion were concerned with an effort to see that Spain and 
Portugal were kept reassured as to the United States' 
intentions and that Spain would maintain her neutrality and 
prevent a German march through the Iberian peninsula to 
Gibraltar to attack the United States troops in the rear. 
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Spain was told that increased economic aid "would be 
possible only so long as Spain stayed out of the war and did 
not allow the Axis to infringe upon her territory." (30) 
Furthermore, the French commanders were to be instructed not 
to take any retaliatory action on D-day against the Spanish 
should there be incidents, until after the consolidation of 
the American forces. (31) 
In the meantime, messages were beomg drafted from the 
President to General Franco, President Carmona of Portugal, 
Marshal Pitain, Governor General Yves Charles Chatel of 
Algeria, General Auguste Nogu\s, the Resident General of 
Morocco, the Sultan of Morocco, Admiral Jean Pierre Esteva, 
the Resident General of Tunisia, and the Bey of Tunisia, 
Sidi Moncef Pacha. These messages said that German and 
Italian troops were planning to invade and occupy North 
Africa and that a powerful American force was being landed 
in North Africa to co-operate with the Governments of 
Algeria, Tunisia, and French Morocco in forestalling this 
threat. Harry L. Hopkins wrote that: 
The final stages of preparation for TORCH 
involved a great deal of very careful word 
choosing for the various messages from the 
President ... (32) 
On reading FDR's proposed letter to Pjtain, Churchill 
the President: 
Will you allo~ me to say that your proposed 
message to Petain seems to me to be too 
kind? ... Will you consider toning it down 
a bit? (33) 
A leaf let containing a message from President 
wrote 
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Roosevelt to the people of North Africa was also prepared. 
It contained a color imprint of the American flag as well as 
the President's photograph and was to be dropped from planes 
from Gibraltar at the time of the first attack. (34) 
Messages were prepared to be broadcast by radio both in 
unoccupied France and North Africa as well as from the ships 
that were to provide the protective cover for the landing 
forces. The President's statement which was printed on the 
leaf let and which was to be broadcast stressed the 
friendship of the United States for the French people. This 
kind of psychological warfare was a new tactic being tried 
out in North Africa. Roosevelt, himself, worked on these 
messages. Afterwards, Eve Curie wrote FDR complementing him 
to which he replied: 
May I tell you that I am glad you liked my 
straightforward French . . . no beautiful 
phrases, nor oratory ... I thought, 
however, that I ought to be myself and the 
French people would understand my normal 
simplicity better than if I did something 
which was not a part of me. (35) 
In spite of the careful preparations for the 
invasion, things did not go as planned. Giraud, who had been 
picked up by submarine, instead of going directly to North 
Africa, stopped in Gibraltar where Eisenhower and his staff 
had set up their headquarters just thirty-six hours before 
D-day. While the landings were taking place, Giraud was 
arguing with Eisenhower and Clark about the command. He 
refused to participate except as supreme commander. 
Eisenhower thought that Giraud was playing for time, that he 
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knew the Americans could not grant his request, but was 
waiting to see if the United Nations landing was successful. 
Eisenhower wrote Marshall that he and Clark were bitterly 
disappointed about his attitude. (36) Giraud finally left 
for Algiers on November 9, thirty-six hours after the 
landings began. He was to do his utmost to stop resistance 
to the United States troops and to begin to organize the 
French forces for employment against the Axis. Eisenhower 
had made concessions to Giraud, but he would, of course, not 
turn over the position of supreme commander to him, nor 
would he promise a simultaneous landing in southern France. 
The military operation did not go as planned either. 
The Joint Chiefs had decided on attacking Casablanca, Oran, 
and Algiers. In explaining this decision, Eisenhower said a 
direct landing in the Bizerte-Tunis area would have been 
desirable, but that area was beyond the range of fighter 
aircraft support. Besides the British had had disastrous 
results running convoys to Malta. Though the Joint Chiefs 
had decided the Tunis-Bizerte area was too risky for a 
landing, Eisenhower, believing that Tunis was so important 
that the United States should land as far east as Bone, 
wanted to attack Oran, Algiers, and Bone. This, however, was 
overruled because the Chiefs of Staff thought the railroad 
between Casablanca and Tunis was an important supply route 
and to ensure its operation the Casablanca landing was 
necessary. This decision meant that the early capture of 
Tunis was less likely. Once the Moroccan and Algerian 
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landings had occurred, the American forces were to protect 
the rear in Morocco while the British First Army under Sir 
Kenneth Anderson, which was to land at Bougie, Djidjelli, 
and Bone in Algeria, would rush eastwards to Tunis. (37) 
In meeting with Eisenhower, Murphy had warned him that 
the greatest resistance would come from General August 
Nogu\s in Morocco. Stopping to see Nogties on his return to 
North Africa from the United States, Murphy had tried to win 
him over, but without success. Nogu\s, fearing an invasion 
would cause chaos, wanted to preserve the status quo. He did 
not want to see French authority disintegrate because that 
would cause North African nationalism to rise. (38) 
When the landings began on November 8, Nogu\s ordered 
the French troops in Morocco to resist the invasion. In Oran 
the lieutenant colonel in charge of the resistance had had 
cold feet and divulged to his chief what he knew about the 
American operation. The chief immediately prepared to resist 
the landing and as a consequence the United Nations faced 
serious fighting at Oran. Only in Algiers, where Mast and 
the Group of Five had successfully organized the resistance, 
was the fighting minimal. 
In the meantime, another unexpected development was 
the arrival in Algiers of Darlan to see his son, who had 
entered the hospital with infantile paralysis. Thus while 
the landings were occurring and Giraud had not arrived, 
Murphy asked Darlan for his co-operation. Though reluctant 
at first, Darlan agreed to seek the authorization of Petain, 
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to whom he drafted a message. General Alphonse Juin, who had 
been commander of the French armies in North Africa until 
Darlan's arrival, urged the latter to cease the hostilities. 
According to Mast, it was Juin who sanely judged the 
situation, refused to continue the fighting in spite of 
Darlan's stubbornness and whose intervention finally made 
Darlan order a preliminary cease fire. (39) In signing the 
cease fire, which was only for Algiers and its suburbs, 
Darlan claimed to have received a message in secret code 
from Pdtain of his approval of Darlan assuming authority in 
North Africa. It was Murphy who negotiated with Darlan until 
Mark Clark flew in on November 9. 
When Clark arrived, he was upset about the Darlan 
agreement because he and Eisenhower had just negotiated an 
agreement that morning with Giraud. However, when Murphy and 
Clark met Giraud in an automobile so as not to be heard, 
Giraud had already met with the high ranking French 
officials and had learned that most of them considered him a 
dissident. As Churchill put it: "The reception of Giraud by 
the leading French commanders was icy." (40) 
Giraud told Murphy and Clark that he wanted to be 
free to devote himself to combat. He also said he would be 
content to work under Darlan. Giraud wanted "an arrangement 
by which the Admiral would be a sort of High Commissioner, 
while he, Giraud, would become commander-in-chief of the 
French forces." (41) Giraud, thus, without any persuasion 
from Clark or Murphy, provided what proved to be an 
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effective formula for the early weeks of "Torch". 
The surprise for the Americans in regard to Darlan 
was the fact that the French officials looked to him as the 
man with the greatest authority in North Africa. Mast and 
others who had co-operated were looked upon as traitors by 
other French officers whose help was needed. Giraud told 
Clark that only Darlan could issue a general cease fire 
order that would be obeyed. 
When Nazi troops started moving into unoccupied 
France on November 12 in violation of the 1940 armistice, 
the last obstacle to an agreement was overcome. As a result 
Darlan decided that P/tain was no longer a free agent and 
agreed to cooperate with the United Nations. Clark persuaded 
Darlan, using a bit of bullying, to give an order to the 
French troops and the navy to stop fighting. He issued the 
order in the name of Marshal Pltain and it was obeyed. As 
Eisenhower wrote, "The fighting at Casablanca had ceased 
because of Darlan's order: at other places the fighting was 
over before the order was received." (42) 
The name of Marshal Pltain carried far more weight 
with the French military in North Africa than the Americans 
or British anticipated. The authority of the state was 
vested in him, and it was to him they owed their allegiance. 
Darlan wore his mantle. As Kenneth Pendar, one of the vice-
consuls described it, most of the French in North Africa had 
an almost mystic faith in P/tain and most of the military 
there were ready to follow the "head of the State." (43) 
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Once France was occupied by the Germans, Petain was no 
longer a free agent and the military could transfer their 
allegiance to Darlan. Since the Germans had broken the 
armistice agreement, Darlan felt free to co-operate with the 
Americans. 
On November 12, the French agreed among themselves on 
a formula for the French command. It was basically the same 
one Eisenhower had proposed in the middle of October. On 
November 13 Eisenhower flew in from Gibraltar and received 
word that the French had agreed. Darlan would head the civil 
government, the present governors would remain at their 
posts, Nogu\s in French Morocco and Chatel in Algeria, while 
Giraud would head the French armed forces. Eisenhower came 
to the meeting and shook hands. The "Darlan deal" was thus 
consummated. While Mark Clark and Murphy had been part of 
the early discussion, it was Eisenhower who took the final 
responsibility for the "deal". According to this 
arrangement, the United Nations stated they would not 
disturb the French administrative control of North Africa, 
provided the French forces and the civilian population would 
obey Darlan's orders to co-operate militarily with the 
United States. (44) 
This "deal" brought a storm of protest in both the 
British and American press because of Darlan's connection 
with Vichy and his pro-Axis politics. To explain more fully 
the situation, Eisenhower sent a long telegram to the 
Combined Chiefs of Staff in which he explained: 
Foremost is the fact that the name of Marshal 
P~tain is something to conjure with here. 
Everyone from highest to lowest attempts to 
create the impression that he lives and acts 
under the shadow of the Marshal's figure. The 
civil governors, military leaders and naval 
commanders agree on only one man as having an 
obvious right to assume the Marshal's mantle 
in North Africa. That man is Darlan. (45) 
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Eisenhower also stated in the wire that it was important 
to have a strong French government in North Africa. 
Otherwise the United States would need a large occupation 
force. 
FDR was convinced that Eisenhower had acted correctly 
in view of the unanticipated situation in North Africa and 
cabled him that he would back him to the hilt. On November 
17 the President issued a public statement saying that he 
"accepted General Eisenhower's political arrangements made 
for the time being in North Africa and Western Africa." (46) 
But he went on to say: "The present temporary arrangement in 
North and West Africa is only a temporary expedient, 
justified solely by the stress of battle." (47) Roosevelt 
said it was made "to save American and British lives and to 
avoid a mopping up period in Algiers and Morocco." (48) 
Needless to say Roosevelt's statement caused problems 
for Eisenhower. Darlan, on hearing about it said: 
Information coming from various parts tends 
to give credit to the opinion that 'I am but 
a lemon which the Americans will drop after 
it is crushed. ' ( 4 9) 
Darlan proved to be very co-operative. He did order 
the cease fire and stopped the fighting on the western coast 
though he was unsuccessful in stopping it in Tunisia. While 
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he had never guaranteed that he would be able to bring the 
fleet over to the United Nations side, he tried and did say 
that the French admiral in Toulon would never allow his 
ships to fall into enemy hands. As it turned out, the French 
scuttled the fleet in order to keep it from the Nazis. In 
Tunisia Darlan's order was received too late. 
At two o'clock in the morning on November 8 Doolittle 
called at the Residency. He gave Admiral Esteva two personal 
messages from President Roosevelt, one for him and the other 
for the Bey asking for free passage for United Nations 
troops "which had no other object than the rapid destruction 
of our common enemies." (50) Esteva, who received Doolittle 
in full dress uniform and Turkish slippers, was terribly 
surprised by Roosevelt's letter even though, as French 
historian Albert Kammerer said, he approved of it "from the 
bottom of his heart." (51) However, because he was ruled by 
the "mystique" of obedience to P/tain, he replied to 
Doolittle that he intended to be loyal to the Marshal. (52) 
On the next day the first Axis radio broadcasts 
announced that important landings by the United States had 
taken place the preceeding night at several points in 
Morocco and Algeria. That evening at seven o'clock Admiral 
Esteva handed the Bey the President's message giving him at 
the same time PJtain's order "calling upon Tunisia to resist 
by all its means the Anglo-Saxon invasion." (53) The Bey 
quite naturally was confused by these two contradictory 
messages and called a council of his ministers, his close 
entourage, prominent members of the Destour and his two 
brothers. 
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The Bey's Prime Minister, the ''timorous soul" 
Doolittle had hoped to depose in the palace revolution, 
advised that no reply should be given. But another "bolder 
soul", who was later chosen as Prime Minister by the Bey, 
pointed out that the French would be abandoning "the basic 
principle of the Protectorate" (54) if they allowed the 
Germans to land and asserted that a reply should be made. 
This view prevailed and the Bey finally drafted a reply for 
the President that Tunisia desired to be neutral. As 
Doolittle pointed out, since Tunisia had no armed force of 
its own, "the Bey and his opera bouffe army could obviously 
do nothing against either one of the belligerent 
forces." (53) 
While this was the official message given to Esteva 
for transmission to the President on November 13, an 
emissary from the Bey, who had climbed over the garden wall 
of Doolittle's house while the guards were distracted by the 
bombing of the airfield, brought him an unofficial message 
on the night of November 12. The emissary talked to 
Doolittle in the garden so as not to attract attention to 
his presence by going into the house and turning on the 
lights. In this oral message to the President, the Bey said 
that since PJtain had taken a position against the 
United Nations and had put the airfield at the disposition 
of the Axis so they could occupy it at any moment, there was 
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nothing at the moment that the Bey could do in favor of the 
United Nations other than to declare his benevolent 
neutrality. 
In case, however, of a future invasion in response to 
an Axis landing, he would want to put at the disposal of the 
United Nations all the resources of the country as well as 
the goods and lives of his people. His Highness did not 
doubt that the United Nations which was waging war for 
justice and for the rights of the little people would treat 
Tunisia according to the principles of the Atlantic Charter. 
The Bey was sure that the American government would do 
nothing to favor the expropriation of Tunisian territory by 
French imperialist elements. (56) 
If the Bey was confused at the time of the invasion, 
Admiral Esteva also had reason to be bewildered. Esteva 
learned from Doolittle the breadth of the operation. Because 
of Vichy's policy of defending the Empire against all, the 
first measures in Tunisia were taken against the United 
Nations. Admiral Derrien, who was in command of the naval 
base at Bizerte, on hearing of the invasion ordered two 
cargo ships sunk in the harbor of Bizerte to block its use 
by the United Nations while General Barri, in charge of 
ground troops, ordered his troops to cover Tunisia from the 
direction of Algeria and Bone. On November 9 Axis planes 
were allowed to use El Aouina airport at Tunis, and were 
refueled as they arrived. Over one hundred Axis planes 
towing gliders overwhelmed the El Aouina airport by landing 
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over one thousand men. Although a French colonel had wished 
to attack the arriving Germans, Barr/ had opposed it and 
ordered his troops to abandon the airport. (57) 
Adding to Esteva's confusion was the fact that he was 
receiving orders from both P/tain in Vichy and Darlan in 
Algiers. On November 11 Darlan ordered the French troops to 
oppose the Germans. Derrien informed his troops that the 
Germans were the enemy and they were to def end Bizerte 
against them. Derrien's troops received the order with 
enthusiasm. Esteva, however, immediately announced that the 
order had been given too hastily and that Darlan had revoked 
it. Strict neutrality was to be maintained and the orders of 
the Marshal were to be followed. The next day the order was 
again reversed and Barr/ and Derrien were told to resist the 
Axis, but by this time it was too late. In case Esteva had 
ever considered independent action, he waited too long. 
Beginning on November twelfth Axis troops began debarking at 
Bizerte and by the fourteenth the Germans occupied Tunis. 
While Derrien's troops may have wanted to fight the 
Germans, Derrien, himself, seemed to have decided not to 
resist. According to Mast, he gave up the naval base at 
Bizerte and all the ships without fighting. Besides refusing 
to fight the Axis, Derrien refused to let the ground troops 
at Bizerte withdraw to the west. Three thousand men thus 
were taken prisoner. The naval forces as well as the arsenal 
of Ferryville were delivered to the Axis who took them to 
Italy where they were used against the United Nations. (58) 
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I 
While Barre had not opposed the Axis landing, he 
withdrew his troops westward into the hills playing for 
time. On the fourteenth the British army under General 
I 
Anderson crossed the Tunisian frontiers to support Barre's 
troops who had taken a position at Medjez-el-Bab. By now the 
I 
Germans had their doubts about Barr~ and asked Esteva to 
relieve him of his command. Esteva refused saying he was not 
authorized to do so. When the Germans ordered Barr/ to fight 
on their side, he followed instead the orders of Darlan and 
Giraud saying: "The war has begun. I am the enemy of the 
Germans." (59) On November 19 the Germans opened fire on 
Barre's troops at Medjez-el-Bab and with that the Tunisian 
campaign had started. 
According to Kammerer, Esteva, Derrien and Barri were 
unanimously against Germany and against all collaboration. 
They wanted the United Natiions to arrive, but they didn't 
do anything useful. 
they limited themselves to sending telegrams 
to the point that the period immediately 
preceeding the Tunisian campaign . . . would 
appear in history as a flight from 
responsibility of all the high agents and all 
the civil and military chiefs. (60) 
Kammerer went on to say that the French soldiers could have 
prevented the landing of the planes or have decimated the 
parachute troops, but the French troops were prohibited from 
firing and the first German planes to land were refueled by 
French attendants at the airport. (61) 
There were a few measures, however, that Esteva took 
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that favored the United Nations. When the Germans arrived he 
ordered the prison doors to be opened allowing enemies of 
the Axis to escape. He also put Radio-Tunis out of 
commission. When German General Nehring arrived on November 
17 proclaiming: "We come here to liberate Tunisia, in 
particular from Jewish oppression," Esteva protested and had 
him suppress the part about the Jews. (62) In fact on that 
same day Nehring, who had opened his command post in the 
United States consulate in Tunis which the Americans had 
deserted, and Dr. Rudolph Rahn, the Nazi diplomatic agent in 
Tunis, recommended that Esteva be relieved of the post of 
Resident General. Finally, Esteva arranged for false papers 
for the American consul and vice-consuls and their families. 
Germans had been landing at El Aouina airport for 
four days, but when Doolittle saw the German ground troops 
arrive on November 13, he asked for an interview with 
Philip, the Prefect of Police, since he and his household 
and staff had been completely cut off from contact with 
friends and unable to leave the residence. When Philip came 
to the house at 9:15 p.m., Doolittle asked whether they were 
to remain prisoners and turned over to the German forces or 
whether the Tunisian administration would arrange for their 
departure. (63) 
Philip promised to discuss it with Admiral Esteva and 
left immediately for his office. When he returned at 11:15 
p.m., he informed Doolittle that they were to be evacuated 
to Algeria. At 12:45 a.m. November 14, Doolittle, his wife, 
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their two Spanish servants, John Utter, two clerks, and a 
couple with their baby hastily left the house. All 
furnishings including silver and rugs were left behind. 
Since the Germans already occupied the nearby crossroads, 
the American party and their French guides took a 
round-about route. Once their cars were stopped by German 
soldiers with a medium tank but, because of the forceful 
intervention of Philip and the Residency officials, they 
were allowed to proceed. Doolittle believed that the German 
soldiers were unaware of who was in this caravan. Later they 
were once again stopped by Germans and again successfully 
passed the barrier. After a few miles all of the French 
officials except for a Monsieur Polifet left them with the 
parting words to hurry back and free the French from the 
prison which seemed inevitable. (64) 
The rest of the trip to Algiers went without 
incident. At the border Polifet left the group, informing 
them that General Barr/ intended to follow the orders he had 
been given to resist any westward advance of the German 
troops. Polifet asked Doolittle to impress upon the United 
Nations command that speed was crucial. He said that the 
Germans had landed some twenty tanks and four thousand men 
at Bizerte, while in Tunis there were about fifteen hundred 
Germans of which at least one thousand were ground staff for 
the aviation forces at El Aouina airfield. 
At 8 a.m. on November 14th Doolittle's party arrived 
at Bone and made contact with the British forces of 
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commandos and parachutists and two Royal Airforce Spitfire 
squadrons. As soon as they had told the British their story, 
Utter and Doolittle took the ladies of the party to Guelma, 
a town south of Bone, where they believed they would be 
safe. When they returned to Bone, they were taken to Algiers 
on a R.A.F. plane, "leaving in the middle of another air 
raid during which their plane was machine gunned and bombs 
were dropped on the field." (66) 
In Algiers Doolittle reported to Murphy and Consul 
General Felix Cole and found that he was not needed. He then 
returned to Guelma passing through convoys of war material 
and troops streaming steadily eastward. At Guelma he learned 
from his wife that he was needed in Constantine to help the 
British Army with the political situation. Returning to 
Constantine, Doolittle became semi-officially attached to 
the Army there for several months. 
Doolittle found in Constantine a strong anti-United 
Nations sentiment among those in control. In contacting 
resistance groups, Doolittle learned that the same 
administration which had been appointed by the Vichy 
authorities for the purpose of suppressing any "pro-British, 
pro-American or pro-de Gaulle sympathies were still in 
charge." (67) They were the same groups that had worked 
against the United Nations since the landings. The 
anti-German groups upon whom the United Nations had relied 
for their information were forced to remain undercover. 
These groups were becoming discouraged while the attitude of 
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the local French authorities was anything but 
reassuring. (68) 
When the local Constantine newspaper received the 
news on November 19 that Barr~ would resist the Germans, the 
French censor forbade its publication. Only after a protest 
was made by the United Nations general to the French 
headquarters, did the article appear. Still the French 
censor told the editor that, when the Germans arrived, he 
would be the first to be hanged. (69) 
The Prefect of Police of Constantine cautioned the 
Director of a Bank, who had expressed United Nations 
sympathy to his employees, against undertaking propaganda 
among his employees. The same Prefect had ordered the police 
to put down any demonstrations for the United Nations 
soldiers passing through Constantine on the part of the 
local citizens and had arrested some people who had welcomed 
United Natiions soldiers. While these demonstrators were 
later released, none of the political prisoners in jail for 
their ideas had been freed, and the local police continued 
to report unfavorably on United Nations sympathizers. A 
French general had stated that the French attitude should be 
one of neutrality to the United Nations soldiers passing 
through since they did not appear of sufficient strength to 
cope with the Germans. 
Anti-United Nations sentiment was also evident when 
rumors were spread through the food lines that there was no 
meat and rations would be reduced because United Nations 
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soldiers had seized everything in the market. Again the 
United Nations general protested to the French staff and a 
communiqu/ was put out stating that United Nations soldiers 
were bringing their own supplies taking nothing from local 
reserves. ( 70) 
This local sabotage came from the civil administration 
and from the higher French military officials who were 
surrounded by members of the Service d'Ordre de 1 
I . a Legion, 
described by Doolittle as the French equivalent of the 
Gestapo. The S.O.L. was the active volunteer law enforcement 
part of the larger veterans organization, "La L~ion des 
Combattants," started by the P~tain government. Mast 
described it as a sort of police force supplementing the 
regular "more peaceful" police force. According to him, the 
S.O.L.'s function before the landing had been to watch and 
control opinions, denouncing those not conforming to the 
Vichy policy of collaboration. They were also to prevent all 
manifestations of ideas or reunions not conforming to this 
Vichy policy. (71) Obviously many members of the S.O.L. had 
not switched their allegiance to the United Nations after 
the invasion. 
Doolittle strongly recommended that these anti-United 
Nations elements be replaced. He thought that at least 
seventy-five percent of the local French population would 
welcome this action and "that the Arabs, passive and 
politically inert, would only look upon such action as a 
manifestation of the show of force which they 
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admire." ( 7 2) 
The political situation in Constantine which 
Doolittle did not find favorable to the United Nations cause 
was a reflection of the political situation as it was 
evolving under Darlan for all of French North Africa. While 
Darlan had made an important military contribution to the 
United Nations cause, in internal affairs he continued the 
Vichy form of government. As Darlan described it in an 
interview: 
I am simply managing French interests in 
French Africa in the name of the prisoner 
Chief of State. I am acting as a trustee 
of authority, the trustee of a national 
treasure. ( 7 3) 
Thus an unexpected consequence of the American arrival in 
North Africa was the reinforcement of Pdtain's "national 
revolution". Not only did Darlan continue Vichy policies 
there, he expelled from the army those that had helped the 
United Nations in the November 8 invasion and even went so 
far as to recommend to Vichy that they lose their 
citizenship. It was only Eisenhower's intervention that 
prevented this step. 
Roosevelt, who was being severely criticized for the 
"Darlan deal" and the continuation of the Vichy regime in 
North Africa, was anxious to change the Vichy laws and told 
General Marshall that restrictions imposed by Vichy should 
be withdrawn including the ban against labor unions and the 
anti-semitic laws. Political prisoners were to be freed. 
First, however, Roosevelt thought it important to have 
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Eisenhower's views on what effect he thought such a 
statement would have on the North Africans. (74) Eisenhower 
sent Roosevelt a detailed report that had been prepared 
under Darlan's orders outlining the steps his regime was 
taking to liberalize and reform the administration of North 
Africa (75), but decided against making a public 
statement. (76) 
Another step Roosevelt proposed to Churchill to deal 
with the situation in North Africa was that they consider 
appointing an American and a Britisher with a veto power 
over French civil administrators. As a result Murphy was 
appointed as a personal representative of the President on 
Eisenhower's staff with the rank of minister and Harold 
Macmillan was named by Churchill to a corresponding 
position. (77) Murphy's position was in addition to his 
duties as chief of Civil Administration on General 
Eisenhower's staff. 
In spite of Secretary Henry Stimson's strong 
objections, Roosevelt issued a directive turning over the 
administration of civilian affairs in North Africa to the 
State Department. (78) Murphy, as Civil Affairs Officer, was 
to coordinate with General Eisenhower's staff "since all 
civilian requirements are subject in the first instance to 
the military situation." (78) The primary objective of all 
civilian officials was to contribute to the successful 
military operations. Relations with the French authorities 
were to be conducted exclusively through or with the 
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approval of the Civil Affairs Officer. (80) 
Though the State Department had been put in charge of 
civilian administration, Roosevelt told Secretary Cordell 
Hull on the telephone a couple of months after the invasion 
that Murphy "was not there to report to Hull but as a 
special appointee of his own to handle special matters on 
which he reported to Roosevelt direct." (81) While Stimson 
thought this was bad administration, he said: "This was a 
truly Rooseveltian position." (82) 
De Gaulle, though not informed in advance about the 
invasion, had taken the matter gracefully and showed 
satisfaction that Giraud had helped, but when Giraud and 
Darlan agreed that Giraud would have command of the military 
and Darlan head the civil administration, de Gaulle was 
furious and blamed the United States for bringing it about. 
De Gaulle had indicated a willingness to work with Giraud, 
but refused to have anything to do with Darlan. 
Darlan's presence at the head of French North Africa 
had aroused opposition from all quarters. The strict 
Vichyites reproached him for having betrayed the Marshal by 
signing the cease fire. The Group of Five were frustrated 
that they had not been rewarded for having aided the United 
Nations, and the Gaullists considered Darlan an obstacle to 
the arrival of their leader in Algeria. Darlan was aware 
that there were several plots against him, even asking 
Murphy after lunch at the summer palace on December 23 what 
the Americans would do if one of these plots was successful. 
On the day after he asked this question, Darlan was 
assassinated by a twenty year old French student who was 
immediately condemned to death. (83) 
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Only recently has it been learned that it was the 
British Special Operations Executive (S.O.E.) that armed the 
assassin. (84) Because the assassin had been a student of 
Carleton Coon, who during the month of December had been an 
instructor of the de Gaullist Free Corps of Africa near 
Algiers, Eddy thought it was a good idea for Coon to 
disappear for a while. One of the places Coon went was 
"through the cold and night to Constantine where [he] found 
Hooker in a cold room with his wife Vecka, two Basque maids 
and two Pekingese dogs in attendance." (85) 
The assassination of Darlan "ended one problem" as 
Eisenhower commented to his Aide, Butcher, "but no doubt 
created many more." (86) One of the problems created by 
Darlan's murder was that Giraud, now head of both civil and 
military affairs, placed a reactionary Vichy general in 
charge of investigating the death of Darlan and this general 
used his post to persecute the leaders of the Algiers 
Gaullist underground. Coon reported that though the assassin 
was a Royalist, the authorities rounded up Free French and 
others whom they wished to harass. Several of the 
instructors where he taught were arrested. (87) Giraud 
brought members of the Group of Five into the 
administration. Lemaigre-Dubreuil, though not taking a 
cabinet post, became his political adviser. Giraud, whose 
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primary concern was military victory, would soon prove to be 
a weak leader. A political conservative, he would wait until 
the spring of 1943 to change the Vichy laws and then only 
under pressure. 
According to Vice-Consul Kenneth Pendar, the men 
Giraud chose to administer, "were hardly outstanding leaders 
or in any way representative ones." (88) Pendar said: "We 
used them because they were available. Later we continued to 
use them because we were committed to them." Pendar thought 
Giraud was honest but inept and was too slow in restoring 
Vichy destroyed civil liberties, in giving the Jewish people 
civil rights and in getting rid of the Vichy group in North 
Africa. While Giraud was not in favor of Vichy's ideas, he 
thought everything could wait until the war was won. (90) 
Harold Macmillan, the British political adviser to 
Eisenhower, wrote in hindsight that it would have been 
better if Murphy had been withdrawn at the beginning of 
January 1943 when the invasion had occurred and Darlan's 
assassination had allowed Giraud's natural succession to 
power. He believed a new phase was about to begin between 
France and the different French groups and the United 
Nations. Murphy had been employed in a Fifth Column 
operation. His job had been to make contacts and to organize 
plots to prepare for a military landing. He had had to deal 
with reputable as well as some questionable people such as 
Darlan and many disreputable agents. Macmillan thought he 
was handicapped by this in the new phase of his work because 
he was under obligations to a lot of people. According to 
Macmillan Murphy should have been replaced by somebody 
uncommitted. ( 91) 
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It is possible to view Macmillan's statement as an 
example of British bias. The British were, after all, 
committed to de Gaulle for whom Giraud, backed by Murphy, 
was simply an obstacle. The United States, on the other hand 
was committed to that obstacle, Giraud. Biased as Macmillan 
may have been, Giraud would not prove to be a good choice. 
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CHAPTER VI 
DE GAULLE-GIRAUD CONFLICT 
By November 1942 the United Nations had seized the 
initiative in North Africa. In the west they had 
successfully invaded Morocco and Algeria while in the east 
the British had taken El Alamein pushing the Germans back 
into Libya. Although fighting continued in Tunisia, 
Roosevelt thought the Germans would soon be driven out and 
proposed to Churchill that the miliary chiefs, including the 
Russians, meet to discuss the follow up to the Tunisian 
campaign. Churchill wanted instead a Big Three meeting. He 
feared that at such a meeting the Russians would argue for a 
cross channel invasion in 1943. In order to dissuade the 
Russians from this idea, he thought that he and Roosevelt 
needed to handle the matter with Stalin rather than leaving 
it to the military chiefs. 
Instead of a cross channel attack in 1943 Churchill 
was promoting the idea of an attack across the Mediterranean 
once the Tunisian campaign had eliminated the Axis from 
North Africa. He suggested striking at Sardinia or Sicily, 
"at the soft underbelly of the Axis.'' (1) In spite of 
General Marshall's warning against too many diversionary 
operations, Roosevelt and the American chiefs were also 
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inclined toward the Mediterranean plan knowing that not 
enough American troops would be available for a 1943 assault 
on Northern Europe. 
Churchill believed that at a Big Three meeting he and 
Roosevelt could explain in person to Stalin their reasons 
for postponing the cross channel invasion in favor of the 
Mediterranean plan. Churchill suggested that they meet in 
Iceland, but Roosevelt preferred a warmer place and 
proposed Africa. Roosevelt sent a cable to Stalin suggesting 
the three leaders meet in January to make strategic plans, 
but Stalin declined the invitation claiming he was needed in 
the Soviet Union where a major offensive was being waged at 
Stalingrad. Roosevelt and Churchill suspected the real 
reason was that he feared that the two Anglo-Saxon leaders 
would try to persuade him that a second front was not 
feasible in 1943. 
In spite of Stalin's decision not to attend the 
meeting, Roosevelt wanted to proceed with it anyway. Not 
only would it be an opportunity to plan the follow up to the 
North African campaign, but it would give a chance to 
discuss postwar plans, now that a turning point seemed to 
have been reached in the war. During the fall of 1942 FDR 
had been considering postwar objectives. He believed the 
Axis powers would need to be disarmed and forced to renounce 
their ideology. To make sure of this Roosevelt wanted their 
unconditional surrender. He had still another reason just 
now for wanting to announce this doctrine. The Darlan deal 
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had raised fears with Stalin and others that the 
western powers would negotiate an early peace with 
collaborators or with Axis leaders. The announcement of the 
doctrine of unconditional surrender would lay those concerns 
to rest. In particular, it should reassure Stalin. 
While Roosevelt did announce the doctrine of 
unconditional surrender at the conference, which took place 
at Casablanca from January 14-24, discussion of the doctrine 
showed differences of opinion between the President and his 
Secretary of State. Hull was afraid that it might prolong 
the war if the people of the Axis countries thought 
they had nothing to which to look forward. He also thought 
the doctrine would require that the Americans and British be 
prepared to take over the governments of the conquered 
countries. (2) The fact that Hull was opposed to the idea 
was probably one reason that Roosevelt did not have him come 
to the conference. But Hull had really been left out of 
French matters ever since St. Pierre and Miquelon. Because 
of Hull's intense anger at de Gaulle for ordering the Free 
French take over of those islands, Roosevelt had taken 
French matters into his own hands. Instead the President, 
who liked being his own Secretary of State, delegated to 
Hull and the State Department the job of planning for the 
postwar peace keeping organization. 
Another reason Roosevelt did not want Hull at the 
conference may have been his fear of Hull's antagonism 
toward de Gaulle, whom he expected to meet. Roosevelt hoped 
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to find a solution to the problem that followed Darlan's 
death of both the Giraud and de Gaulle factions wanting to 
be recognized as the provisional government of France - "the 
French quagmire", as he called it. (3) At the conference the 
Combined Chiefs of Staff decided in only four days that, 
once the Germans had been cleared out of North Africa, 
Sicily would be the next target, but the French problem 
proved to be more difficult. 
Upon the assassination of Darlan, de Gaulle had drawn 
up a program to meet the new situation whereby his 
committee would move to Algiers and become the provisional 
government of the liberated French with himself as 
president. Giraud would be designated as commander-in-chief 
of all the French armed forces fighting with the United 
Nations. (4) 
The Giraud group had a similar plan: Giraud with his 
advisors would be the civil head and de Gaulle would be a 
member of the Vichy created Council of the Empire, and a 
military adviser. From the beginning of their association 
with the Americans, the Lemaigre-Dubreuil group had hoped to 
set up an autonomous French government in North Africa. 
While they said their first goal was a military one, they 
had a political plan as well. They considered that these 
political aims had been endorsed by the United States in the 
Giraud-Murphy Accord of November 2, 1942. This accord, based 
on several letters between Giraud and Murphy, guaranteed 
that the restoration of France to full 
independence in all the greatness and vastness 
which it possessed before the war in Europe as 
well as overseas is one of the war aims of the 
United Nations. ( 5) 
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Furthermore, the United States promised to treat the French 
as allies and declared that they would not involve 
themselves in interior administrative questions of the 
temporarily occupied territories. 
This accord had been annulled to a certain extent by 
the Clark-Darlan Treaty, by which the administration of 
North Africa was left to the French under Darlan in exchange 
for their help with the war. Now that Darlan was out of the 
picture, Lemaigre-Dubreuil tried to reestablish the terms of 
the Giraud-Murphy Accord. When Lemaigre-Dubreuil visited 
Washington at the end of Decernber 1942 to make arrangements 
for the rearming of the French, Hull agreed to see him. 
Lemaigre-Dubreuil was astonished to find that Hull knew 
nothing of the Giraud-Murphy Accord. Once Hull knew of the 
accord, Lemaigre-Dubreuil tried to get him to agree to its 
consequences: namely the formation of a provisional 
government in Algeria allowing France, independent of the 
Axis, to be represented abroad. Hull replied that, if the 
Giraud group tried to form such a government, the Foreign 
Office would insist on making de Gaulle its head. Hull did 
not think it was the right time to raise the political 
problem. ( 6) 
Informed by Hull about his talk with Lemaigre-Dubreuil 
and the Giraud-Murphy Accord, Roosevelt, just before his 
departure for Casablanca, tolo the Joint Chiefs of Staff at 
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a meeting on January 7, 1943 that Murphy, in giving certain 
pledges to restore France and the colonial possessions, "had 
exceeded his authority," (7) and that he, as President, was 
not prepared to make any promises. There were some colonial 
possessions that would not be returned to France, and he 
wanted the Chiefs of Staff to make this clear to Murphy and 
Eisenhower at Casablanca. (8) 
Like Hull, Roosevelt wanted to make no promises to 
recognise either faction as a provisional government. 
Instead he wanted to make temporary arrangements with local 
authorities as territories were liberated. He felt strongly 
that the French people should choose their own government 
after the war. 
Murphy and Macmillan had suggested that de Gaulle be 
offered joint political control with Giraud. The latter 
agreed, but de Gaulle resisted. In fact, de Gaulle refused 
to come to the conference at all. His committee did not wish 
to have any part of a government including Vichy personnel 
such as General Auguste Nog~es. Roosevelt wired Anthony Eden 
in London, "I have got the bridegroom, where is the bride?" 
(9) Only when Churchill threatened to cut off financial 
support, did de Gaulle agree to appear. 
It didn't help matters when Giraud met de Gaulle as 
though he were still the lower ranking officer who commanded 
a regiment of tanks. He had not taken account of the fact 
that he was now a powerful political force respected by 
members of the Resistance. ( 10) De Gaul le refused to 
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support the Murphy-Macmillan plan claiming it was dictated 
by the Americans and British, but did agree to have his 
photograph taken shaking hands with Giraud. 
It may have been because of his annoyance at de 
Gaulle that Roosevelt signed two memos presented to him by 
Giraud just before he left the conference and after 
Churchill had already gone. These memos, which came to be 
known as the Anfa agreement after the suburb of Casablanca 
where the conference was held, were drawn up by 
Lemaigre-Dubreuil. 
Lemaigre-Dubreuil, who questioned Giraud's ability to 
look out for his group's political interests, had managed to 
be at Casablanca by saying that he had to visit family in 
Morocco. Later Murphy would accuse Lemaigre-Dubreuil of 
lying to get to Casablanca. By signing these two memos, the 
President agreed to provide weapons and supplies to Giraud's 
forces in North Africa and to recognize Giraud as the 
military-civil commander in Africa. (11) Roosevelt also 
agreed that the letters exchanged between Murphy and Giraud 
before the meeting remained in force. By these letters, the 
United States had guaranteed the restoration of the French 
Empire and to treat France as an ally. Probably Roosevelt 
did not realize what he had signed because, in agreeing to 
the latter, he was doing what he had told the Joint Chiefs 
he opposed. 
In the political field Roosevelt had only recognized 
Giraud as the trustee of French interests, not as the head 
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of a provisional government. Nevertheless, Churchill, on 
learning of the agreement which had committed Great Britain 
to Giraud as well, insisted on amending it to include de 
Gaulle and to changing the word trustee to manager of French 
interests. Because of Giraud's indifference to politics, he 
agreed to Churchill's changes, thereby losing the political 
benefits of Anfa. (12) 
Basic differences about the nature of the post-war 
world between the British and Americans underlay the de 
Gaulle-Giraud problem. Churchill wanted a strong France 
that would counterbalance Russian hegemony in central 
Europe. Roosevelt and Hull wanted a collective security 
agreement that would enable the major powers to deal 
individually with the trouble spots. Nor did Roosevelt see 
France as one of these great powers. In a talk with Molotov 
eight months before, Roosevelt had included France as one of 
those countries that should be disarmed after the war. When 
Molotov asked about France becoming a great power, Roosevelt 
said it might happen in ten or twenty years. (13) 
It was at the Casablanca Conference that these 
different strands of Roosevelt's thinking on collective 
security began to fit together. While there Roosevelt 
discussed with his son, Elliot, his idea of trusteeship 
which would replace the old mandate system of the League of 
Nations. The trustees would report to the "organization of 
the United Nations." (14) This was the first time Elliot had 
heard of this plan. Indochina was one of the countries that 
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Roosevelt had in mind for a trusteeship and he was to 
propose this to Anthony Eden later in the spring of 1943. 
When Eden objected, an impasse developed with the British 
over colonialism in Southeast Asia. 
Differences with the British over colonialism were 
quite apparent at Casablanca. The trip to North Africa had 
reinforced Roosevelt's anti-imperialism. On his way he had 
visited Gambia where he was shocked by conditions. 
Dirt. Disease. Very high mortality rate. I 
asked, life expectancy - You'd never guess what 
it is. Twenty-six years. Those people are 
treated worse than the livestock. Their cattle 
live longer. (15) 
On returning to the United States he "talked much about the 
horrible conditions of the natives in the places he had 
stopped . " ( 16) 
At a dinner party for the Sultan of Morocco, 
Roosevelt, in front of Nogu'es and Churchill, expressed his 
sympathy for colonial aspirations for independence and 
suggested some form of economic cooperation between Morocco 
and the United States after the war. While this raised the 
hopes of North African nationalists, it only accentuated the 
differences with Churchill. 
Roosevelt's attitude could only cause problems with 
all the French. The Giraud group were no less imperial-
minded than the Free French of de Gaulle. Roosevelt probably 
perceived Giraud as being primarily concerned about military 
matters and somebody that he could control in the political 
realm. At all costs he wanted to avoid reinforcing 
Churchill's imperial ideas by recognizing his prot~g,, de 
Gaulle. 
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While the United States was committing itself to the 
support of Giraud at Casablanca, disillusionment with him 
was already evident among his supporters. Discouraged by 
Giraud's weakness, Lemaigre-Dubreuil had not accepted any 
position in his administration, becoming instead his 
political adviser. Lemaigre-Dubreuil complained that instead 
of a total rupture with Vichy, the new situation left P'tain 
in a certain sentimental place as "prisoner" of the Germans 
and the Vichy collaborators still in place. (17) 
General Mast had good reason to be disillusioned. 
Mast, who had been Giraud's representative in North Africa 
before the invasion, expressed real bitterness about the way 
Giraud refused to intervene when Darlan expelled Mast and 
the other officers, who had helped with the United Nations 
invasion, from the army "even though" as Mast wrote, "the 
most elementary moral sense would have dictated to him to 
oppose it with energy." (18) 
Nor did Giraud intervene when Darlan had Vichy strip 
Mast and the others of their French citizenship. Only 
because Mast went to Eisenhower, who intervened with Darlan, 
was their citizenship restored. According to Mast, Giraud on 
the civilian front was obviously not a chief - "one who 
takes responsibility and covers his subordinates for the 
consequences of the mission he had given them." (19) Since 
Mast and the others had lost their army positions, Giraud 
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decided to group them in a liaison mission to the United 
Nations forces under Mast's command. They were installed in 
a few rooms in the St. George's Hotel in Algiers where the 
United Nations forces had their headquarters. (20) 
Other officers, who had helped the United States 
before the invasion, were not as lucky as Mast and his 
group. There was a program of removing those officers and 
sending them to remote posts where chance of contact with 
Americans was slim. One of the best French regiments which 
had tried to prevent Nogu~s from resisting the American 
landing had been practically disbanded. (21) 
In his position as head of the liaison mission to the 
United Nations forces, Mast was able to observe Eisenhower's 
conduct of the war. This campaign was not proceeding as 
swiftly as had been anticipated. The strategic plan 
formulated before the disembarkment was for the First 
British Army under General Kenneth Anderson to clean out the 
Axis troops from Tunisia. Once this was accomplished, he was 
to go to southern Tunisia and fight Rommel whose army was 
being pursued by the British Eighth Army coming from Libya. 
Difficulties with supplies, heavy rains, and deep mud in the 
northern part of Tunisia had stopped Anderson's advance in 
December. The Germans, who had poured troops into the 
Bizerte-Tunis area, began a counterattack which put the 
United Nations forces on the defensive. Observing the troops 
mired down in the mud in early December, Eisenhower decided 
to halt operations on a line in Tunisia running from Medjez-
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el-Bab in the north to Gafsa in the south. This line was 
held by British troops in the north, French (African Army) 
in the center, and American in the south. 
While the offensive from the west temporarily halted, 
that from the east by the British Eighth Army was advancing 
westward in Libya and on February 2 crossed the Tunisian 
border. Concerned about his position, Rommel began a series 
of attacks on his western front in February causing bitter 
fighting, but by March United Nations counterattacks forced 
the Germans to begin falling back. Soon the attack from two 
fronts was successful, and on May 7 American and French 
troops took Bizerte while the British at approximately the 
same time entered Tunis. Though several more days were 
required for mopping up and for collecting the prisoners, 
this was the real end of the Tunisian battle. 
Mast believed that victory could have come by the end 
of December if the Americans had reinforced Anderson's two 
British brigades. Unfortunately a powerful German army 
supported by airplanes from Sicily could not be beaten by 
only two British brigades. (22) Instead of committing more 
of their troops to battle, according to Mast, the American 
command was preoccupied with training their troops behind 
the combat zone while others were protecting the rear in 
Morocco in case of a German invasion through Spain. Mast 
found that there was no United Nations strategic plan to 
combat a classic German strategy which had been well thought 
out. Mast blamed this on Eisenhower's lack of 
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experience. (23) He was struck by the fact that, even though 
the United Nations had numerical superiority, the troops 
committed to battle were always less than what the Germans 
had and for this reason could not impose their will. (24) 
Mast was also critical of the Americans for not 
rearming the French as they had promised at the meeting that 
he had had with Mark Clark at Cherchel. While the French 
African Army had fought well, they could have done better 
with proper arms. From Constantine in January Doolittle 
confirmed what Mast said about the French forces in southern 
Tunisia being badly armed. They were armed with old 
material, and what modern weapons they possessed were short 
of ammunition. Their losses had already been heavy. 
Doolittle thought 
if the elite French troops now there should 
receive a beating for lack of equipment, 
food, and services the morale of the French 
army, none too good except in the isolated 
units and individuals, may also receive a 
blow which will permanently render French 
assistance useless. It is to be hoped that 
the Allied command will make use of their 
knowledge of the ground and local tactics 
instead of letting this happen. (25) 
Doolittle was also concerned because the Germans were giving 
the Tunisians in the Axis occupied area of Tunisia goods 
that had been pillaged locally and were reported to be 
arming Tunisian snipers in northern Tunisia. However, he had 
learned that plans were under way to counteract this by 
buying those Tunisians back with foodstuffs and 
clothing. (26) 
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Not only was there the French African Army of 150,000 
men under Giraud fighting in North Africa, but there were 
the de Gaulle Free French forces of 15,000 fighting. One 
Free French division under Le Clerc had come north to 
Tunisia from Chad while another under Larminat was fighting 
with the British Eighth in Libya. Rivalry existed between 
the French African Army and the Free French forces each of 
which tried to recruit from the other. This was one of the 
reasons Churchill and Roosevelt were trying to bring the 
factions together. Mast had the opportunity to compare the 
morale of these two forces when in February he was offered a 
new mission. 
When General Georges Catroux came to North Africa as 
liaison between the de Gaulle and Giraud groups, Mast 
explained to Catroux how Giraud, frightened by his illegal 
position, sought always to get back into what he believed to 
be legality. This obsession, Mast observed, had eliminated 
all those officers responsible for the rebellion and without 
whom Giraud would not have become the leader. (27) Now that 
Giraud had been named civil and military commander-in-chief 
by the Council of the Empire, he signed all his decisions in 
the name of the "Marechal empech/. 11 Mast explained to 
Catroux the heartbreaking situation of all the officers 
abandoned by their chief and for this reason put in 
quarantine by the rest of the army. While Catroux could not 
intervene, he proposed to Mast to come as a liaison to the 
Free French forces in Egypt and Lebanon. Giraud agreed to 
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let Mast go on this new assignment. (28) 
Mast had no sooner assumed his new job than an 
incident occurred that made him aware of its importance. A 
young French soldier appeared in Algiers in a torn shirt. 
This soldier, who was fighting with the de Gaulle forces in 
southern Tunisia, had been allowed to leave his unit to 
visit his family in Algiers only to find himself badly 
treated in an encounter with soldiers belonging to Giraud's 
French African Army. (29) 
When Mast visited the First Free French Division of 
General Larminat, he discoverd a far better morale among the 
soldiers than that of the soldiers of the French African 
Army who were jealous of each other, disputed among 
themselves, and among whom defeatism was prevalent. The 
defeatism among the latter was so strong that, at the time 
of Rommel's attack in southern Tunisia, a French colonel had 
been impatient for the Germans to arrive at Constantine. 
Mast believed that the defeatism of Vichy had left its mark 
on these men and they were afraid to show their patriotism. 
Because of Catroux's intervention, Mast would later 
be appointed as Resident General of Tunisia. Giraud had 
wanted somebody else, but Catroux had said it was important 
to choose somebody who had never accepted the principles of 
Vichy's National Revolution. (30) A broken hip, resulting 
from an airplane accident in Lebanon, would keep Mast from 
assuming his post at the time of the Tunisian victory. 
General Alphonse Juin served as acting Resident General 
until he had recuperated. 
In Washington Secretary of War Stimson considered 
winning in Tunisia a significant step in the war. In his 
diary on May 12, 1943, he wrote, "Today is a great day of 
victory for the allied arms in Tunisia." (31) His press 
conference was a "jubilant occasion because of the 
victory," (32) over 150,000 prisoners had been taken. He 
told the press that 
the defeat of the Axis in Tunisia was more 
than the loss of an army - it was the loss of 
a campaign, the loss of a continent. The 
battle of Tunisia ranks with the battle of 
Stalingrad as one of the two great military 
disasters suffered by the Germans within a few 
months. (33) 
At the same time as Stimson was celebrating the 
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military victory in Tunisia, Cordell Hull was proclaiming it 
a victory for the Vichy policy. Talking with Churchill, who 
was in Washington, Hull said, "'Your' and our Vichy policy 
has been justified and vindicated 100 per cent." (34) Hull 
had been sensitive to the criticism of this policy as well 
as the constant press attacks. It would be only two months 
later in July 1943 that Hull requested from Stimson access 
to material for a book that he was having written on the 
Vichy policy by William Langer (Our Vichy Gamble). 
While Churchill was in Washington, he discussed the 
Giraud-de Gaulle problem. Progress had been made since the 
Casablanca conference in bringing the two factions together. 
This was partly due to the efforts of Jean Monnet, a French 
businessman who had originally gone to Washington to work 
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with the British Purchasing Commission. He was highly 
regarded by Harry Hopkins who persuaded Roosevelt to send 
him to North Africa to work with Giraud on handling the Lend 
Lease supplies for equipping the French Army. (35) According 
to Robert Sherwood, this was one time when Hopkins 
successfully circumvented the State Department. Hull had not 
wanted Monnet to be sent, believing him too closely 
connected with the Lazard Fr~res banking firm which had ties 
to the de Gaulle organization in London. (36) 
As soon as Monnet arrived in Algiers, he realized 
that changes were needed. He persuaded Giraud to do away 
with the Vichy laws and to institute more democratic ones. 
On March 5 in a radio address Giraud announced that "France 
had no racial prejudices." (37) Then on March 14 Giraud made 
a speech advocating that all Frenchmen fighting the Axis 
should unite meaning, of course, the French African Army and 
the Free French forces. He also advocated the return to a 
more democratic regime. On the eighteenth he had ordinances 
published restoring the laws of the French Republic and 
abrogating those imposed on North Africa by the Vichy 
government, while letting it be known that he was ready to 
receive General de Gaulle in order to form a union. (38) 
Commenting on Giraud's speech of the fourteenth, 
Doolittle, who had been temporarily assigned to Rabat, 
Morocco in February, said the French there were unanimously 
in favor, and the bulk of the population approved of the 
ordinances. They had traditionally been left-wing 
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republicans and had favored de Gaulle. Almost all Frenchmen 
wanted to see the independence of France restored. 
There was, however, a minority opposed to the 
ordinances. Among those opposed were high ranking government 
officials, army and navy officers, and former leaders of the 
Legion. These officials and officers were worried that they 
might be called to account under a more democratic regime 
for their actions since 1940. Some were simply reactionary. 
This minority considered "the maintenance or installation of 
a 'strong' government as important as the defeat of 
Germany." (39) Doolittle thought this group might have been 
used by pro-Germans such as Laval, but any pro-German 
activity they engaged in was only incidental to their main 
purpose of building a "strong" government. They adapted 
easily to the situation created by the United Nations 
landing up to the point where it was important to revise 
internal policy. According to Doolittle: 
Here they were incapable of flexibility. On 
the contrary they resorted to every device to 
prevent public opinion from expressing itself 
and to retard the inevitable. (40) 
Nogu~s was still one of the primary obstacles to the 
union Giraud was now proposing to de Gaulle. Doolittle had 
had an opportunity to talk to Nogu~s in person. He described 
him as having a "flexible" character which had made him more 
susceptible to orders from Vichy than Esteva, whom he 
described as the "inflexible 'Bearded Virgin' of Tunis, who 
when pushed too far, flew to Vichy, pounded on tables and 
flatly refused the more outrageous requirements." (41) 
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Removing Nogu'es would do a great deal to elevate the moral 
tone of all of Morocco. (42) Doolittle, who had had the 
opportunity to know Nogues and Esteva, both of whom had 
followed Vichy at the time of the invasion, seemed to have 
retained more respect for Esteva than Nogu~s. 
While de Gaulle let Giraud know he had received his 
message with pleasure and that he hoped to go to North 
Africa soon, it required two more months of negotiations 
before de Gaulle actually left London for Algiers. Finally 
he arrived in late May and on June 3 Giraud and de Gaulle 
announced formation of the French Committee of National 
Liberation on which the two would share the presidency. A 
contributing factor to the union may have been the evident 
popularity of the de Gaullists both in North Africa and in 
mainland France. The Germans' total occupation of France 
and the drafting of French workers starting in February 1943 
for work in Germany had caused many French to look toward de 
Gaulle as the main hope of deliverance from the Axis. The 
various Resistance movements had pulled together into a 
National Council of the Resistance under Jean Moulin and 
announced that they considered de Gaulle their leader on May 
15. (43) 
Hull and Roosevelt decided to accept the French 
Committee of National Liberation because it had promised it 
would turn over its power to the Provisional French 
Government to be established after liberation. (44) 
Roosevelt had insisted that Giraud keep command of 
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the army and since Churchill agreed with this, Giraud 
remained as commander-in-chief. 
The fusion of the de Gaulle-Giraud factions did not 
stop the problems nor did it ease the annoyance of Roosevelt 
and Hull with de Gaulle. Hull expressed his bias against de 
Gaulle in the lack of recognition given to the military 
achievements of the de Gaullists in North Africa. Though 
these were considerable with much loss of life among the 
Free French, Hull in a memo to the President which he quoted 
in his "Memoirs" said: 
It cannot but be realized from your message of 
congratulations for the Allied victory in North 
Africa that the real French contribution was 
given by the French forces under General Giraud, 
while throughout the period of the battle 
de Gaulle, through his political agitation 
directed from London, caused nothing but 
disturbance and concern to our military 
commanders. (45) 
In his determination to justify the Vichy policy, Hull 
discredited the Free French divisions even though they 
deserved praise. ( 4 6) 
In spite of the union, problems continued in North 
Africa. One problem was that each army continued to recruit 
soldiers from the other. In Tunisia the Free French troops 
who had come from Chad under LeClerc and those who had been 
fighting with the English Eighth under Larminat had been 
welcomed with enthusiasm. (47) After the victory parade in 
Tunis a fight for recruitment began between the two forces. 
Recruiting bureaus were set up. Since the Free French troops 
had new and modern uniforms, they were at an advantage. 
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Entire units of Giraud's African French troops rallied to 
the Free French. Another reason for the success of the 
recruiting offices opened by the de Gaulle forces in 
Tunisian towns under Generals Leclerc and de Larminat was 
explained at some length by Doolittle after he returned to 
Tunisia. Before the November 8 landing, Tunisia had been the 
most favorably inclined toward the United Nations cause of 
any of the North African countries. This was because of the 
menace of an Italian takeover. Tunisia's rather small French 
population was equalled by Italians, and there was an active 
Italian Armistice Commission resident in Tunisia. In some 
respects Tunisia was like an occupied territory. These 
conditions as well as the closeness to the fighting in 
Tripolitania caused the spirits of the French to go up as 
the British armies moved westward and those of the Italians 
to go up as the fighting moved eastward. With the last big 
advance by Rommel, the French realized the danger in which 
they stood. (48) 
Before November 8, with the exception of a few 
officials who worked for Vichy, according to Doolittle, 
the feelings were almost entirely for de Gaulle as Giraud 
had not appeared on the scene. Doolittle may have been 
expressing a selective perception here since he had mainly 
talked to Resistance French. Other French who lived in 
Tunisia at the time recall that P'tain enjoyed substantial 
support among the colonists until the invasion. After that 
de Gaulle being better known through the radio was favored 
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over Giraud. During the Axis occupation the spirit of 
resistance was so pronounced that the Vichy regime was 
required to send over from France "special strong arm 
squads" to replace the heads of the Legion and other 
pro-Vichy organizations. Only a few French Tunisians were 
found ready to persecute their fellow Frenchmen. (49) 
After the invasion most of the French residents of 
Tunisia, knowing that Giraud was leading the North African 
French forces, assumed that this was simply a part of the 
whole and that the union between Giraud and de Gaulle would 
be arrived at quickly. Reports of dissension between the two 
men, which appeared in the German controlled press and over 
the radio, were considered as so much propaganda. When 
the United Nations forces arrived and Tunis was retaken, the 
inhabitants were surprised to learn that the dissension was 
true. The surprise turned to wonder and finally to 
annoyance. It was in this context that the de Gaulle 
recruiting was successful. ( 5 0) 
When de Gaulle visited Tunis in late June, he 
expressed some of his feelings about the American attitude 
toward him. On his arrival he had received an enthusiastic 
reception. At a dinner in his honor Doolittle asked him how 
he had liked the reception given him by the Tunis crowd. 
The General drew himself up to his full 
height, which is a great deal, and stated 
that it was to be expected because there was 
no doubt of the sentiment of the majority of 
Frenchmen in regard to the Free French 
Movement, sentiment which was unfortunately 
ignored by representatives of certain 
governments for political reasons. (51) 
150 
When Doolittle asked him about this remark, de Gaulle 
explained he was referring to the representatives of the 
American government who, while declaring for the unity of 
the French people, were rendering that unity impossible by 
not permitting the necessary changes which would produce 
such unity. "For instance, he said, the creation of this 
half-and-half committee at Algiers . . was directly due to 
American intervention." (52) 
After dinner, while coffee was being served, de Gaulle 
came up to Doolittle and asked him to sit and talk with him. 
The General praised the United States action in North 
Africa, but said that the Americans had overlooked one 
thing, 
the sentiment of the French people underlying 
the group of big colonists, industrialists, 
and military figures with whom the Americans 
had dealt and who had introduced the figure of 
General Giraud. (53) 
Giraud, he considered "a fine soldier, a courageous patriot, 
and altogether a splendid person," (54) but at that time 
there were only two possible "mysticisms or loyalties, that 
of Vichy and Marshal Pe'tain, who stood for defeat, and that 
of the Free French, who had always stood for resistance and 
resurrection of France." (55) He explained to Doolittle that 
the Americans should not have been surprised at the coolness 
of Giraud's reception in North Africa since he stood for 
neither or both at the same time and could not possibly have 
any political influence. Too many people with the Vichy 
spirit surrounded General Giraud and the small people who 
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represented the other side had not been given the voice they 
deserved. ( 5 6) 
De Gaulle complained to Doolittle about American 
newspaper attacks which 
accused him of being 1. a fascist and 
reactionary 2. a communist 3. desirous of 
bringing back the old French parliamentary 
machine with all its faults and 4. personally 
ambitious to emulate Hitler himself. (57) 
All of these were false, he said, and he wondered why the 
American press was so poorly informed on the objectives of 
his movement. (58) 
was 
In this, his first meeting with de Gaulle, Doolittle 
greatly impressed ... with his evident 
sincerity and directness. De Gaulle is 
obviously fanatic, a man with a single 
idea, but there is no doubt of his hold 
on the rank and file of the French people, 
or even in the lower ranks of the French 
North African Army which has rapidly 
gravitated in the direction of the Free 
French Forces wherever there has been 
contact between the two groups. (59) 
Doolittle thought de Gaulle's visit had "infused new life 
into the de Gaulle movement in Tunisia," (60) but, because 
of the withdrawal of almost all the Free French forces to 
Tripoli with the British Eighth Army, recruiting had fallen 
off. 
While the rivalry between the two factions over 
recruitment may have lessened, that between the two leaders 
on the Committee continued. Differences between them were so 
bad that in September Murphy told the State Department that 
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it threatened the prosecution of the war. Just as Giraud 
was losing his troops to the de Gaulle forces, so was he 
losing ground to de Gaulle in the political field. Harold 
Macmillan made an interesting observation about Giraud in 
his War Diaries. After calling on him in late June he wrote: 
The old boy was as charming and as vague as 
ever. I like him more and more, but of course 
he is really out of his depth. (61) 
No doubt it was because Giraud was "out of his depth" that 
de Gaulle would be able by November to force him out of the 
FCNL though he still retained the title of commander-in-
chief of the French armies. Macmillan talked to de Gaulle 
the night Giraud left the Committee in November and had this 
to say about de Gaulle. 
Once again I ended the day feeling that 
de Gaulle stood head and shoulders above all 
his colleagues in the breadth of his 
conception for the long term. Meanwhile, he 
was clearly the victor in the short-term 
struggle for power. Giraud, while remaining 
for the time being Commander-in-Chief, left 
the Commit tee. ( 6 2) 
While the power struggle between de Gaulle and Giraud 
that Roosevelt and Churchill had tried to resolve at 
Casablanca had finally been settled, the Committee still 
struggled to get Roosevelt to recognize them as the 
provisional government. Churchill had brought up recognition 
when he had been in Washington in May, and then in July he 
had sent Roosevelt a wire urging him to recognize the 
Committee. According to Macmillan, 
he did seven drafts of it before sending it. 
It is witty, convincing, pleading - loyal all 
at once. I feel it must have an effect. (63) 
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It had no effect on Roosevelt nor did a wire from Eisenhower 
who also wanted immediate recognition of the Committee. 
Roosevelt was determined that the French people 
should choose their own government after the war. De 
Gaulle's ousting Giraud from the Committee simply increased 
Roosevelt's antagonism toward de Gaulle and his 
determination not to recognise the Committee. He feared 
that, by doing so, he would be endorsing him as the postwar 
head of the French government. Now more concerned than ever 
about what he perceived as de Gaulle's dictatorial 
tendencies, he was afraid de Gaulle would not give the 
French people a chance to choose their own goverment after 
the Germans were expelled and his leadership would cause 
civil war in France. It would not be until October 1944 that 
Roosevelt finally agreed to granting recogniton. Macmillan 
contended that by snubbing de Gaulle, the Americans elevated 
him in French eyes. 
Furthermore, the Americans in backing Giraud had 
backed a general with very old fashioned, right-wing ideas, 
one of whose main concerns had been reestablishing his own 
"legitimacy" with Vichy. He was obviously out of step with 
the mainstream of French political opinion. 
One can only wonder at Robert Murphy's inability to 
perceive Giraud's political limitations. In the spring 
Murphy had actually tried to impede the Giraud-de Gaulle 
union. According to Macmillan: 
The situation vis-a-vis the Giraud de Gaulle 
negotiations is becoming very difficult. My 
colleague Murphy is back at his old tricks and 
trying to impede the union, without quite 
consciously admitting (even to himself) that 
he is doing so. He has an incurable habit of 
seeing every kind of person and agreeing with 
them all in turn. (64) 
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Instead of recognizing that Giraud represented a political 
viewpoint that was too far to the right to be acceptable to 
the majority of the French and which was not in keeping with 
American ideals, Murphy was trying to maintain exclusive 
control for Giraud. At the same time the Giraud-de Gaulle 
conflict was working itself out, another one was taking 
place in North Africa involving Murphy and Doolittle. 
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CHAPTER VII 
RECALL OF DOOLITTLE 
Unlike the Giraud-de Gaulle conflict, that between 
Murphy and Doolittle was not a power struggle. Instead it 
was a clash over whether the United States should stand by 
its principles, enunciated in the Atlantic Charter, and 
acknowledge Tunisian aspirations for self-determination 
or whether it should ignore these in order to keep peace 
with the French. The latter course was expedient militarily, 
and Murphy stood by it steadfastly. Doolittle, on the other 
hand, did his best to open Murphy's eyes to the plight of 
the Tunisians under the repressive policy of the French 
after the Germans were expelled. 
When Esteva permitted the Germans to occupy Tunisia, 
he not only made it necessary for the United Nations to 
fight an extended campaign to liberate that country, but he 
also brought about serious economic and political 
disruptions. One was the severe inflation caused when the 
Germans imported French bank notes and threw upon the 
market, at their arrival, the reserve stocks of wheat and 
foodstuffs built up by Admiral Esteva. Although ample 
supplies were available at first, shortages soon followed, 
and the black market became the only source of food. While 
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the rich could survive, the poor nearly starved. With 
Italian guidance the Germans also looted the textile and 
clothing stores and distributed their goods to the Tunisians 
thus to show their friendliness. (1) 
Politically French authority had been severely shaken 
by the occupation. The administration had almost collapsed. 
The French civil control officers who had resisted the Axis 
had been arrested by the Gestapo, usually after being 
denounced by the Tunisians, local Italians or Frenchmen 
belonging to the Service d'Ordre de la L'gion (S.O.L.). 
Those who collaborated had come under the control of the 
local caids, the chiefs of the S.O.L or the occupation 
authorities. When the Germans left many of the French 
collaborators left with them. (2) 
In general, the Germans were hard on the French 
population. They requisitioned and occupied French homes 
while the terrified owners remained cowering in the 
basement. While some of the Germans, usually the higher 
ranking ones, were correct in relation with the French, 
others carried away household property when they left before 
the United Nations advance. The Italians, dominant after the 
Axis occupation had taken place, also treated the French and 
Tunisians badly. Encouraged by the Fascists, who distributed 
black shirts, they looted and humiliated the French. The 
Germans and Tunisians also engaged in looting. For the most 
part, any farm whether Tunisian or French was pillaged if it 
were abandoned. 
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While the French suffered under the Germans, it was 
nothing compared to the Jews. Albert Memmi, a Tunisian 
Jewish author, described vividly in La Statue de Sel what it 
was like to be Jewish during the German occupation. Measures 
against the Jews started the day after the Germans landed at 
the airport. During the nisht the Germans had installed 
their command posts. The following morning the German 
commander took the first anti-Jewish measure. 
Armed with well made lists, the German police, 
accompanied by French colleagues went to 
collect several hundred hostages. It was 
announced that at the first refusal they would 
be shot. Then the requisitions, the exactions 
and the assassinations began. (3) 
On the eighth day the Germans required all Jewish men 
eighteen to forty to assemble so they might be sent to 
concentration camps. The first response of the Jewish 
community was to send a delegation to Admiral Esteva to ask 
for advice and protection. He simply sent it away declaring 
he was under the orders of the Germans. Memmi himself was in 
one of the camps. (4) 
In Tunisia Jewish property was requisitioned while in 
rural areas Jews were forced to sell their holdings of olive 
oil and turn the proceeds over to the Germans. There were 
compulsory Jewish labor gangs, the expenses for which were 
borne by the Jewish community. There was a levy to defray 
Anglo-American aerial bomb damage. In a report prepared by 
the United States Treasury, it was estimated that the 
monetary cost to the Jews was 100,000,000 francs 
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($2,000,000). 
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To underwrite the expenses imposed upon them, the Jewish 
community in Tunis made a capital levy of ten to fifteen 
percent upon the property of its members and borrowed funds 
from French banks at high rates. Individuals were forced to 
sell property and personal effects to meet their levies. 
Much of their property was mortgaged to French banks. After 
the liberation, the banks threatened mortgage foreclosures 
on those who had not met their payments because of lack of 
funds. (5) 
After the United Nations retook Tunisia, Henry 
Morgenthau took a personal interest in this matter. He asked 
the American Consul General in Algiers to urge the French to 
adopt a program to undo the economic hurt inflicted upon the 
Jews in Tunisia. The matter dragged on for several months 
during which time the President was kept informed. In 
November 1943 Consul General Wiley advised Morgenthau that 
"in view of local political considerations" presentation of 
the program seemed inadvisable. Not meddling in French 
politics was consistent with American policy in North 
Africa. Apparently there was a "bitter dispute" (6) in the 
State Department over the program. The Political Division of 
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the State Department claiQed that the problem was an 
internal one for the French and that it should make no 
recommendation even though Dean Acheson supported 
Morgenthau's position. Finally the American position was 
presented in late November and December to the French who 
said they would give it further study. (7) This same problem 
of whether or not to interfere in French affairs was 
involved in the Doolittle-Murphy conflict which came to the 
attention of the President in November 1943. 
While the middle class Tunisians stayed neutral, many 
of the poorer Tunisians collaborated at the beginning of the 
German occupation. The fact that the Germans were the 
conquerors gave them prestige. The Tunisians may have been 
even more impressed by the way the German soldiers treated 
them as equals and made no distinction between them and the 
Europeans. The Tunisians preferred the German soldiers, who 
ate in their houses and played with their babies, to the 
French who treated them poorly. According to Memmi, it was a 
miracle that the Tunisians were not completely won over by 
the Nazis, for nothing was overlooked - promises of 
independence, Arab radio broadcasts by Radio Berlin, and 
reminders of the Islamic friendship of William II. (9) 
The Bey, of course, was the object of special 
attention by the Axis. During the occupation both the German 
and Italian consuls tried to establish direct relations with 
him only to be referred back to Admiral Esteva. The Bey told 
them that all transactions should be carried on through 
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normal channels. (10) Attempts were made to get the Bey to 
declare war against the United Nations and, after an 
especially bad bombing of Tunis, to have him condemn 
publicly the barbaric methods of the Anglo-Saxons. He 
refused both of these. He also refused the Italian consul's 
suggestion that he denounce the French treaty of the 
Protectorate and replace it with one with Italy. Instead, 
the Bey told the Italian consul that he would be grateful if 
the Italian government, which was holding members of the 
Destour in Rome, including Bourguiba, would hasten their 
return to Tunisia. The consul left the palace "white with 
rage." (11) 
From the beginning of the occupation the Italian and 
German consuls pressured the Bey to bestow decorations on a 
list of twenty-six of their countrymen. The Bey interposed 
objections and inquired of Admiral Esteva if it would be in 
keeping with his November 8, 1942 position of neutrality. 
Esteva replied that conferring the decoration was not 
incompatible with his position. Finally on April 30 the Bey 
presented the decorations in the presence of Esteva. These 
actions of the Bey were of importance later when Hooker 
Doolittle would urge his superiors to resist the French 
desire to depose the Bey because of his alleged 
collaboration. (12) 
The Bey, who had begun to regain some of his powers 
from the French before the invasion, became increasingly 
independent during the occupation. The Germans treated him 
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as an autonomous sovereign. One example of his independence 
was seen in an interview the Bey had with a representative 
of Pe"tain from Vichy as reported in a Tunisian newspaper. 
According to Doolittle, it was noteworthy that the interview 
had been published at all as it never would have been under 
the French. In the beginning of the interview, the Bey 
asked about the "health of the Marshal for whom he held a 
particular affection." (13) He said also that he hoped 
that in the future Tunisia and France would have a common 
destiny. In spite of the many errors committed by the 
French, the Bey declared "we desire to pass the sponge over 
the past." (14) The Bey continued by stating that he had 
named new ministers and that he was certain France would 
"demonstrate her comprehension and justice. 11 (15) The Bey 
brought up the list of Tunisian claims that had been 
presented to Esteva the previous year. The representative 
requested a copy and said he was sure the Marshal would 
support a new policy in Tunisia. Doolittle remarked that the 
outspokenness of the Bey demonstrated that French control 
was ''illusory if not actually non-existent." (16) 
One of the ministers the Bey appointed was Habib 
Bourguiba who had been imprisoned in Marseille without trial 
since 1938. When the Germans occupied all of France in 
November 1942, they sent him to Rome, where they hoped he 
could be used for propaganda purposes. Apparently they 
were unaware that in October 1942 Bourguiba had sent his 
wife and son back to Tunis with a personal message to the 
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American consulate that ample time for reflection had made 
him realize that the Tunisians could expect nothing from the 
Germans and that he was telling his followers to support the 
United Nations. (17) 
As an example of this support by the Destourians, 
Doolittle in a letter to Murphy, pointed out that in 
February 1943, when Rommel made his push against Kasserine 
and drove the Americans and French out of Tozeur and Nafta, 
areas where the Tunisians had always been considered very 
anti-European, the retreating French asked the Destourians 
of Tozeur to handle the policing of Tozeur. They did such a 
good job that no looting took place there "and not even the 
Jews were molested." (18) 
Even though Bourguiba was treated handsomely by the 
Italians in Rome, he resisted their attempts to have him 
ally himself with the Axis. While he made a speech from Rome 
to the Tunisians, he made it sufficiently ambiguous to 
give no aid to the Italians. In fact, he was probably 
referring to Italian designs on Tunisia when he said "while 
our country is the theater of operations it is at the same 
time a booty of colonization." He ended by saying that 
"he hoped to join them as soon as circumstances 
permit," (19) and by asking the Tunisians to obey Moncef 
Bey. 
The Axis sent Bourguiba back to Tunisia in March of 
1943. While he found that some of the Destourian cells had 
cooperated with the Germans, won over by the promise of 
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freedom and independence, he quickly took the matter in hand 
and turned the Neo-Destour back in favor of the United 
Nations. Bourguiba wrote, 
My first care was to put the brakes on the 
purely sentimental movement which carried 
certain militants toward the Axis powers 
because they had liberated all the imprisoned 
Destourians. (20) 
While it would still be several months before 
Doolittle would be involved directly with the economic and 
political problems caused by the German occupation, he was 
already anticipating them in Constantine. The economic 
situation, he said, would be catastrophic with "ruined 
ports, railroads, electric plants, water supplies," (21) all 
of which would have to be reestablished immediately. 
Politically the situation would be more complicated. The 
French would undoubtedly throw out the Vichy partisans in 
the administration but the status of the Tunisians, who 
constituted five-sixths of the population, would still 
present a "very delicate" problem. (22) 
Before the United Nations invasion of November 8 the 
Bey of Tunis had begun to regain from the French Resident 
General some of his powers. Doolittle said the latest 
information from Tunisia indicated the Germans were treating 
him as an independent sovereign. Because of the political 
sophistication of the urban Tunisians and because the 
Germans were playing up to him, Doolittle believed the 
French could no longer treat the Bey solely as a puppet. 
Since the Americans would have the primary responsibility of 
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feeding, clothing, and reequipping Tunisia, he thought they 
should serve as a buffer between the French and the 
Tunisians. Because of its role in supplying the "stricken 
Tunisian population," (23) the United States should be in a 
position to impose its decision on these opposing groups. 
To do this, there should be an American representative with 
definite instructions as to policy and with authority to 
carry it out. Although in this despatch to his superiors in 
the State Department Doolittle was arguing for an American 
policy to be established which would allow the American 
consul in Tunisia to serve as an intermediary between the 
French and the Tunisians, this was later to be denied him, 
and he was not to be consulted on Tunisian policy. 
For their part the French, well aware of the prestige 
they had lost during the German occupation, were making 
their own plans to reestablish their authority as soon as 
Tunisia would be recaptured. One obvious step needed was to 
unify the two factions so there would be one definite 
authority. In a report to the Free French in London in April 
1943, the Secretary General of their Algerian mission 
reported that Tunisia was in a chaotic state with two enemy 
armies and five United Nations armies operating there. Each 
army was recruiting their political agents among the French 
or the Tunisians. According to the Secretary General, the 
French administration had disappeared or had no more 
prestige. The leading Tunisians were absent while those who 
had collaborated had fled with the Germans. The faithful had 
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been taken to the rear. Every troop was acting as its own 
police, administering on the spot, and pillaging at random. 
To reestablish order the Secretary General thought it 
crucial that the political and military unity of the Empire 
be achieved. He meant, of course, a solution to the 
Giraud-de Gaulle problem. 
To delay this risked compromising French 
authority in the region which had always 
been the most difficult to govern in North 
Africa and the most receptive to anti-French 
forces. (24) 
Other measures were also being considered, the most 
important of which was the deposition of the Bey. In a 
report from one of the French civil controllers in Tunisia 
during the occupation on what steps would be necessary after 
the war, he thought it was "important to exploit the 
occasion to diminish the importance taken by the Beylical 
family." (25) This controller in his report pointed out the 
"need to be tolerant with the Destourians whose only error 
was to nourish premature ideas of national liberation." (26) 
Perhaps because he saw the Destourians as weak, this 
Frenchman did not see them as the threat other Frenchman 
would. He also thought it would be important to ameliorate 
the conditions of life for the Tunisians. 
In February 1943 Doolittle was assigned to Rabat, 
Morocco. While there he learned that the French were 
considering deposing the Bey. Pointing out the Bey's 
pro-United Nations sympathies, he wrote Murphy that he 
thought this was a serious mistake and that the Americans 
should intercede to prevent the French from doing it. In 
bringing up the question of the deposition of the Bey, 
Doolittle was broaching a subject on which he and Murphy 
were to differ profoundly. 
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Doolittle asked to be excused for putting in his "six 
cents", but said that if he was to go back to Tunisia, he 
felt strongly that the Bey should not be deposed. It would 
be an opportunity for the French to rid themselves of a Bey 
"with a mind of his own" (27) and to wipe out the vestiges 
of Tunisian nationalism, but he did not see any reason for 
the United States to be a party to such action. 
Doolittle asked what acts of the Bey were reproached. 
The only ones he could think of were that the Bey had 
received the Germans and had decorated a German general or 
two. He asked though "what would any of us have done in the 
position of the Bey?" (28) He then asked about the pressure 
brought by the American Army on the Sultan of Morocco for 
private audiences and decorations. He concluded by saying 
it was his opinion that "we have everything to lose and 
nothing to gain by deposing the most popular sovereign of 
Tunisia since Naceur Bey," (29) the present Bey's father. 
Murphy, however, took the position that it was a 
strictly French problem. In replying to Doolittle, Murphy 
told him that his letter carried the thought that the United 
States was going to deal directly with the Tunisian 
question; "I have the feeling that that is a contract which 
we do not want to assume." (30) Murphy believed that the 
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United States probably did not want to deal directly with 
the Tunisians. He didn't think that the United States or the 
British wanted to take over the responsibility of 
administering Tunisia from the French nor did the United 
States want to interfere in French internal policy as long 
as that policy did not interfere in the war effort. 
Cooperation of the French was more important than the 
position of the Bey, as long as the protectorate was 
maintained. (31) 
Doolittle responded by saying that he feared Murphy 
had missed the point. Doolittle had never meant for the 
United States to deal directly with the Tunisians, 
but, since the French and the Americans were fighting 
together against the Axis, whatever policy the French 
adopted would surely be attributed to the Americans as well. 
Whether the Americans wished to assume ''the contract" or 
not, Doolittle thought the United States would be held 
responsible. Everyone would believe the Americans had been 
consulted in the matter and told the French to go ahead. 
Because of this, Doolittle believed that the United States 
should "restrain the action apparently envisaged." (32) 
Should it turn out badly, the French would be the first to 
say that the Americans approved or even ordered the action 
to be taken. Later events proved that Doolittle was 
essentially right because the French would ask if the 
Americans approved of deposing the Bey before they did it. 
Doolittle referred to a memo prepared by Lieutenant 
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Archie Roosevelt, a cousin of the President and an OSS agent 
in Morocco. In this memo Roosevelt had come independently to 
the conclusion that it would be a bad policy to allow a 
spirit of revenge to prevail in handling the Tunisian 
question after the arrival of the United Nations forces in 
Tunisia. 
Doolittle told Murphy that if he, Doolittle, were 
going to go back to Tunisia, he would be the person 
responsible for carrying out any policy or lack of policy. 
Even though Doolittle had not been consulted on Tunisian 
affairs since leaving Constantine, he thought he should have 
had a chance "to put a word in here and there." (33) Though 
Murphy did not want to upset the status quo, Doolittle asked 
if deposing the Bey was not in fact upsetting it. Doolittle 
did not think all French proposals should be swallowed 
without examination. Should the Americans follow the one 
about deposing the Bey, they would be turning their backs on 
their own public declarations such as the Atlantic Charter, 
and would "lay ourselves open to the accusation of talking 
through our honorable hats, brass-bound or silk." (34) 
The return of the United Nations to Tunis on May 7 
began inauspiciously for the Bey. No sooner had British 
soldiers moved into Tunis then they attacked the summer 
palace of the Bey at Hammamlif and forcibly took him at 
bayonet point to Tunis to the off ice of the British Consul 
General. The recently arrived acting Resident General Juin 
had him returned to Hammamlif. The British excused 
themselves for this unfortunate incident by saying their 
soldiers were carried away by the heat of the moment and 
were badly informed. (35) 
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Juin, who was to serve until Mast was well enough to 
assume his post, had arrived in Tunis right after the 
British. Describing his entry, he said that he was greeted 
with a "a delirious enthusiasm" (36) as he passed through 
the Jewish quarter. He mentioned how these poor people had 
suffered terribly during the German occupation. As for the 
Tunisians he saw few of them while "the Italian colony 
naturally didn't put its nose outside." (37) When he reached 
the Residence, he found a few French and Tunisian officials 
and some prominent persons who had escaped being forcibly 
removed by the Germans, as well as some French resisters who 
had come out of hiding. At the Residence Juin proceeded to 
give his first commands restoring order. (38) 
Doolittle, Murphy, and Colonel Julius Holmes, Allied 
Force Headquarters, visited Tunis on May 11 for three days. 
Doolittle found that his home, which had been used by the 
German military commander, had been "thoroughly and 
completely sacked." (39) Doolittle reported: "My wife and I 
now have not even a single napkin to our names." (40) 
Clothing, silver, china, kitchen utensils, furniture, rugs, 
everything were lost. According to his daughter, Katya, it 
was the rugs collected in Persia and the Caucausus that he 
most minded losing. (41) The consulate, which had been used 
as offices by the Germans, had also been ransacked and the 
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safes blown. 
Murphy wired the President and Secretary of State 
that the Tunisian population was enthusiastic, but affected 
by the destruction which had occurred. In many towns it had 
been quite severe while Tunis on the other hand had suffered 
little except for the dock area. Eight hundred civilians had 
been killed, but, had the bombing not been confined to the 
dock area, the toll might have been much greater. Other than 
a shortage of food and the lack of electric lighting caused 
by the destruction of the power plant by the Germans as they 
left, the situation in Tunis was almost normal. As soon as 
transportation was reorganized, Murphy thought there would 
be no serious food problems. The enemy trucks that had been 
seized would help solve distribution needs. While the 
Germans had either consumed or taken two-thirds of the 
livestock in northern Tunisia and one-third in the southern 
part, Murphy thought enough remained, along with a good 
cereal crop about to be harvested, to alleviate the food 
situation. (42) 
On this trip Murphy had also visited Bizerte which 
was "a complete shambles, not a building in the town 
remained undamaged." (43) He saw many thousands of enemy 
prisoners on the roads and in the prison camps. In one camp 
there were a group of 36,000 German prisoners, principally 
young shock troops; in another, there were 20,000 Germans 
and Italians. 
Included in Murphy's telegram was a report on the 
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political situation. Giraud had arrived in Tunis on the 
twelfth and discussed with Murphy and Juin the question of 
the Bey. Giraud believed the Bey should not be allowed to 
remain in office on the grounds that he had collaborated 
with the Axis and permitted acts of disloyalty on the part 
of his subjects which militated against the United Nations 
effort. Giraud told Murphy that he proposed to detail Juin 
to suggest to the Bey "that the happiest solution would be 
for the Bey to abdicate." (44) When asked by Giraud whether 
the United States government would approve the French action 
in deposing the Bey, Murphy said: 
There apparently is no law under which the 
action could be taken without invoking 
necessity arising out of the military 
situation. (45) 
Murphy informed Giraud that he had no instructions from his 
government, but he was sure that American opinion would 
favor any French action that proposed to punish those who 
had actively aided the Axis during the course of the 
Tunisian campaign. He said the internal affairs of the 
Protectorate lay between the competent French and Tunisian 
authorities. (46) 
While it fell upon Juin to execute the decision to 
depose the Bey, he claimed in his M~moires that the order 
bothered him since he did not wish to commit an injustice. 
After making an inquiry, Juin could discover nothing serious 
against the Bey. All one could reproach him for was having 
conferred some decorations on some enemy personalities at 
the insistence of the Resident General. He had formally 
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refused to recognize them himself. The only other complaint 
invoked against him was his pro-Neo-Destourian sympathies. 
Nevertheless, the Committee at Algiers was insistent on 
profiting by the disarray and shock produced by the defeat 
of the Axis. According to Juin, since "the instructions had 
once again an imperative command, he had no choice but to 
obey." ( 4 7) 
Juin called on the Bey on May 13 and asked for his 
abdication explaining that the decision had been made in 
Algeria. The Bey insisted that he would not abdicate. After 
three hours, Juin left saying he would wait until four p.m. 
for his decision. At four with the Bey's decision unchanged, 
Juin had him flown with a reduced entourage to Laghouat, 
Algeria near the Sahara. Juin had hoped that, since he had 
never flown, he would change his mind and abdicate. Instead 
he showed a joy, which Juin patronizingly called childish, 
in mounting the plane. With the approach of summer being at 
Laghout, according to Juin, was not "a beautiful gift." (48) 
In his Mi'moires Juin said, in recalling these events, that 
he regretted that the "pseudo-government of Algeria", in 
haste and in ignorance of the exact facts of the political 
situation, had required of him "an unwise act to the 
detriment of a sovereign to whom there was nothing grave to 
reproach and who had always been loyal." (49) 
The Tunisians were devastated by the deposition of 
the Bey. They went into mourning for three days, shutting 
their shops and praying in their homes. (50) Whereas there 
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had been some Tunisians favorably disposed toward the 
French, the deposition had the effect of turning them 
unanimously against them. As French historian Charles-Andr~ 
Julien wrote, "in eliminating Monce£ one had created 
Moncefism which was to give to nationalism a virulence 
without precedent." (51) He continued, 
Moncef ism took on a passionate character that 
did not let up until the death of the Bey. It 
was around him that nationalism crystalized. 
The inconsiderate decision of General Giraud 
executed hastily but without conviction by 
Juin rendered all French Tunisian rapprochement 
impossible and furnished a solid basis for 
Destourian opposition ... (52) The French 
Committee should have shown itself more 
prudent. With the exception of General Catroux 
who said the era of colonial domination had 
ended, the technicians surrounding de Gaulle 
and Giraud had forgotten nothing and learned 
nothing. ( 53) 
Juin had one last "thorny case'', as he called it, to 
handle before leaving Tunisia and that was the presence in 
Tunisia of Habib Bourguiba. The latter had gone into hiding 
when the United Nations entered Tunis since he was not sure 
what his legal status would be with the return of the 
French. Bourguiba, according to his own account, had refused 
to follow the Germans, who had proposed to take him to save 
the head of the nationalist movement. "I refused in order 
not to compromise the party and the unity of the Tunisian 
movement." (54) Persuaded that the Axis forces were going to 
an inevitable defeat, he thought the Neo-Destourians had no 
interest in finding themselves at the end of hostilities on 
the side of the defeated. 
He knew, however, that the Allies at Tunis 
would mean the presence of the French 
partisans of de Gaulle or of Giraud and in 
short the French whatever their tendency would 
be in agreement that Bourguiba and the Destour 
constituted the enemy. (55) 
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Bourguiba was quite right that the French looked upon him as 
the enemy. Juin referred to him as "the Destourian 
agitator." (56) Juin, however, did say that, in truth, 
Bourguiba had not compromised himself and since his arrival 
in Tunis Juin had verified this. 
Bourguiba sent an emissary to seek an interview with 
Doolittle. He wanted him to intervene with the French to 
have them lift the order for his arrest. While Doolittle 
rejected this demand, since it was not part of his job, he 
did take the opportunity to tell Juin that Bourguiba had 
been detained illegally during five years ~nd that appeared 
to him unjustifiable. He suggested that the order of arrest 
be rescinded, that he talk to the Destour leaders and use 
them as instruments of French policy rather than "make of 
them outcasts and martyrs and thereby lose all touch with 
the very considerable body of Arab opinion which they 
represent." (57) Juin told Doolittle that his orders were to 
arrest Bourguiba, that he could not disobey, and "that to 
assuage British and American opinion these present measures 
against the Arabs were necessary." (58) Juin, at that point, 
seemed to be blaming the Americans for the hard line he was 
taking against the Tunisians. This was precisely what 
Doolittle had told Murphy the French would do. Doolittle 
replied that he was unaware of any great British or American 
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opinion which demanded such repression and that if it did, 
it was obviously misinformed. "Now that France was again 
becoming strong, she could afford to be generous." (59) 
Bourguiba, as he would recount later, recognized that 
while the war lasted against the Axis powers, the United 
States did not want to displease the French or hurt their 
feelings. Bourguiba believed that such a policy was 
justified at a time when Vichy propaganda was attempting to 
raise up the French against the United Nations by accusing 
the English and Americans of having designs on North Africa 
and wishing to defraud the French of their colonial 
possessions. (60) 
In fact, Bourguiba wrote a manifesto when the French 
returned to Tunisia asking his followers to put aside until 
after the war their nationalistic ambitions and join the 
Fighting French in the war against the Axis. The French 
authorities, however, refused to allow the diffusion of this 
appeal. According to Bourguiba, 
They were aware of the fact that from the moment 
it would be published it would be difficult to 
justify the repression of a movement which 
declared itself ready to cooperate with them. (61) 
Doolittle thought the manifesto had irritated the 
French because it implied that they would also make a 
gesture of reconciliation. Doolittle found it ironical that 
Bourguiba had said that he could speak freely now because he 
was confident that the United Nations would not let the 
French proceed in a spirit of revenge and that "the way is 
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open for a fruitful collaboration." (62) Doolittle commented 
"nothing of the sort. No Tunisian can speak freely. An 
answer of any kind to the most unjust accusation is taken as 
insolence." (63) The French had shut the door unfortunately 
to any collaboration and had alienated the Tunisian 
bourgeoisie "who had always been sincerely Francophile and 
remained so during the occupation." (64) 
The United States was pretending, according to 
Doolittle in a despatch to the State Department, 
that this was a matter for the French alone and 
would not see that the French were not able to overlook 
their own pettiness. 
Led by a stiff-necked and stupid military clan, 
overloaded with generals of 1906 vintage and 
admirals without ships, they suddenly find, at 
the behest of selfish colonists and inefficient 
administrators, that now that France as embodied 
by the handful of colonial rejects and self-
promoting armchair warriors in North Africa, is 
great and powerful and therefore must take the 
strong hand with a helpless native population. 
They forget that sixty years of the strong hand 
had done nothing to endear them nor to create a 
group of native collaborators animated by no 
other motives than that of splitting the 
proceeds of exploitation of the fellah with the 
French officials set over them ostensibly to 
guide and control. ( 65) 
Doolittle had heard that Allied Force Headquarters had 
issued orders saying no members of the Destour should be 
arrested simply because they were Destourians, but by a 
peculiar coincidence most of those arrested were known as 
Destourians. 
Besides leaving the order of arrest for Bourguiba in 
place the French had instituted harsh and repressive 
measures against the Tunisians. Doolittle wrote: 
As I had foreseen, the French, not the Tunisian 
French but the French military administration in 
which few changes in mentality or efficiency are 
to be observed came into Tunisia in a spirit of 
revenge for their three years of humiliation. It 
was obviously necessary to find a scapegoat for 
the acts of the French administration and what 
more natural and easy than to choose as the 
scapegoat the Arabs of Tunisia with their Bey 
and childish attempts at nationalism. (66) 
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It should be realized, Doolittle continued, that it was 
not the Tunisians who allowed the Germans to enter, but 
Admiral Esteva and General BarrJ, the two responsible heads. 
Nor was it the Bey and his court who had requisitioned 
animals and provided foodstuffs for the Germans during the 
occupation, but again it was the French administration. The 
Bey had refused to sign decrees given to him on this score. 
Admiral Esteva himself had done this by Residential orders. 
Nor was it Moncef Bey who had organized the North African 
Phalange which sent young Frenchmen to fight against their 
brothers under General Giraud. Inspite of all this, when the 
Army of Liberation entered Tunis, they immediately deposed 
Moncef Bey and began a series of arrests, the number of 
which was reported at about five thousand. While Doolittle 
agreed that "pillagers, spies, and denouncers should be 
apprehended and punished," (67) very few Tunisian notables 
were known to have collaborated with the Germans. None of 
the French officials who underwent the occupation were 
consulted as the steps to be taken and several protested 
vehemently against the actions and considered resigning in 
protest. Doolittle pointed out that neither he nor 
Vice-Consul John Utter had been consulted in Tunisian 
matters since leaving Constantine. (68) 
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The new Bey, Sidi Lamine, accepted the post only to 
preserve the Hussenite Dynasty. New ministers were chosen by 
the French to replace the ones that Moncef Bey "had had the 
effrontery to choose for himself." (69) Two of these new 
ministers had talked to Doolittle about the unfairness of 
deposing Moncef Bey. The Tunisian bourgeoisie, whose conduct 
during the German occupation was dignified according to 
Frenchmen who stayed there, "was disgusted and 
worried." (70) Numbers of Tunisian merchants had not 
reopened their shops in the souks, and the peasants in the 
outlying districts were afraid to bring in their products. 
There was an atmosphere of repression and terror. (71) 
American prestige was high in North Africa at that 
time. Doolittle asked if the United States was to let it be 
dimmed because it turned its back on the series of 
injustices of the French. "By their acts since 'liberating 
Tunis' the French have made the Tunisians more unan±mous 
than formerly in detesting them." (72) 
It was also true that the Tunisians had a first hand 
knowledge of what German occupation meant. With the 
exception of a few who profited, most of the Tunisians found 
it worse than expected. "Here then was a malleable material 
ready for use through a policy of generosity and 
understanding." (73) The French told the Americans to tell 
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the Tunisians to settle their differences with the French. 
Yet this implied two sides to the bargain. Doolittle asked, 
if the French themselves refused to settle, how could the 
Tunisians arrive at a settlement? (74) 
Doolittle thought the Americans, "the torchbearers of 
freedom", should accept the responsibility they had assumed 
by landing in North Africa by making their voice heard in 
the policies that affected not only North Africa, but the 
whole Islamic world. He wrote: 
Any observer here in North Africa is soon forced 
to the conclusion that the French are 
psychologically sick. Their division, their 
petty quarrels, their lack, with a few notable 
exceptions, of any will to help themselves out 
of the muddle, their tendency to call upon the 
British and Americans to help them, and not 
only to help them but to do everything for them, 
and then object to measures taken indicates that 
they need a rejuvenation of spirit and a 
direction which they themselves are incapable of 
furnishing. ( 7 5) 
Doolittle thought that the Americans had the men and 
material to give the French a new direction. If so, the men 
must be given the authority and those with specialized 
knowledge should be consulted. (76) 
Doolittle supplemented his despatches of this time 
with a telegram. 
Present policy toward Tunisian Arabs is 
disastrous. The army of liberation in three 
weeks has succeeded in what 60 years of 
occupation has failed to do, unite the 
Tunisians solidly against the French. (77) 
He continued that the United Nations were blamed for the 
deposition of the Bey. The situation had degenerated into 
"a reign of terror, arbitrary arrests, beatings, and 
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torture." (78) Forced labor was being obtained by police 
roundups. Instead of returning to Tunisia "to heal the 
wounds of German occupation," the French had returned "as to 
a conquered country." He reminded the State Department that 
the army that was to be raised in Tunisia would be largely 
composed of Tunisians. A copy of this as well as all of his 
despatches went to Murphy who apparently ignored them. 
For his part, Bourguiba wrote a long letter to 
President Roosevelt asking him to help the Tunisian people, 
who were being treated poorly by the returning French. 
Bourguiba described how repression of Tunisian patriots had 
started with the events of April 9, 1938 when the militants 
and the party chiefs had been put in prisons and 
concentration camps in France and Tunisia. 
This repression, which ironically had only known 
a moment of respite during the German-Italian 
occupation, has started again with an 
accelerated rhythm. Inspired by a desire to 
humiliate and terrorize the people and taking 
advantage of the terror weighing on the country, 
the heads of Free France have by an 
unparalleled blow deposed the legitimate 
sovereign of the country, Sidi Moncef Pacha Bey, 
who in spite of advances and pressures of the 
Germans and Italians had obstinately remained 
neutral and faithful to the French Protectorate. 
Thus by an irony of a sort which is particularly 
cruel to Tunisian democratic hearts the victory 
of the Democracies in Tunisia had established 
methods which were most authentically 
fascist. (80) 
Bourguiba said the Tunisians were putting all their hopes in 
the President to intervene with the Free French "who were 
fighting against Nazi enslavement to see that they did not 
treat the Tunisians as an enslaved people." (81) Bourguiba 
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believed that the United Nations could not be indifferent 
to the crisis in Tunisia for the errors being committed by 
the French "out of a spirit of revenge could not but nullify 
the Allied war effort by alienating precious 
sympathies." (82) 
Suddenly on June 6 a member of Juin's staff informed 
Doolittle that, if Bourguiba presented himself to the 
Director of Security, Juin would give him and his immediate 
colleagues, their provisional liberty whereas, if he did 
not, he would be shown no mercy. Doolittle relayed this 
proposition to Bourguiba's Destourian friends. They replied 
that Bourguiba wished to meet Doolittle. Doolittle accepted, 
and the two met clandestinely at night. Bourguiba wanted to 
inform Doolittle of Tunisian nationalist goals, while 
Doolittle wished to know the truth about the accusations 
that Bourguiba had collaborated with the Axis. Doolittle was 
quoted on the occasion of a celebration of this meeting: 
I did not know him before. From the first 
contact, he enchanted me. He was really 
bubbling, a real force in action like an 
overcharged battery. He pleaded the Tunisian 
cause, naturally. I was already won over to the 
cause he was defending. By the time we 
separated, we had become two good friends. (83) 
Bourguiba presented himself to the Director of 
Security and at first was met coldly by the Director who 
asked what his demands were. When Bourguiba replied that he 
had come, as requested, to regularize his juridical 
situation which was not clear, since he had been imprisoned 
by the French and liberated by the Germans, the Director 
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became more cordial. Bourguiba told him that he had no plan 
of creating public demonstrations, but, if treated with 
understanding, would be happy to try to "disintoxicate the 
Tunisian people from the poison left by the German 
occupation." (84) 
In reporting this to the State Department, Doolittle 
remarked that "in spite of injunctions not to meddle in Arab 
affairs as being exclusively a function of the French 
administration" he thought 
a constructive act has been taken. The fact that 
the French themselves came to the Consulate for 
a matter of this kind indicates that they 
recognize that we have a certain right to be 
consulted on their policy inasmuch as we are all 
engaged in the same struggle. (85) 
Doolittle was far too optimistic about the French. 
Juin's version of this, as given in his ~es, was quite 
different. He said there was "not a day that passed that I 
was not pestered" (86) on the subject of Bourguiba's 
freedom by his American friends. Juin thought it "of public 
notoriety that the Americn diplomatic agents in North Africa 
always made themselves the advocates of the most active 
nationalists." (87) According to Juin's account, Doolittle 
insisted that Bourguiba be authorised to come see him, but 
since Juin did not wish it at any price he replied that he 
could see his Director of Security who would give him his 
instructions. ( 8 8) 
Having given Bourguiba his freedom, Juin left Tunisia 
in June 1943 and was replaced by Mast. Little or no change 
in French policy toward the Tunisians was apparent. 
Bourguiba found Mast's policy as repressive as Juin's had 
been. Mast no sooner arrived in Tunis than he sent a 
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despatch back to Algiers saying that it was desirable to 
obtain the abdication of Monce£ Bey. Mast reported that the 
Destourians were telling the Tunisian population that the 
new Bey was not legitimate. The new Beylical court was upset 
by rumours that the return of Moncef Bey was imminent and 
that his return would be because of American pressure. Mast 
wanted to suppress this agitation by obtaining the Bey's 
abdication in exchange for his being moved to a more 
tolerable climate on the seashore. (89) 
Nor was the arrival of de Gaulle in North Africa to 
cause any noticeable difference as far as French policy 
toward the Tunisians went. Though he had not arrived in 
North Africa at the time the Bey was deposed, he expressed 
his approval of the measure in his MJmoires, saying that it 
was necessary because the Bey's "attitude had been 
troublesome with regard to the obligations that had linked 
him to France." (90) He went on to say that the Committee 
had no more serious problems in Tunisia after that and that 
he supported Mast who, he said, was doing his job with 
intelligence. Furthermore, he blamed Esteva, whom he 
referred to as "that unfortunate man'', for causing serious 
political consequences when he allowed the Germans to occupy 
the country. (91) The presence of the Germans and Italians 
in Tunisia had given "agitators many occasions to turn the 
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citizens against France." (92) For imperially minded 
Frenchmen any nationalist could by labelled "agitator". By 
his actions in Lebanon in November 1943 de Gaulle 
demonstrated his general attitude toward nationalists; he 
dissolved the newly elected parliament, suspended the 
constitution, and arrested the ministers. (93) 
Doolittle's concern for the Tunisians bothered the 
French. Before Juin left Tunisia, he wrote Giraud that the 
Americans were critical of the deposition of the Bey and 
thought it harmful to the United Nations cause. Juin 
believed the Americans lent too attentive an ear to the 
complaints of the Beylical milieux, and he feared that their 
solicitude extended to the nationalists as well. (94) When 
Mast arrived, he also complained about Doolittle and 
actively pursued obtaining his removal. 
Under pressure from the French, Murphy now began 
seeking Doolittle's recall. In first bringing up the matter 
with the State Department, Murphy said that he personally 
liked Doolittle and "admired his idealism" and did not like 
to suggest his transfer, but thought it might be 
necessary. (95) Murphy was disturbed about "the independent 
policy pursued by Doolittle in respect of the Arabs in 
Tunisia." (96) Since his return to Tunisia Doolittle had 
not disguised his disapproval of the deposition of the Bey 
and had encouraged the Tunisians to come to him with their 
grievances. Murphy admitted that ''the French may have been 
too aggressive in punishing those who had aided the Axis," 
but Doolittle was the only person he knew who called it a 
"reign of terror." (97) 
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While despatch after despatch had flowed from 
Doolittle to the State Department with copies to Murphy 
about the Tunisian situation, now telegram after telegram, 
all secret, started flowing to the State Department from 
Murphy with no copies to Doolittle about the Doolittle 
situation. Although Murphy at first had only suggested that 
Doolittle's recall might be necessary, he soon was actively 
building up a case against Doolittle in order to obtain his 
recall. 
He reported that an observer who had just come back 
from Tunis was worried "that Doolittle had gone so far out 
for the Arabs that a serious French reaction had set in 
against him." ( 9 8) The same observer said the French 
resented Doolittle's intervention on behalf of Bourguiba. 
This was in accord with Juin's opinion as quoted above. 
After Doolittle had intervened for different Tunisians 
several times, the French Second Bureau decided to ignore 
his interventions "because of his advanced partisan 
attitude." (99) 
Murphy then sent letters from two different American 
Army officers, who were stationed in Tunisia, saying that 
Doolittle was overstating his case. However, both admitted 
that there had been instances of mistreatment and that 
French methods were "somewhat more drastic" than 
American. (100) 
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Murphy also sent a complaint from the French Director 
of military security about Doolittle. On June 27 Doolittle 
had visited a camp of internees in Sousse accompanied by 
Lieutenant Archie Roosevelt and by a Tunisian, Abdelaziz 
Hadj Hussein, also known as "Slim Driga", to inquire about 
the latter's brother, Abdallah. Slim Driga was the one who 
had climbed the garden wall with the message from the Bey 
after the German occupation when Doolittle was confined and 
just before his escape. In an interview with Abdallah, 
Doolittle learned that he was poorly fed and ill-treated. 
Doolittle told the warden that he was going to try to have 
Abdallah released, as he had done intelligence work for him 
against Italy, and he did not consider that having belonged 
to the Destour Party a serious offence. The French Director 
thought Doolittle's attention should be called "to the 
irregularity of any direct action on his part, which might 
well be interpreted as an attempted interference with the 
rights of sovereignty of France over its own 
subjects." (101) 
Murphy had discussed with General Mast, just before 
the latter assumed his duties as Resident General, what his 
policy would be in dealing with the Tunisians. Mast assured 
Murphy that he would "avoid anything savoring of repressive 
brutality in dealing with the Arabs." (102) For those 
Tunisians responsible for treasonable conduct or criminal 
acts, they should be punished, but he planned to follow 
judicial procedures and make every effort to avoid 
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injustice. {103) 
Doolittle's despatches and Murphy's telegrams did not 
go unnoticed at the State Department. Paul Alling, Assistant 
Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs, now wrote 
Murphy asking for his comments on the French policy of 
deposing the Bey. Murphy replied that he did not agree with 
the statement of Doolittle that "we had nothing to gain and 
everything to lose by the deposition of this Bey." (104) 
Murphy thought United States policy had been that the French 
authorities were "responsible for the native policy in North 
Africa" (105) and, if the Americans had reversed this 
attitude in the case of Moncef Bey, it would have had an 
adverse effect on American relations with the French. Murphy 
admitted that the Bey had never been proven to be actively 
pro-Axis, but that his feud with the French administration 
of the Protectorate before the Germans came played a 
decisive part in his removal. (106) 
In late July Doolittle was recalled to the Department 
"in order to clarify the issues." (107) While Doolilttle was 
on his way, Wallace Murray, Adviser on Political Relations, 
on July 27 sent a long memorandum to Adolf Berle, Assistant 
Secretary of State, summarizing the differences between 
Murphy and Doolittle. Murray pointed out to Berle that the 
two ''took diametrically opposed positions." (108) Murray 
thought the proper policy lay somewhere in between. 
The attitude of Murphy, according to Murray, was quite 
understandable and was based on the status quo in French 
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North Africa that he found when he was sent there to work 
with General Weygand. Obviously the objective then was "to 
leave no stone unturned to gain the goodwill of the French 
masters of that area" (109) and enlist their active 
collaboration in the military landing. Murphy pursued this 
loyally and with great success. Murphy could not be worried 
about whether French rule was just or unjust. His assignment 
was to win over the French and he could not have done this 
if he had tried "to carry water on both shoulders'' (110) by 
worrying about complaints of the North Africans against the 
French, no matter how justified. 
Murray went on to say that Doolittle, whose North 
African tour of duty went back to 1933, knew more about 
"native problems'' and was more inclined to see the point of 
view of the Tunisians than to adhere to "Mr Murphy's rigid 
objective of dealing solely with the French and steering 
absolutely clear of native problems." (111) 
While Murray believed that Murphy's policy was sound 
before the landing and through the close of military 
operations, it should not be followed indefinitely. In view 
of the policy the United States had adopted for subject 
peoples and their aspirations as stated in the Atlantic 
Charter, the United States could not ignore Tunisian 
aspirations. Should the United States do this, it would 
reinforce the British belief that the Americans were 
peculiarly interested in maintaining the French Empire while 
undermining the British Empire by their sympathy for 
192 
India. (112) 
Murray pointed out that of the three French areas in 
North Africa, two, Morocco and Tunisia, were protectorates 
and not parts of the French Empire. Both had been 
independent countries with which the United States had 
diplomatic relations. Neither country had forgotten its 
lost independence, and there was every chance that sooner or 
later the United States would be reminded of the articles in 
the Atlantic Charter stating that peoples shall have 
governments they choose. While Tunisia and Morocco might not 
be ready to assume independence, Murray wondered whether 
their ability to rule themselves was any less that that of 
the Ethiopians or Afghans whose independence the United 
States didn't question. In his opinion, the problem might 
"come home to haunt us in due time and that the unduly 
prolonged policy now being pursued by Mr. Murphy will not be 
good enough in the long run." (113) 
Berle wrote Murray that his memorandum about the 
deposition of the Bey was "extremely interesting." (114) He 
had heard the same differences of points of view that the 
cables from Doolittle and Murphy expressed from other people 
returning from North Africa. The dilemma was that, while the 
French colonial system was far from perfect, American 
soldiers were not there to revise it but to restore France 
and fight the Germans. Berle said it did appear that the Bey 
did not deserve the treatment he received. The way the 
Tunisians were treated appeared wrong too. Still, he 
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questioned whether the United States was entitled to use the 
war to improve European colonialism. While the Americans 
would like to do much, he did not think they should be "too 
expansive about it." (115) 
He suggested proposing a commission, made up of 
French, to study the administration of Tunisia. While the 
United States would have to be careful, he thought forces 
could be set in motion to improve the situation. The only 
right to say anything, beyond that, would be if American 
forces were endangered by ill-considered measures of the 
French that might provoke a Tunisian uprising. Berle asked 
Murray to think about what the United States could do. 
Referring to the remark of Doolittle about the colonial 
policy of the "1906 vintage'', he said that "besides being 
inherently immoral, French policy may offer very solid and 
political dangers." (116) 
Mast made a trip on July 29 to Algiers to protest 
informally to Murphy about the policy of Doolittle. 
Unfortunately, Doolittle, who had stopped in Algiers en 
route to the United States, had just left that morning. 
Otherwise, Murphy wrote, he would have insisted on a joint 
conversation. Mast asserted that Doolittle had associated 
"with Arab enemies of the French administration acting as 
their counselor and adviser and encouraging them to be 
anti-French." (117) According to Mast, Doolittle had 
connected Lieutenant Archie Roosevelt with these activities 
causing the Tunisian leaders to believe that President 
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Roosevelt favored the policy of Doolittle. Mast continued 
that the French administration was increasingly embarrassed 
by the activity of Doolittle "in cultivating and supporting 
anti-French leaders" (118), which was being interpreted as 
an indication that United States' policy was unfriendly 
toward France. Mast was aware that the attempt of Doolittle 
to defend Tunisian rights was primarily a personal matter, 
but he thought it best if Doolittle did not return to Tunis. 
Murphy assured Mast the United States had no intention of 
supporting anti-French activity. While in Algiers, Mast took 
advantage of his "friendly relations with Eisenhower," (120) 
whom he had known from the time he had served as head of the 
liaison mission to the Allied Force Headquarters, to discuss 
the Doolittle matter with him and Bedell Smith. Requesting 
that Doolittle not return to Tunisia, Mast put it on a 
purely military plane referring to his need to maintain the 
order and the security of Tunisia which served as a base for 
United Nations operations. Eisenhower told Mast that he 
agreed that Doolittle had gone beyond his job as consul, and 
he assured him that the Consul General would not regain his 
post. Mast also obtained the assurance from Eisenhower that 
Lieutenant Archie Roosevelt would be sent to another theater 
of operations. Mast thought Doolittle used Roosevelt because 
of his name. (121) 
In Algiers Mast, of course, talked to the French 
administration about 
the activities of the Consul General of the 
United States toward the Moslems, the 
relations he maintained with influential 
members of the Destour, the violent criticisms 
he directed against the Protecting Nation and 
how the Doolittle administration had unsettled 
circles favorable to France. (122) 
On his return he wrote that he believed that the 
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assurances he had received from Eisenhower would contribute 
to maintaining the political situation in 
Tunisia and will permit me to obtain a 
progressive amelioration of the state of the 
indigenous mass. (123) 
Murphy thought it had been superfluous for Mast to 
speak to Eisenhower as though nothing had been done about 
the Doolittle matter. Nevertheless, when Eisenhower 
questioned Murphy about the Doolittle problem, Murphy 
explained it to him as he had already done to Bedell 
Smith. (124) Both Eisenhower and Bedell Smith insisted that 
Doolittle not be allowed to return to Tunis. They thought 
that he was acting against United States policy and that 
American military concerns in Tunisia were so important that 
the United States could not risk the trouble with the French 
that would result if Doolittle continued his activities. 
Eisenhower requested that a "well balanced and intelligent" 
(125) replacement be found. In reporting this to the State 
Department, Murphy concluded by saying that some 
French who were already unfriendly to the United States were 
using the Tunisian policy of Doolittle as another example of 
the "meddling" of the State Department in French affairs and 
saying that United States policy was designed to diminish 
the French position in North Africa. ( 12 6) 
Murphy may have been influenced by Macmillan, who 
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in his War Diaries indicated he had had a hand in 
Doolittle's recall. Macmillan described himself as an old 
friend of Mast, whom he had known and liked from Algiers, 
and who was "very pro-British and reliable.'' {127) Macmillan 
had dinner with Mast at the mess in Tunis on July 23. On 
July 24 when Bedell Smith came for a talk with Macmillan, 
the latter expressed his desire to see Doolittle removed "as 
a source of trouble to the French and of disunity to the 
Allies." {128) Macmillan had met with Doolittle and formed a 
bad opinion of him. {129) In view of the fact that he was a 
friend of Mast and represented a prime minister who had 
sworn to defend the British Empire this was not surprising. 
Felix Cole, who came at the end of July to Tunisia 
from Rabat, Morocco to serve as temporary Consul General 
when Doolittle was recalled, sent a long letter to Murphy 
about the situation as he found it. After being there only 
eleven days, he wrote that a change was necessary in the 
United States Consulate especially in connection with 
relations with the French. While Doolittle was "an able, 
intelligent and attractive personality," he had pursued a 
personal policy which was not in accord "with the general 
line prescribed ... The Consulate has become his personal 
appanage and the seat of his personal politics." (130) Those 
toward whom his personal policies were aimed were the 
leaders of the Tunisian "intelligentsia''. They have taken 
advantage through him, or through his influence on Murphy in 
Algiers, or the Department in Washington to promote their 
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goals of obtaining from the French more control over their 
own affairs and own people. As Cole understood it, 
interfering in the question of Tunisian rights and 
grievances toward the French was not "the proper 
concern" (131) of the United States Consulate in Tunisia 
except to preserve peace and quiet in a military area. 
Cole noticed a "swarm of visitors at the 
office" (132) on his first day. A Tunisian, Abdelaziz 
Hussein, "Slim Driga'', was using the kitchen of the 
Consulate apartment to receive reports of French abuse. 
This slackened a day or two after Cole came partly because 
Doolittle, before he left, had already told Slim Driga to 
stop using it. Recently Doolittle and Utter had suspected 
that he was receiving money by posing as the consul's 
private secretary and as the only channel by which one could 
communicate with the Consul General. According to Cole he 
had had police charges in 1937 of "abuse of confidence, 
embezzlement and bad checks" which may or may not have been 
because of Neo-Destourian activities. (133) 
Mast reported to Algiers that Doolittle's departure 
had brought about a marked "detente'' in the relations with 
the American Consulate. He had seen Cole twice and the 
latter had expressed his desire to stay out of local 
intrigues and to have no relations with anti-French Tunisian 
personalities. Cole gave Mast the impression, by his 
attitude and words, of having received formal instructions 
in this regard from Murphy. Some United Nations officers, 
however, persisted in maintaining toward "indigenous 
elements" a policy similar to that of Doolittle. (134) 
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Mast continued that rumours had circulated in the 
Destourian circles that Doolittle was not coming back. 
Bourguiba appeared discouraged and, according to reliable 
sources, thought of abandoning politics and of going to 
Egypt for some time. Mast wrote "I, of course, would not put 
any obstacles in his way." (135) 
On September 14, 1943 Murray wrote Murphy that he had 
"given much thought to your various communications regarding 
Hooker Doolittle's policy with respect to the Arabs in 
Tunisia." (136) Because of Eisenhower's "strong views in 
this matter," the Department had decided that it would be 
"inadvisable to have Doolittle remain in Tunis and that he 
should be transferred to another post." (137) The 
Department, however, thought it best "for reasons of 
prestige" (138) for Doolittle to return to Tunis for a short 
time to wind up his affairs and to receive a transfer in the 
near future. This would avoid the precedent "of yielding to 
French pressure" (139) which the United States might regret 
in the future. Murphy thought Felix Cole and Doolittle might 
exchange posts with the latter going to Rabat, Morocco. 
In Tunisia both Cole and Mast now confirmed what 
Doolittle had been reporting about French treatment of the 
Tunisians. To save face Mast probably had to wait until 
Doolittle was no longer on the scene to take measures to 
correct the situation. Mast now formed a commission to study 
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ways of opening up more positions in the administration for 
Tunisians. A start had been made by appointing a Tunisian to 
be a counselor in city planning. Since many Tunisian homes 
were destroyed during the fighting, using a Tunisian to plan 
the rebuilding could be beneficial. According to Cole, while 
the French realized it was politically desirable to open 
more positions to Tunisians, it was difficult to find 
Tunisians who would stay in the bureaucracy. Tunisians 
usually studied to become either lawyers or physicians. 
While the latter found jobs as community physicians in the 
administration, the former did not fit easily into a routine 
bureaucratic job. (140) 
Beginning in August Mast had begun to try to create 
an atmosphere of confidence and understanding between the 
French and Tunisians. Utter had obtained a letter from "very 
confidential sources" (141) that Mast had written to bureau 
and office heads of the French administration reprimanding 
them for their behavior toward the Tunisans. About this 
letter Cole wrote the State Department: 
This rebuke to French bureaucratic behavior is 
unprecedented as far as anyone in this off ice 
can remember. Many of the French Government 
employees, uneasy because of their own conduct 
during the occupation, have sought to assuage 
their consciences by taking it out on the 
Arabs whom they accuse of all the misdeeds of 
which they themselves were guilty. The 
inferiority complex which local French 
officials have consistently shown also 
explains their attitude of bullying the weaker 
party. ( 14 2) 
Mast in his letter asked the Frenchmen "to adopt a 
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correct attitude toward Tunisian Moslems by avoiding all 
contemptuous words or gestures.'' (143) He reminded them that 
the French acts were being observed by foreign troops as 
well "as an educated and cultured Tunisian bourgeoisie and 
that every blundering and stupid act may endanger the very 
existence of the Empire." (144) 
In October Murray, Adviser on Political Relations, 
sent Berle a report on native affairs in Morocco written by 
Gordon Browne, now with the OSS, whom he described as 
formerly "one of our ace control officers" (145) in that 
area. Going into the history of the protectorate in Morocco, 
Browne discussed the present Moroccan situation which was 
similar to that of the Tunisians. He, also, mentioned that 
stories had begun to drift into Morocco about the French 
attitude toward the Tunisians when that country was 
reoccupied. Murray felt sure that Berle would agree with him 
that when the views held by such persons as Gordon Browne 
and Hooker Doolittle became current in the United States, 
the State Department would be subjected to rather severe 
criticism for ignoring the Atlantic Charter. The 
inconsistency of this policy would be pointed out in that 
the United States was going to great lengths to suppress 
those principles in North Africa while being concerned about 
them in India. 
Browne's report along with one which Berle had 
received from the Joint Intelligence Committee of the Army 
must have made Berle decide it was time the President 
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learned of the Doolittle situation. The J.I.C.A. report, 
drafted by an informant, described how the Tunisians had 
turned instinctively to Doolittle because of the "massive 
arrests even of the important Arab families," (147) how 
Doolittle had intervened several times, how the Tunisians 
became used to addressing him and deserting the French 
Residence, and how this had annoyed Mast. The Tunisians had 
reacted emotionally to the news of Doolittle's recall which 
had been a real blow to them and especially to 
Bourguiba. (155) 
Berle asked Murray to draw up a one page memorandum 
for the President. While this was prepared and signed by 
Acting Secretary of State Edward Stettinius, a handwritten 
note attached to it in the Archives indicates that it was 
"not seen by the President." (149) Probably Stettinius did 
not despatch the memorandum to the President because in the 
meantime he had arranged a personal meeting between the 
President and Hooker Doolittle. Stettinius, who was upset by 
Doolittle's recall, had him stopped in Union Station as he 
was about to leave Washington. In a note to the President he 
wrote: 
You have been interested in the problems of 
the natives in North Africa. I wonder if you 
would perhaps care to see Hooker Doolittle, 
Consul General in Tunis up to a couple of 
months ago, who, prior to that, spent eleven 
years in the area; was an eye witness of the 
French colonial policy in Tunis; got to know 
too much; was fired out by the French for that 
reason. The story is dramatic; and really 
raises the question as to whether we ought to 
try to mitigate the rigors of the French 
imperial policy. It is quite a story. (150) 
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Stettinius' promise of a good story must have aroused 
Roosevelt's interest because he agreed to see Doolittle. A 
meeting was arranged for 11:15 a.m. on November 9. 
While the President began the interview by asking 
Doolittle about what he called "the Moors" in Tunisia, the 
problem was discussed only briefly and superficially. 
Doolittle told Roosevelt that there had been some relaxation 
of the actively oppressive measures and that the Resident 
General had written his subordinates that they were now 
under observation by foreign forces. When he reported that 
some steps which he had suggested had been taken, the 
President said, ''Good work." To Doolittle's suggestion that 
he had interpreted the President's sentiments too early, the 
President smiled and said, "it seemed so," but he agreed 
with the idea of acting as a conscience. 
The President then questioned Doolittle on a broad 
range of topics including what sort of person the new Bey 
was, the reception given de Gaulle in Tunis, how the Arabs 
got along with the Jews and Italians, and about the food 
situation. Doolittle responded that the new Bey was an 
elderly scholar without the influence of the former Bey; 
that de Gaulle had received a great welcome and was a superb 
showman; that the Arabs resented the Jews and Italians 
because of economic competition and because of memories of 
Italian acts in Libya; and that wheat and olive oil were not 
moving and would soon create a storage problem. (152) 
For his part Doolittle expressed the opinion that 
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"Foreign Service officers could help the Arabs by reporting 
on their difficulties and asking tactful, but pointed 
questions." (153) The main problem was lack of contact. 
Roosevelt was aware of this and mentioned Archie Roosevelt 
as having been transferred from North Africa because he was 
too "pro-Arab". Doolittle said he had seen Archie in North 
Africa and his "pro-Arab" tendencies were similar to his own 
in merely wishing to see them have decent treatment. The 
French not only tried to prevent the North Africans from 
talking with Americans, but from being exposed to American 
publications. Doolittle showed Roosevelt a copy of the 
Arabic edition of the Reader's Digest which the French did 
not permit in North Africa. Roosevelt was surprised and 
asked why not. Doolittle presumed they did not want to give 
the "Arabs any food for thought.'' (154) Doolittle thought it 
should be made available through United States offices 
there, "that it would be intellectual manna." (155) 
Doolittle concluded that the President was well 
informed on the whole situation and was especially 
interested in Morocco. He was also interested in the idea of 
an international trusteeship. He talked about "the vast Arab 
majority and seemed to feel that something should be done 
for them." (156) He noted the difference between Algeria and 
the Protectorates, Morocco and Tunisia, where he thought a 
difference in treatment could be brought about. While 
obviously interested and sympathetic with the plight of the 
North Africans, Roosevelt did not bring about any policy 
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changes. He may, however, have intervened to see that 
Doolittle was able to return to Tunis eventually to wind up 
his affairs and help move his wife and household to Egypt. 
(157) 
The State Department must have "yielded to French 
pressure" after all because Doolittle did not return to 
Tunis until after he had assumed his new post in Alexandria, 
Egypt. The fact that he went there before returning to 
Tunisia and was not given the position in Rabat was probably 
due to another intervention by Mast. Four days before 
Doolittle's interview with Roosevelt, Mast cabled the French 
Committee that Doolittle was about to resume his post and 
he thought Ambassador Henri Hoppenot, the accredited 
representative of the Committee, should make an energetic 
intervention in 
Washington based on promises made by Murphy 
and Eisenhower. Destourian circles are talking 
of Doolittle whom they considered as their 
protector and their best agent. Mrs. Doolittle 
who is in Tunis is not unfamiliar with these 
rumours . ( 15 8) 
Apparently Mast thought of the Doolittles as engaged in 
something of a conspiracy. 
In an undated essay entitled "L'Affaire Doolittle", 
written on stationary of the Division of Political Studies, 
Doolittle with a certain amount of bitterness, wrote of the 
power the American Army exercised in dictating what State 
Department personnel should remain or not in North Africa. 
Doolittle said the ideas of the State Department, regarding 
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its personnel in North Africa, did not appear to be worthy 
of consideration since 
General Mast continues to dictate the 
movements of personnel in that area apparently 
on the grounds that he is the only friend 
still left to the American Army there. (159) 
Doolittle thought it was regrettable that the Army 
was isolated. However, he continued, no effort had been made 
to determine the reason. Possibly it was due to ignoring the 
wishes of the majority so as to keep the "professed esteem 
of certain agreeable individuals." (160) By this Doolittle 
probably meant people with whom Murphy had been working, 
such as Mast, as well as those who were holdovers from the 
Vichy regime. 
It was alleged that Doolittle had intervened in the 
internal affairs of Tunisia. Doolittle asked if any specific 
charge had been filed to this effect. The internal situation 
was said to have improved since the intervention stopped. 
"Has the fact been mentioned that certain measures suggested 
by Doolittle to the French prior to his departure have been 
put into effect and may have something to do with better 
Arab-French relations." (161) If the French treated the 
Tunisians in such a way as to cause "resentment against not 
only themselves but also against American forces," it would 
seem obvious that the United States should try to persuade 
the French to adopt a policy that would tend to "conciliate 
local majorities." (162) 
The worst aspect of the intervention by the United 
States Army in this situation was that, by relinquishing the 
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position of the State Department, "we give up any moral 
influence we may have and with it the hope of implementing 
any of our ideas regarding the betterment of colonial 
peoples throughout not only French colonies but throughout 
the world." ( 163) 
If United States policy was to be determined by 
the personal social relations of colonial 
administrators with American army officers who 
happen to be stationed in certain areas, the 
work of the Division of Political Studies 
seemed useless and henceforth the United 
States should simply approve in advance the 
policies of the subordinate officers in the 
colonies occupied by American forces. (164) 
Doolittle's daughter, Katya Coon, said her father was 
very depressed when he returned to the United States, 
fearing that his career was finished with the State 
Department. It was her belief that it was due to the 
intervention of Roosevelt that he was reinstated. (165) 
Still it was Mast and the American Army that had the final 
word. Roosevelt may have been preoccupied with other 
problems for it was at this time, November 1943, that de 
Gaulle forced Giraud out as chairman of the National 
Committee, and it was in November that de Gaulle had taken 
repressive measures against the nationalists in Lebanon, 
which Roosevelt had not liked. In this case, even if he had 
wanted to intervene, Roosevelt may have found himself in a 
difficult spot since his personal representative, Robert 
Murphy, was supporting the French position of asking for 
Doolittle's recall. Roosevelt probably did not wish to 
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overrule him. Nor would he have wished to overrule the 
decision of the Supreme Commander, Eisenhower. The latter 
had probably been persuaded by Mast's argument that 
Doolittle's presence interfered in the war effort. Even if 
he were not persuaded, his policy from the first was that he 
needed the French and had to have their cooperation. 
Eisenhower revealed the reasons for this policy in a 
letter he wrote to his brother Milton on June 29, 1943 just 
a month before Doolittle's recall in which he said that 
there was 
deplorable racial and political discrimination 
that not only cried aloud for quick 
correction, but were of the type that our 
people were determined that war should 
eliminate. (166) 
Nevertheless it was necessary to have the 
active cooperation of French forces. If we had 
not we would have had to permit the Axis to 
take over and defend Tunisia. If we had done 
that we would be fighting the Tunisian 
campaign until next Christmas. The size of the 
eventual military victory certainly justified 
the policy of evolution rather than revolution 
in the political field. (167) 
While Eisenhower's policy was understandable, 
Murphy's was not. Eisenhower, after all, did acknowledge the 
"deplorable" conditions of the North Africans. Murphy, on 
the other hand, chose to ignore them. Although Doolittle had 
aroused the sympathy for the Tunisians of members of the 
State Department in Washington such as Murray, Berle and 
Stettinius, he had not influenced Murphy who was in a 
position to talk to the French. When Giraud asked Murphy 
what American opinion would be if the French deposed the 
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Bey, Murphy could have pointed out that the American Consul 
General considered it a mistake. It might have saved the 
French from a move which later many of them acknowledged to 
be a mistake. Instead Murphy told Giraud what he wanted to 
hear, that it was a French problem as long as it didn't 
interfere with the war effort. It would seem that Macmillan 
was right when he said about Murphy: 
He is a pleasant enough creature and amenable 
to kind and firm treatment but he had neither 
principles nor judgment. (168) He is without 
fixed purpose or plan and is affected by every 
changing mood of local opinion or Washington 
rumour. (169) 
If Macmillan's assessment is correct, then one can better 
understand why Murphy ignored Doolittle's strenous efforts 
to have United States policy in Tunisia reflect the 
principles of the Atlantic Charter and was swayed by the 
French. 
The choice of Marcel Malige as Doolittle's 
replacement was a clear indication that the policy of 
appeasing the French had prevailed. French Ambassador 
Hoppenot cabled Mast that he had the best reports about the 
new Consul General to Tunisia, Marcel Malige, whose parents 
were both French, and who had always shown a sympathetic 
understanding of French interests. Malige, who had been 
consul in Martinique, had a "favorable prejudice toward 
Petain and for certain aspects of the National 
Revolution" (170), according to Hoppenot, while he was only 
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Chapter VIII 
TUNISIA AFTER DOOLITTLE 
Marcel Malige came to Tunis as the American Consul 
General in January 1944 and stayed approximately one year. 
His appointment was obviously meant to appease the French, 
and it must have done just that. His sympathies were in 
harmony with theirs, and he followed a policy of 
non-involvement with the nationalists. The American 
Consulate was across the street from the Residency and he 
came to know both General and Madame Mast well since he was 
often their guest. Because of his friendship and close 
contact with Mast, Malige viewed Tunisia very much as the 
French would have liked the Americans to view it - a country 
where French and Tunisian lived in harmony. 
Malige seriously underestimated the force of 
nationalism and thought that American observers had 
exaggerated the importance of the Destour. Malige thought 
the Tunisians, for the most part, were "apathetic to any 
change at all because of innate fatalism and 
non-combativeness." (1) Of course, the Destour were quiet 
the year Malige was there because they were following 
Bourguiba's manifesto of May 1943 of forming a bloc with the 
French for the sake of winning the war. Malige did admit 
that there were those who wanted more Tunisians in the 
administration. 
It is true that a few agitators, such as 
Bourguiba, are genuinely imbued with a desire 
to see Tunisia governed by more Arabs and less 
Frenchmen with a view to eventual elimination 
of the latter: but they have recently confirmed 
Bourguiba's appeal of as long ago as May 1943 
calling upon the Tunisian Arabs to collaborate 
with the French. (2) 
The fact that Malige referred to Bourguiba as an 
"agitator" indicated his identification with the French 
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point of view. Because of Malige's policy of non-involvement 
with the nationalists, he was probably out of touch with 
their true strength. Instead he thought that the "initial 
enthusiasm among the Destourians over the Atlantic Charter 
had disappeared," (3) and they had had to accept reality. 
They had "resigned themselves to gradual political evolution 
within the framework of a more enlightened French 
policy.'' (4) By this remark Malige himself seemed to deny 
the validity of the Atlantic Charter for the Tunisians, 
agreeing instead with Mast's basic belief that Tunisia 
belonged to the French Empire and that this situation was 
irrevocable. 
During this period, Mast continued to restore French 
authority, on the one hand, by forcibly eliminating any 
threats to it and, on the other, by gaining the goodwill of 
the Tunisians, or as de Gaulle wrote in his M'moires de 
Guerre, "Resident General Mast maneuvered readily between 
plans for reform and authoritative action."(5) While it was 
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not until 1945 that Mast announced his plan for long range 
reforms, he made many gestures during 1944 to obtain 
Tunisian good will. At his request de Gaulle pardoned 
thirty-three Tunisians who had been in prison since 1938 for 
crimes committed during the Destourian riots of that time. 
The Residency announced this action as an indication of its 
desire for "Franco-Tunisian appeasement and frank 
collaboration." (6) At the same time he launched the 
Paysannat Plan at Kairouan whereby he presented 350 title 
deeds to Tunisian peasants who already occupied the land as 
squatters. In his speech there, he emphasized that "France 
always keeps her promises." (7) Mast tried to form a 
commission composed of French and Tunisians to study 
reforms and took many good will trips to outlying areas. 
As Mast told Malige, he hoped to do for Tunisia what 
Marshal Lyautey had done for Morocco. By his reforms and 
goodwill trips Mast also hoped to nullify the Neo-Destourian 
demands. As for nationalist demands, he refused to concede 
to their wish for liberty of party organization and freedom 
of expression. While he aspired to be an enlightened 
administrator, as Malige considered him, Mast was very much 
imbued with the idea of Empire as he revealed in an 
interview with the Paris newspaper Lib~ration in November 
1944. In his interview Mast spoke of a wish to create "a 
patriotism of empire." (8) Each country of the Empire would 
have its own individuality and be governed with the 
assistance of its elite - including the elite among the 
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Tunisians. The independence movement would fail because the 
improvements planned by the French "will give sufficient 
liberty." (8) He referred to hopes of the Tunisians raised 
by the wari "certain Tunisian illusions, of which some 
remain." (10) Nevertheless, Mast thought there was a 
favorable attitude "among the native masses'' toward France. 
"The influence of the former Destourian Party is no longer 
to be feared. They are divorced from the people." (12) 
Mast continued that to counteract those "perspectives 
of independence" (13) held out to the indigenous people in 
the Atlantic Charter, Tunisia would need the help of England 
or the United States. England was loyal as well as the 
United States to the French position. Right after liberation 
Tunisian Arab agitators believed they found 
encouragement in the attitude of the American 
Consul General, Mr. Doolittle. My personal 
position allowed me to breast the current. 
Mr. Doolittle departed. The comportment of the 
present Consul General cannot lead to confusion 
and the Tunisians know there is no divergence 
of views to exploit. The most effective 
agitator of the past has sought contact, but 
he struck a categorical refusal. (14) 
Mast told Malige that the author of the Lib,ration story had 
obtained the reference to Doolittle elsewhere, but, in 
general, the article reflected accurately enough present 
French policy toward the Tunisians. (15) 
In the article Mast referred to the "former 
Destourian Party." In October 1943 the French Committee of 
National Liberation had decided that the "indigenous party" 
could not be authorized, it having already been banned since 
1938. However, Tunisians could join French parties. The 
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"agitator'' undoubtedly referred to Bourguiba. 
The French were not all happy with Mast's reform 
plans. Some of them thought that instead of giving Tunisians 
land to cultivate, they should be taught to increase 
production. Mast, however, realized the settlers had to 
relinquish some privileges. He thought that giving labor an 
honorable status could not hurt the real interests of the 
French. In his interview with Lib~ration Mast said that with 
the French settlers the war had brought about the fear of 
losing everything which was then manifesting itself in a 
determination "to regain all former privileges - even the 
most unjust perhaps." (16) 
Mast's trips to outlying areas gave him the 
opportunity to act the part of the benevolent colonial 
administrator. Even Malige realized that they were so 
carefully staged that it was hard to judge true native 
sentiment. These trips, on which Madame Mast accompanied 
Mast and occupied herself with charitable works, were given 
much publicity. Mast often asked the American and British 
consuls to accompany him. This had the effect of reinforcing 
the French position. In fact on one trip the Bey went with 
him to quiet rumours that there were differences between the 
two. 
Very shortly after Malige arrived, he accompanied 
General Mast on a goodwill trip to northwest Tunisia. 
Writing about this trip and others, Malige portrayed a 
Tunisia that was living comfortably with the French 
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administration. Malige described how at the towns they 
visited the French and the native leaders made speeches, all 
claiming loyalty to France, after which Mast would give each 
of the native officials an autographed photograph of 
himself. (17} 
On the first trip they stayed overnight with a 
colonialist who had left a practice as an architect in Paris 
to restore a wheat farm to its productivity of Caesar's 
time. This meant restoration of underground tunnels which 
pumped water to the surface and, as Malige wrote, was an 
example of France 1 s "mission civilizatrice". (18} On this 
farm the owner had built new concrete living quarters for 
the Tunisians to replace their sod huts, but the latter 
still preferred sleeping in their clothes directly on the 
floor. A future step for the owner in the civilizing process 
would be to raise the sleeping surface a few inches onto a 
bed. Malige wrote: 
This recalcitrance to first steps in 
civilization characterizes two-thirds of the 
population of Tunisia and reminds one of the 
American Indian's aversion to our own early 
efforts to help him. ( 19} 
Malige found Mast interested in the material welfare 
of the Tunisians. Malige reported that there was a serious 
lack of cloth "and natives in the more remote areas. .are 
so clothed in rags as to arouse pity." (20) General Mast 
promised to have a small amount of clothes sent including 
discarded American Army clothing. Madame Mast, on one trip, 
took clothing to the people in the area, while in Tunis she 
224 
organized a charitable sale of articles of clothing. (21) 
Malige did say that the receptions at the various 
towns that Mast visited had been organized well in advance 
by the controllers. While Malige had "an opportunity to talk 
freely with the native leaders, it was difficult to assess 
how faithfully the reception portrayed native sentiment 
towards the French." (22) Malige, however, believed that 
French influence had not suffered much due to the war "and 
that sentiment in favor of France's recovery through Allied 
victory was genuine." (23) Goodwill toward France had been 
built up by French doctors and nurses. Malige wrote that 
anti-French sentiment was found mainly in Tunis among a few 
thousand educated youth and in a few other towns. Actually 
Malige found little interest in politics outside of Tunis 
and three or four other cities. In fact he said, what went 
on in Tunis was looked upon with distrust. One caid told 
Malige that all natives realized the ascendancy of the 
Protecting Power, but "only the malevolently disposed 
criticized the relationship." (24) The Tunisians were 
indifferent to who occupied the Beylical throne so long as 
the French upheld it. (25) 
In the south a caid told Malige they respected the 
Bey because of the French and, if the Protectorate were 
eliminated, they would go back to independent tribal ways. 
In the north around Sfax, Arabized descendants of 
Phoenicians were distrustful of Arabized Berbers. Both 
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wanted the French to stay as arbiters between them and as 
caretakers of order. ( 2 6) 
Reporting on a study trip to central and southern 
Tunisia, Malige described the controller-caid relationship. 
There were twenty-four French civil controllers and 
thirty-six Tunisian caids who governed 2,500,000 Tunisians. 
Six of the controllers were chiefs of six regions with the 
other eighteen under them. Each controller had a district 
with usually two or more caids to control. The essence of 
the French Protectorate was this co-sovereignty. (27) 
Malige was impressed that "the Controllers were of 
uniformly high standard." (28) He thought their job required 
much tact "in teaching the Caids to carry out their 
responsibilities to the governed along western 
standards." (29) On the other hand the caids had punitive 
powers which led to "venality that characterized the native 
officials". (30) Graft was not considered immoral by the 
Tunisians because it was an "ingrained practice consolidated 
by many centuries." (31) According to Malige, 
all Controllers and Caids agree that the 
universal Moslem trait of deception carried to 
the point of perjury is their greatest problem, 
one they despair of ever solving. (32) 
The checks and balances made the system "function among a 
people who are fundamentally undisciplined by 
nature." (33) 
One of the cities where anti-French sentiment was 
found was Moknine where the first attack against French 
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authority was made in 1938. Representatives of both the 
British and American Consulates were invited to accompany 
Mast on a trip there. John Utter went along. Utter reported 
that in his speech there, "realizing that he was among the 
enemy, so to speak, Mast spoke less in generalities and 
devoted much of his speech to subjects which touched the 
inhabitants of his region." (34) Mast told Utter he had 
purposely come to Moknine to "beard the lion in his 
den." (35) By putting into effect that for which the 
Destourians were agitating, the new French policy was, 
according to Mast, taking the initiative away from Bourguiba 
and his followers. (36) 
When Utter asked Mast why he didn't give Bourguiba a 
place in the administration, Mast replied "that Bourguiba 
would have too much to lose in abandoning his party - both 
in prestige and income." (37) Utter also asked Mast how "the 
exploratory conversations by Tunisians for reforms were 
progressing." (38) When Mast answered that "nothing was 
being accomplished so far and prospects were poor," (39) it 
confirmed what Utter had already heard. 
Utter was referring to the commission Mast was trying 
to form of twelve Tunisians and twelve French to study 
reforms. Bourguiba refused to join the commission unless the 
ban on the Neo-Destourian Party was lifted. Other Tunisians 
had also declined. In October, however, Mast was able to 
induce Tahar ben Amar, the head of the Tunisian Section of 
the Grand Conseil, the legislature, to bring together 
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seventeen leading Tunisians, including Bourguiba, to seek 
agreement on political aspirations preparatory to appointing 
twelve of them to the Franco-Tunisian Commission. When they 
met, they voted against participation in the commission 
unless liberty of expression, party organization and meeting 
were restored. They also wanted seven of the Tunisians at 
the meeting to be designated as an exclusively Tunisian 
committee which would reflect the different Tunisian 
political views. These seven would decide on a program for 
eventual presentation to the French government rather than 
the Resident General's commission. Mast refused and 
esplained to Malige that bitter experience with sabotage and 
bloodshed in 1934 and 1938, when the Tunisians had liberty 
of organization, precluded restoration of the liberty asked 
for by the Tunisians. (40) 
Mast, in trying to form his commission, had brought 
the Tunisians together. They had settled their differences 
and were presenting a united front to the French. The 
Tunisian Committee of Seven in November voted in favor of 
self-government with a prime minister who would be 
responsible to a popularly elected assembly. France would 
remain the Protecting Power. These views would be submitted 
to other leading Tunisians before being adopted as the 
Tunisian nationalist platform. Mast, however, considered the 
resolution impolitic at a time when solidarity with France 
was important. Receiving this decision, the committee voted 
to do nothing. ( 41) 
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Bourguiba, who had resumed his law practice, had 
advised his followers to be patient and to cooperate with 
the French in their stated policy of appeasement of the 
native population. In March 1944 Mast reported to Algiers 
that Bourguiba was in semi-retirement and nationalist 
activities were confined to "court intrigues and clan 
rivalries." (42) According to Mast, Bourguiba's policy 
appeared to be one of "playing the French card." (43) Mast 
went on to say that Bourguiba was beginning to be criticized 
for his policy of "attentisme'' and his desire for a 
rapprochement with France. Mast thought that the former Bey, 
Moncef, had supplanted Bourguiba in the spirits of the 
bourgeois and the more educated. "The star of the chief of 
the Neo-Destour had seemed to pale," and he was already 
considered "un vieux'' by the young ambitious 
Destourians. (44) 
In fact some Tunisians even accused Bourguiba of 
having been bought by the French. Some of his lieutenants, 
including Salah ben Youssef, considered the most important 
Neo-Destourian leader after Bourguiba, had wanted more 
political activity and had wanted to distance themselves 
from Bourguiba. Bourguiba, however, had brought them back 
into line and in August 1944 the party had issued another 
manifesto justifying the apparent inactivity. (45) 
In spite of Bourguiba's cooperative position, Mast, 
who met with Bourguiba in August 1944 and asked what he 
wanted, refused his request to print an unmuzzled party 
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organ and to hold a party congress of four hundred delegates 
at which the reinstatement of Monce£ and Tunisian 
independence would be discussed. Mast told Bourguiba there 
was no real political unrest in the regency. (47) In fact 
from the summer of 1944 Mast restricted Bourguiba's 
movements more and more. In the summer of 1944 a bad food 
shortage, resulting in heavy French requisitions, had added 
to native unhappiness. Mast must have feared that there was 
a risk in allowing Bourguiba to circulate freely. Even 
though Bourguiba repeatedly tried to reach an understanding 
with the Residency and attempted to convince Mast that his 
policy would only add more troubles, he was "brushed off" 
and put in a situation equivalent to forced residence. (47) 
Discouraged by Mast's intransigence, Bourguiba 
decided that the French were not going to make any 
concessions and only in obtaining help from the outside 
could pressure be put on the French to grant the reforms 
they refused to give spontaneously. His hopes as well as 
those of the other Neo-Destourians turned toward the Arab 
League. In the fall of 1944 he sought help from both the 
American and British consuls to intercede with Mast to allow 
him to leave for a pan-Arab conference in Cairo. 
Pan-Arabism had been a negligible force in Tunisia, 
but Tunisians had been made aware of it in 1943 when Feisal 
and Khaled, the two sons of King Abd al-Aziz Ibn Saud of 
Saudi Arabia visited Tunis. When they left, the Bey sent a 
letter to the King in which he expressed the hope that his 
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majesty would find success in the idea of a Union of the 
F.rab World which would be the "reward for his noble and 
glorious initiative in striving to help Arab states . 
out of the sometimes painful straits in which certain ones 
among them still find themselves." (48) 
Bourguiba approached Malige to ask him to intercede 
with Mast for permission to go to a pan-Arab conference in 
Egypt despite, according to Malige, "previous failures to 
involve me in Destourian questions." (49) Malige agreed to 
see him, having first made sure that Mast had received him. 
Though the meeting had been scheduled at one o'clock for a 
half hour, Malige found Bourguiba so interesting that he 
kept him all afternoon. The two men found that they were 
both graduates of L'Institute d'~tudes Politiques in Paris, 
having attended together in 1926-1928, though not having 
met. (50) In spite of his interest in Bourguiba, Malige 
refused to help him leave Tunisia by interceding with Mast, 
and he refused to see him on another occasion when Bourguiba 
wanted to see him "ostensibly to air Nationalist resentment 
over continued denial of the right of self-expression." (51) 
Malige thought it was possible he wanted to see him to 
"strengthen his own position among the party 
leaders." (52) 
The Communists were taking advantage of the 
inactivity of the Neo-Destour and at times Mast seemed more 
worried about them than the Destourians. After the United 
Nations liberation some Neo-Destourians had joined the 
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Communist Party with the idea of using membership as a way 
of criticizing French policy not allowed them as 
nationalists. The Communists trying to enlarge their numbers 
had taken on the political goals of the Destourians as well 
as keeping the goals for social change of their own party. 
In September 1943 Mast put the Secretary General of the 
Communist Party in jail for sending him a letter in which he 
strongly criticized Mast's Tunisian and economic policies, 
charging that the situation had become worse than during the 
German occupation. In October 1943 Mast reported to Algiers 
that Communist propaganda could have a disastrous effect on 
the Tunisians who were unbalanced by the enemy occupation. 
The Communists could cause serious social troubles which 
could gravely hurt the war and the French position in 
Tunisia. Mast wanted the Committee to limit Communist Party 
membership to French citizens. (53~ 
Mast called on Macmillan in Algiers in October 1943 
to express his concerns about the Communists who were 
working hard with the Tunisians and "stirring up 
disaffection." (54) Mast complained to Macmillan that he 
couldn't get support from the French Committee in Algiers 
for firm measures against the Communists because de Gaulle 
was "always flirting with Russia and Communists." (55) 
Macmillan, describing this meeting in his War Diaries, 
wrote: "But poor Mast is rather a 'fusser', and apt to 
exaggerate on this topic." (56) Macmillan told him he should 
get Stalin to intervene and tell the Communists to be quiet 
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as they were interfering with the war effort. When Mast 
"brightened up" at that idea, Macmillan promised to put him 
in touch with the new Russian Ambassador. ( 5 7) 
By January 1944, however, Mast found the Destourians 
were the most troublesome party. By then the Communists had 
separated from the Destour because, they claimed, the 
Destourians were taking up anti-French activity. For their 
part, the Destourians were upset with the Communists for 
their pro-French position and in March 1944, when the 
Communists publically stated their platform which included a 
pledge of cooperation with the Protectorate, the Destourians 
walked out. Ben Youssef, who thought there were several 
thousand Tunisian Communists, told the American vice-consul, 
Paul O'Neill, that this stance would not change as long as 
the Communists went along with the French. He did say that, 
if the Communist Party came out wholeheartedly against 
France in Tunisia, he would become a Communist immediately 
along with all other Destourians. O'Neill commented that 
this statement showed how bitterly anti-French and 
opportunistic some of the more militant nationalists 
were. (58) 
Less militant Destourians looked upon the Communists 
as adversaries. They worried about their recruiting of 
Tunisians. According to Mast, the Communists tried to win 
the Tunisian population over to their side by flattering 
them in their sentiments for the former Bey, by showing that 
Islam was compatible with Bolshevism, in attacking the 
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established order, the bureaucrats, and in particular the 
government, and in exploiting economic difficulties, notably 
that of provisioning. ( 59) 
The concern of the nationalists was expressed in an 
editorial in the Arabic N~hda, which Malige described as 
much a nationalist organ as was possible under the 
Destourian ban. It stated, "We are Moslem Arabs7 we have our 
own ideals and traditions: we want none other." (60) Malige 
commented that the permission of the Residency to print the 
editorial reflected its dislike of both Communists and 
Destourians. According to Malige, Mast welcomed the 
controversy between the two believing it created for him "a 
divide-and-rule atmosphere." (61) 
At the time of the death of Shaikh Taalbi, the head 
of the old Destourians, in October 1944 a bad rift occurred 
between the Communists and Destourians. The latter were 
furious over the obituary of Shaikh Taalbi in the local 
Communist Party organ. It was written by its leader, a 
Tunisian, who referred to the Old Destourians as 
pro-fascists and suggested Taalbi was a Hitler sympathizer 
and that he had consented to the collaboration of his 
political associates with the Axis occupation. Bourguiba 
told Malige that the Destourians "were already lukewarm 
to the Communists, because the latter were too pro-French 
and this latest attack has split them wide apart." (62) 
Both the American and British consuls agreed not to 
attend the funeral. In Malige's case it was probably because 
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of his non-involvement with the nationalists. When Bourguiba 
did not attend Shaikh Taalbi's funeral, it was feared that 
he had left for the Pan-Arab Conference. Mast had asked both 
the British and American consuls to prevent any escape of 
Tunisian leaders via United Nations military aircraft. 
Actually Bourguiba had not gone. (63) 
While there was little political activity among the 
Tunisian nationalists during 1944, significant changes 
occurred in the French Committee of National Liberation. In 
April 1944 de Gaulle relieved Giraud of his rank as 
commander-in-chief thereby essentially eliminating Giraud 
from the scene. Roosevelt continued to be opposed to 
recognition of de Gaulle in spite of the fact that the 
invasion of France was imminent and Eisenhower and Murphy 
recommended recognition in order to have a French 
administration in place with which to deal after the 
invasion. Henry Stimson blamed Roosevelt's opposition on 
Leahy, who had warned the President that he might expect a 
revolution in France. Although Leahy had had the advantage 
of being stationed in Vichy for several years, Stimson did 
not think his advice was good. He did not consider Leahy "a 
very acute person." (64) 
On May 7 de Gaulle visited Tunis in celebration of 
the anniversary of the United Nations victory there. In a 
speech he spoke of the need for recognition. 
On the eve of battle in France, we ardently 
wish that French realities be definitely 
recognized, so that the Allied armies can 
concentrate on their task, which must remain 
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strategical. (65) 
On June 6 the United Nations invasion of Normandy took 
place, and though there was no revolution, Roosevelt still 
refused recognition. 
In June Mast expressed some bitterness to Malige over 
the "mistaken" United States policy of non-recognition of de 
Gaulle. He spoke of an anti-American sentiment that was 
developing because of it. Mast was now pro-de Gaulle, not 
from personal attachment, because his sympathies were with 
Giraud, but because of the political leadership of de 
Gaulle, which he considered the best rallying point for 
Frenchmen under the circumstances. (66) 
Mast told Malige that the proclamation of General 
Eisenhower (the Darlan deal) had been expedient, dealing 
with officials found on the spot. They were, however, "Vichy 
tainted." Mast continued that, "Just as Darlan had been 
eliminated from the Algiers scene so would any other rival 
of de Gaulle" (67) who might arise under American aegis. No 
French prefect could govern his department without a 
superior and central French authority. 
Mast attributed United States policy to the 
unsympathetic reaction Roosevelt had at his one meeting at 
Casablanca with de Gaulle. He thought other meetings would 
have changed the reaction. Besides, he thought personalities 
should be overlooked. Mast felt deeply over what he felt to 
be the misguided policy of the United States. Malige had 
observed the same belief in the press and in conversations 
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with other Frenchmen. (68) 
Actually President Roosevelt had invited de Gaulle to 
meet with him in July 1944, the following month, but Mast 
had heard that "the President's invitation was 'to have tea' 
and nothing was expected from it." (69) Mast was right 
because, when Roosevelt met with de Gaulle in Washington, he 
refused to grant any concessions to de Gaulle's Committee 
other than "temporary de facto authority" for civil 
administration in France, on condition that military 
authority rest with Eisenhower and that the French people 
would choose their own government. (70) While Paris was 
liberated from the Axis on August 25 and the Committee moved 
from Algiers to Paris, it was not until October 1944 that 
Roosevelt gave his approval of recognition which was 
announced on October 23. Shortly after that Mast held a 
reception to commemorate recognition by the United States 
and Great Britain at which he reminded Malige of his 
"outburst" of June. Malige and Mast agreed that frankness 
was the best policy among friends. (71) 
When Malige was transferred to another post in Poland 
during the early part of 1945, Vice-Consul Paul O'Neill took 
over as acting Consul General. He had arrived in Tunis at 
the end of August 1943. At that time he had only just become 
a Foreign Service Officer. Having been sent briefly to 
Canada, he had requested a post as close to the war zone as 
possible. Though from a Quaker family, both his brothers 
were in the armed forces, and he, himself, was not opposed 
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to fighting. Still, because he was married and had a child, 
he was exempt. ( 7 2) 
O'Neill had met Doolittle when the latter came to 
Tunis for three weeks to pack up his things. O'Neill admired 
him though he felt he had gone too far in his 
pro-nationalist position. O'Neill found that Malige was 
pro-French with a hands-off attitude towards the 
nationalists. Though the latter had sought out O'Neill, he 
was less involved with the political side while Malige was 
there. It was John Utter who saw the nationalists and who 
was much more understanding of their aims than Malige. 
Utter, however, left Tunis for an assignment in Paris in 
February 1945. (73) 
In that month O'Neill wrote of the reaction in French 
government circles to a speech made on February 4 by de 
Gaulle in Paris. Roosevelt had not wanted de Gaulle at the 
Yalta conference and rejected the latter's request to 
attend. Regarding France as a defeated and collaborating 
power, Roosevelt did not think France deserved to have an 
equal role in making postwar decisions. Nor did he want to 
add to de Gaulle's power by giving him a voice in these 
decisions. De Gaulle, on the other hand, wanted to assert a 
position for France as a victor power with equal authority. 
His exclusion from the conference had led to hurt feelings 
among the French. For those with whom O'Neill had spoken, 
the part in de Gaulle's speech which brought forth the most 
pride was the one saying that, in the future peace, France 
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would not consider herself bound by anything which she had 
not discussed and approved in the same way as the other 
powers . ( 7 4) 
By the time of Yalta Roosevelt had accepted the idea 
that France would play a stronger role in Europe than he had 
previously wanted. Because he did not think the United 
States public would agree to keeping occupation troops in 
Germany more than two years, he decided at Yalta to give 
France an occupation zone and to let France arm eight more 
divisions. By Yalta Roosevelt had also given up the idea of 
putting former French possessions under trusteeship except 
for Indochina and by March he would agree to make that 
country a trust territory of France. (75) 
Roosevelt asked de Gaulle to meet with him in Algiers 
after the Yalta conference. De Gaulle refused feeling that, 
if Roosevelt had a good reason to see him, he should have 
permitted him to go to Yalta. Furthermore, de Gaulle did not 
think the American President qualified "to invite the French 
President to visit him in France." (76) De Gaulle realized 
that for Roosevelt, Algiers probably was not France, but de 
Gaulle felt it was just as well to remind him. Besides, 
Roosevelt was starting his trip by going through Middle 
Eastern Arab states inviting kings and heads of states 
aboard his cruiser including the presidents of Syria and 
Lebanon, French mandates. De Gaulle considered it an affront 
that the President was offering to receive de Gaulle "on the 
same ship and under the same conditions." (77) Thus, at the 
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time of Roosevelt's death on April 12, 1945, relations 
between the two men had not improved, and this fact 
undoubtedly had an effect on future United States relations 
with France. 
When O'Neill took over as acting Consul General his 
despatches were far more concerned with the Neo-Destourians 
than Malige's had been, indicating, no doubt, more contact 
with them. Nationalist activity was still relatively 
dormant. The nationalists were aware that they could expect 
no backing at this time from Great Britain and the United 
States and without their help or French concurrence, they 
were powerless. 
O'Neill had an interview with Salah ben Youssef in 
which they discussed different aspects of party policy and 
attitudes which, to some extent, were a reaffirmation of 
already known ideas. Ben Youssef was at that time more 
militant than other top nationalist leaders and was closely 
watched by the French, who thought him the likely successor 
to Bourguiba should anything happen to the latter. Ben 
Youssef told O'Neill that the party had two projects for the 
immediate future. One was to work on strengthening itself 
internally and on organizing for posible action along 
"maquis" lines when the war finished. The other was to send 
a top notch representative to Cairo to carry out anti-French 
activity. O'Neill mentioned how the Destourians had already 
attempted to send a representative and to obtain United 
States aid. Ben Youssef confirmed that they were still 
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determined to do this and, in fact, a few students had 
already left the country via Libya in secret several months 
before and were now in Cairo where they were to make contact 
with young Algerians and Moroccans who had been there since 
before the war. (78) 
For his part, Mast still refused to recognize Tunisian 
aspirations. At the final meeting of the Grand Conseil, 
which had been considering the 1945 budget, the 
Vice-President of the Tunisian Section, Tahar ben Amar, 
again, as he had at the opening session, asked for 
democratic liberties for the Tunisian people and for more 
internal self-government. (79) 
General Mast replied that the Protectorate "from the 
beginning had been established on a permanent basis." (80) 
There was a great deal of comment that the Vice-President, 
who had been considered a French stooge, had spoken out as 
forthrightly for extensive concessions. Some thought he had 
been put up to it by General Mast in order that the latter 
could silence all speculation by his answer. Others thought 
it more likely that he had been prompted by his colleagues 
on the Tunisian Committee of Seven. (81) 
While Mast's reply was well received by most of the 
French residents, it was bitterly criticized by the 
nationalists who were especially upset by Mast's use of the 
word "permanent." Mast said, 
Although this question (Tunisian aspirations) 
is not within the jurisdiction of the Grand 
Conseil since it has been raised gentlemen, I 
don't want to leave any doubts in your mind ... 
other French Government spokesmen have already 
drawn your attention to the fact that a 
protectorate was not a mandate and that the 
French Protectorate was, from the beginning, 
established on a permanent basis. (82) 
Furthermore, Mast went to great lengths to make it 
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appear to the outside world that the Tunisians were content 
with this permanent arrangement. The British consul told 
O'Neill that he had seen no nationalist leaders for a while 
but, when he did see Bourguiba, he suggested, after telling 
him that no British support could be expected for 
nationalist agitation, that the party would better occupy 
itself in preparing its case for the peace conference. The 
Destourians, since they were outlawed, expected no such 
opportunity and complained that France had for some while 
been gathering as much evidence as possible to prove, when 
the matter arose, the attachment of the colonial subjects to 
France. To counteract this was another reason the 
Destourians wished to send a spokesman to Cairo. (83) 
To prove this attachment of the Tunisians to France, 
all the newspapers had been publicizing telegrams received 
from civil controllers in different parts of Tunisia 
expressing gratitude and happiness to Mast for his reforms. 
All the telegrams had approximately the same date and 
O'Neill learned that they were sent in response to 
instructions from the Residency. The way this worked was for 
the controllers to assemble the leading Tunisians such as 
caids and shaikhs and read them a summary of the reforms and 
then recommend that they send telegrams on behalf of the 
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assembled group. Presumably these messages were for external 
use to prove that the Tunisians were fully and loyally 
attached to the protecting power. (84) 
Mast outlined his long range political, social, and 
economic plans for Tunisia in a broadcast on February 17, 
1945. Politically the reforms were to permit the Tunisians 
to participate more in the government and administration of 
the country. Socially and economically there were plans for 
more schools, better medical care, and new building 
programs. As envisioned by Mast, the reforms would require 
twenty to fifty years and large sums of money. Mast 
"emphasized that all reforms would be carried out within the 
framework of the French community and under the 
Protectorate." ( 8 5) 
After Mast's speech sixty-eight Tunisians of 
different political parties met and denounced the reforms as 
"insufficient and illusory." (86) This group was an 
enlargement of the Committee of Seven which had met during 
the past few months to obtain agreement on their political 
aspirations. Representatives from all Tunisian political 
parties and independent groups attended including the Old 
Destour, Neo-Destour, the Tunisian Section of the Grand 
Conseil, Chamber of Commerce and Chamber of Agriculture, 
professors from the Grande Mosquje, College Sadike and 
College Alaoui, businessmen, and landowners. (87) 
At the meeting a motion was read requesting internal 
self-government with a popularly elected assembly. The 
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Committee of Seven had already approved this motion. Some of 
the group thought that the motion did not go far enough and 
wanted complete independence with integration of Tunisia in 
an independent North African Federation, and then into a 
larger pan-Arab federation. Both the Old and New Destour 
leaders, however, said this was not a good time to raise the 
question of complete independence as it would hinder the war 
effort of the United Nations. Furthermore, internal 
self-government was a necessary step before external 
sovereignty could be thought of. (88) 
It was clear to the participants at the meeting that 
outside pressure would be needed if Tunisian aspirations for 
self-government were to be met. They also believed that it 
was important that the sacrifices of the Tunisians for the 
war effort, particularly in troops, be credited to the 
Tunisians and not to France; and that the 
claims for self-government be presented to the 
outside world independent of ideology and 
passion for the world must know that these 
claims are based not on fanaticism or 
xenophobia but on the need for more self 
respect, liberty, better food and living 
conditions. These needs are not met by France 
which not only humiliates and represses us but 
prevents us from advancing in education, 
agriculture, and technical fields. {89) 
The meeting agreed to form four study groups to work 
out a detailed plan for self-government with commissions for 
political and legislative problems, economic and financial 
problems, educational and cultural problems, and social 
problems. O'Neill pointed out that nationalist parties had 
formerly concentrated on political aims and had been vague 
about details of administrative, social, and economic 
matters. (90) 
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Mast, several days later informed Tahar ben Amar, the 
Vice-President of the Tunisian Section of the Grand Conseil, 
who had in the past been agreeable to French directives, 
that he, Mast, was "most displeased'' (91) with the 
activities of the meeting, and that no more of these illegal 
meetings should take place, and that the leaders would be 
confined if it continued. A second meeting was cancelled. 
O'Neill wrote of an article in Nahda about a 
conversation between its director and General Mast on the 
reforms planned by Mast. In parentheses O'Neill explained 
that Nahda and the other Arabic daily, Zohra, were both 
censored and under a certain "amount of control and 
suggestion from the Residency," (92) but Nahda to the extent 
allowed, was more representative of nationalist opinion. It 
was believed that the interview was initiated by the 
Resident General in order to allow Tunisian critics who 
thought the reforms did not go far enough "to let off a 
certain amount of steam" (93) and to allow Mast to say these 
reforms were planned steps that, when finished, would be 
followed by others. 
In talks with some of the leaders of the Neo-Destour, 
O'Neill was told that the party policy for the time being 
was one of "wait and see." (94) While a minority wanted to 
act now in hopes that demonstrations and their repression 
would elicit the sympathy and action of Great Britain and 
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the United States, the majority were for waiting in hopes 
that the San Francisco Conference scheduled for April 25, 
1945 would result in some colonial agreement favorable to 
the Tunisians. They were looking for the support of 
independent Middle Eastern countries, especially Egypt, at 
the conference. 
The Destourians continued to insist that they would 
get an important leader to Cairo in the near future. 
Bourguiba was now limited to the city of Tunis proper by the 
security authorities, and his colleagues claimed that this 
was because the French were afraid that he would be the one 
to attempt to leave the country or, should he be permitted 
to come and go freely, he would conduct a campaign in the 
interior against the reform plan of General Mast. (96) 
April 9, the anniversary of the Tunisian nationalist 
demonstrations of 1938 after which the French legally 
dissolved the Destourian parties, was quiet without any 
incidents. The French police patrolled the streets and 
Sengalese troops, as well as the American military police, 
were put on alert. Several inflammatory bulletins were 
passed around before April 9 and a few were posted on walls 
I 
around the Grande Mosquee where the students were a focal 
point for nationalist loyalties. Nationalists reported that 
some French "agents provocateurs" were trying to promote 
demonstrations. The Neo-Destourian party, however, had asked 
its members to remain quiet and avoid any open action. The 
native quarter appeared normal during the day. (97) 
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This peacefulness was not unexpected. The nationalist 
leaders had often assured the Americans and British that 
they would refrain from any active disturbances that might 
hurt the war effort. They knew that any disturbances would 
be quickly put down by the French authorities and would be 
disapproved by the United States or Great Britain. (98) 
While the peacefulness of April 9 was expected, the 
vast outpouring of grief at the time of Roosevelt's death on 
April 12 was not. The extent of Tunisian mourning came as a 
real surprise to the French. The nationalists looked up to 
him because he had espoused self-determination in the 
Atlantic Charter, and they organized a mammoth parade of 
mourning. Demonstrations had previously not been allowed, 
but this ceremony of mourning was allowed on this day. There 
was great fervor and shouting. It was a memorable occasion 
that really startled the French and frightened them since it 
was the first time that they saw the dimensions of the 
nationalist movement. O'Neill described it saying, "you 
could hear the shouts. There was peaceful marching in 
ordered ranks. There were rows and rows - thousands." (99) 
It gave the nationalists a sense of their own strength and 
was a real shot in the arm for them. The French were 
alarmed, but O'Neill was not sure what their reaction was or 
what they did in retaliation. (100) 
O'Neill reported on a couple of minor incidents that 
happened at the memorial ceremony which involved Tunisians. 
In one, Tunisian students marched around with a sign in 
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Arabic saying "Glory to the Great President Roosevelt, 
Creator and Guiding Spirit of the Atlantic Charter." (101) 
French authorities watched them carefully to make sure no 
unanticipated demonstration took place as a result of this 
group. Another minor incident was over the report of a 
French newspaper that "several Tunisian religious 
organizations took part" (102) in the memorial ceremony. The 
Tunisian press was indignant because all sections of the 
Tunisian population had taken part with great 
enthusiasm. (103) 
When it was learned that Habib Bourguiba had 
disappeared, there was much discussion. It was rumoured that 
he had been whisked away by the French, as a precaution 
before April 9, or that he had left secretly for Egypt, 
which he had wanted to do in order to promote Tunisian 
nationalist aspirations. (104) 
The rumour that Bourguiba had escaped to Egypt was 
indeed true. When the French had refused to allow him to go 
to his niece's wedding in his native village of Monastir, it 
was the "final blow," (105) and he decided to go anyway. His 
car was sent empty to Monastir while he remained 
"ostentatiously in Tunis." (106) Then, taking a midnight 
train to Sfax, he mixed with a group of Tunisian students 
and arrived at Monastir where a group of Destourians ready 
to fight kept the police from arresting him. The Tunisian 
governor of the district advised the local French controller 
not to start riots by keeping Bourguiba from going to the 
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wedding so he was permitted to attend and to return to Tunis 
by car. In Tunis his comrades told him his escape had been 
arranged. He was to leave his car conspicuously parked in 
front of his house and go to a hiding place. (107) 
From his hiding place he went on March 26 to Sf ax 
where, disguised as a fisherman, he took a sailing ship to a 
small port in Tripolitania. The trip took almost a week and 
at one point the ship was becalmed for three days within 
sight of Gabes. Bourguiba spent his time below deck. In 
Tripolitania he bought native clothes and was able to join 
the party of a shaikh going to Benghazi. From there his trip 
was by camel, donkey, and on foot for sixty kilometers until 
he passed the Egyptian border where he was arrested on April 
26, one month after leaving Tunis. His release was arranged 
through the Secretary General of the Arab League and the 
British immigration authorities allowed him to remain 
indefinitely. (108) 
In Egypt Bourguiba saw advocates of the Arab League 
and other groups concerned about their North African 
brethren. He also contacted Doolittle and on May 15 he 
visited the Alexandria consulate and recounted his story. 
Doolittle told Bourguiba to take up with the Legation any 
political matters that he could not handle himself. In his 
despatch Doolittle wrote, 
I hope that he may be accorded a hearing. Habib 
Bourghiba is a most interesting man. A fanatic 
in defense of his ideals of national autonomy. 
I have found him to be straight and direct 
beyond the conception of any other Oriental 
politician. Slight of figure with blazing blue 
eyes, he is the type that lives on nervous 
energy and inner convictions. (109) 
Doolittle's youngest daughter, Natasha, who joined her 
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parents in Egypt in 1945, recalled that Bourguiba had come 
twice for lunch. Her father saw that Bourguiba was not the 
unscrupulous agitator the French portrayed, but a man 
devoted to his country. (110) 
When Mast learned of Bourguiba's arrival in Egypt and 
meeting with Doolittle, he lost no time in telling O'Neill 
that he was afraid that the friends of Bourguiba might try 
to send messages to him through the American Consulate and 
that he would view seriously any such help to the 
nationalists by the United States. O'Neill assured him that 
"it was established policy not to accept such material from 
any source." (111) 
In his anxiety about Bourguiba and Doolittle, Mast 
must have again asked the French Embassy in Washington to 
intervene. The Counselor from the latter spoke to Loy 
Henderson in the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs of the State 
Department about the fact that Doolittle 
had been encouraging Tunisian revolutionists 
who had taken refuge in Egypt and in particular 
had been giving encouragement to Mr. Habib 
Bourguiba, one of the most notorious of the 
Tunisian revolutionary leaders. (112) 
Henderson told the Counselor that "after investigating the 
matter the Department was convinced that Doolittle was not 
assisting or encouraging Tunisian revolutionists." (113) 
Doolittle "had been in the Foreign Service for many years 
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and his record was such that the Department had confidence 
in his integrity and judgment." (114) 
Because he feared Henderson was "fed up" (115) with 
his complaints, several weeks later the same Counselor 
approached another member of the State Department with 
reports of frequent contacts between Doolittle and Bourguiba 
along with a report that Bourguiba's journey to Egypt had 
been arranged by Mrs. Doolittle. The Counselor was told that 
the story about Mrs. Doolittle was absurd and "that all of 
these reports bore the stamp of overzealousness on the part 
of some agent." (116) 
It was not only Doolittle that Mast worried about, 
but any contacts by the Americans or British with the 
Tunisians. Mast expressed a concern to O'Neill about the 
activities of OSS and JICA representatives in Tunisia, 
saying they were interfering with the internal affairs of 
the country. O'Neill believed Mast's complaints were 
unfounded and represented only a general concern about 
foreign aims in North Africa. ( 11 7) 
Mast was worried about Doctor Frend, a member of the 
British Psychological Warfare Board, who thought that the 
administration of Tunisia was too heavy a burden for the 
French and that the troubles in Tunisia could only be 
remedied by replacing the Bey's ministers with members of 
the Destour who enjoyed the confidence of the Tunisians. 
Frend thought an interallied commission should be formed to 
study and find solutions to the Tunisian problems. Frend had 
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been in touch with Ben Youssef and Bourguiba through the 
intermediary of Slim Driga "ancien Secretaire de M. 
Doolittle." (118) Mast thought it was important to call 
these "agitations" to the attention of the British and have 
him recalled from Tunisia. (119) 
On a trip to Paris Mast met with Malige, now 
Counselor for Economic Affairs at the American Embassy, to 
complain of a certain OSS agent who was consorting with a 
notorious Arab prostitute. He ended by saying "with a smile" 
that this was "the only problem of importance which existed 
in the relations between the United States and the French 
Protectorate of Tunisia." (120) 
Mast's overzealousness may have been partly due to 
his own personality, formed by a military career, which 
could not tolerate any threats to his authority. John Utter, 
who was also working in Paris, saw Henri Gantes, a French 
controller from Sfax, who explained why he had refused the 
job offered to him by Mast as Chef du Cabinet. In giving his 
reasons, he was very critical of Mast who, he thought, saw 
everything from a military point of view. He considered Mast 
to be too rigidly maintaining an outdated colonial system. 
He is not in agreement with the General's Arab 
policy . . . Gantes was born and brought up in 
Egypt, has a thorough knowledge of the English 
treatment of this Moslem country and is 
definitely inclined to such methods for French 
North Africa. He fears strongly that France is 
not keeping pace with the world-wide evolution 
of colonial policy and is sure to run into 
trouble if definite actions and unselfish 
gestures are not substituted for fine yet 
vague words. The top-heavy structure of 
Functionnaires in the Regency appalls him. 
Gantes does not want to work closely with a 
man who views everything from a purely 
military angle, and he feels that Mast does 
not listen to advice. (121) 
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While Mast may have had such limitations, his policy 
simply reflected that of the de Gaulle administration and 
the very nature of colonialism. The watchword of the de 
Gaulle administration was maintenance of the colonial status 
quo. This stemmed from its own weakness. The Committee, 
later the Provisional Government, could not afford to 
alienate the large landholding colonialists and 
industrialists in the colonies, who, of course, had always 
felt threatened by any hint of change or liberalization that 
might benefit the Tunisians. The Committee itself included 
members formerly connected with big business and the army. 
Naturally, the Committee stuck to the traditional colonial 
line. Even if members of the Committee had wanted to change 
that line, the Committee was too preoccupied with attempting 
to strengthen itself internally and establishing itself as 
the representative of France to begin new programs. (122) 
De Gaulle's anticipation of France's post-war 
situation was a major factor in his colonial policy. He felt 
in order for France to regain its position as a first rate 
power, it needed the Empire, and he did not wish to give the 
colonial peoples the slightest hope of independence. This 
rigid policy probably came from the fear that colonies might 
break away if given any privileges while France was in such 
a weak position. Preserving the greatness of France was the 
dominant idea of all the Gaullists. Macmillan described the 
French attitude in the fall of 1943: 
They are really as touchy as a divorced woman 
about their 'reputation' and their 'position 
in European society'. If they could get a 
ticket for the Great Powers Enclosure they 
would be happy. (123) 
The French bureaucracy was composed of officials, 
many of whom had held their posts since before the war. 
Since their major concern was their pensions, it was not 
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surprising that they didn't want to give up the traditional 
colonial policy for some new liberal ideas. Furthermore, the 
bureaucracy contained many pro-Vichyites who were motivated 
by hanging-on rather than introducing new ways. (124) 
The very nature of colonialism was at the heart of 
the problem. Memmi in Portrait du Colonise-1, pr~cedd du 
Portrait du Colonisateur described how the colonizer became 
a reactionary, even a fascist, since he had no choice but to 
approve the discrimination and codification of injustice. 
The colonizer worried whenever any political change was 
suggested and could support only governments that were 
oppressive and reactionary or at least conservative. (125) 
According to Memmi, racism symbolized the fundamental 
relation between the colonizer and the colonized. The 
colonized had lost the habit of active participation in 
government. At first the colonized attempted to imitate the 
colonizer, but, in this attempt at assimilation, he was 
denying himself and his traditions. The next step was to 
revolt. Memmi did not think it was a coincidence that many 
colonial leaders, such as Bourguiba, had mixed marriages. 
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Having pushed the attempt at assimilation to its limi~ they 
had returned to their own base and to the realization that 
their own future coincided with that of their people. (126) 
While still imprisoned in Marseille, Bourguiba had 
written his intimates that the colonized had a 
responsibility for his servitude. The first thing he needed 
to do was to become aware of the mediocrity of his condition 
and the pride of being liberated from it. "The day when the 
colonizer will have been delivered from his complex of 
dominator and the colonized from his complex of servitude, 
colonialism will have seen its end." (127) 
It was the colonial system that was at the heart of 
the problem between Doolittle and Murphy as well as between 
de Gaulle and Roosevelt. Even if Roosevelt and de Gaulle had 
been able to meet again and perhaps overcome personality 
problems, there would have remained their fundamental 
difference over colonialism. The reason De Gaulle refused 
Roosevelt's invitation to meet in Algiers was a 
demonstration of this. De Gaulles' readiness to take as an 
insult Roosevelt's inviting him to the same cruiser on which 
he had talked with the presidents of Syria and Lebanon shows 
something of his touchy attitude of superiority toward these 
colonials. 
For his part Murphy took the side of the French. 
Since he had been the Counselor of the Embassy in Paris 
before coming to North Africa, he was, perhaps, in the habit 
of identifying with French goals. Because of his role in 
obtaining French help for the North African invasion and 
then keeping it during the Tunisian campaign, it was 
understandable why he avoided consideration of Tunisian 
goals. 
Murphy had his critics. Roosevelt received several 
letters and telegrams complaining about his appointment of 
Murphy as Ambassador to Germany in the fall of 1944. One 
telegram suggested that Roosevelt would be hurt in his 
campaign for reelection by his appointment of Murphy. A 
letter entered a protest against Murphy's appointment 
because of his record which was "at such variance with the 
Democratic Ideals expressed by you [Roosevelt] and longed 
for by most people." (128) Another letter su~gested that 
Murphy was being appointed only because of "personal 
appearance and handsome social manners." (129) 
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It would seem that Doolittle might have resented 
Murphy's part in his recall. According to his daughter, 
Katya, however, this was not the case. Katya indicated that 
he continued to feel friendly towards Murphy. Paul O'Neill, 
who later served with Murphy in Brussels, thought this was 
not surprising because Murphy was very affable. Possibly 
Doolittle was unaware of the case Murphy built up against 
him and thought it was primarily the influence of Mast on 
Eisenhower that had caused his withdrawal. 
Roosevelt and Doolittle shared similar beliefs about 
carrying out the goals of the Atlantic Charter. Roosevelt 
envisioned a world without colonialism with trusteeships for 
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former colonies serving as an intermediary stage. He would 
have liked French Indochina to have been one of these. One 
of the reasons he had tried to block de Gaulle from power 
was because of the latter's wish to restore France and its 
Empire to its former glory. Not only did Roosevelt not 
succeeed in preventing de Gaulle from taking power, in 
retrospect it was obvious that he had far less influence on 
the French than he thought he should have. 
Like Roosevelt, Doolittle thought the United States 
could influence French policy. Military necessity was the 
reason for not interfering. While this may have been 
sufficient reason during the war, it need not have kept the 
United States from lending a sympathetic ear to the problems 
of the North Africans and attempting to understand their 
nationalist goals. 
This was what Doolittle had done. In a letter to 
another Foreign Service Officer, Doolittle speculated that 
his outspokeness had hindered his advancement in the State 
Department. Doolittle wrote that his own career was 
marred and often retarded by an unfortunate 
propensity for expressing what I believed in 
the interests of the country rather than what 
the powers that be in the Department wished to 
have reported. (130) 
Doolittle was Minister to Pakistan when he retired to live 
in Tangier. In his letter he told the friend if he came to 
Tangier to 
Go to Cape Spartel and turn left into the 
valley. Look for a vine covered stone hut 
surrounded by some straggling weeds and a 
bench where a disreputable elderly native is 
trying to catch a prawn for a frugal supper. 
Hirn, the native will be me - ex F.S.O. (131) 
While Doolittle's career advancement may have been 
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hindered by his forthrightness, he did receive the Medal of 
Freedom for 
his active and successful role in the work of 
preparation for the landing of Allied forces 
in French North Africa. Speaking the French 
and Arabic languages, Mr. Doolittle was able 
successfully to establish useful contacts with 
the resistance movement in French Morocco and 
Tunisia and to assist in counteracting the 
subversive activities of the German and 
Italian Armistice Delegations and their agents 
operating in that area. (132) 
Bourguiba credited Doolittle's intervention on his 
behalf in 1943 for saving the Neo-Destour from oblivion. On 
0une 7, 1966, the anniversary of the date that Bourguiba was 
given his freedom, Bourguiba honored Doolittle at a 
celebration in Tunis. At that time Bourguiba recalled in a 
radio address the help Doolittle had given him. Only 
recently Doolittle's daughter, Katya, and granddaughter were 
welcomed by Bourguiba and his wife on a visit to Tunisia. On 
that visit they discovered that there was a Hooker A. 
Doolittle Street in Tunis. 
The fact that Tunisia obtained independence without 
bloodshed may perhaps be attributed to Bourguiba's patient 
and sensible guidance. In his radio broadcast of June 7, 
1966 he stated 
We were able to disengage ourselves from a 
difficult situation by using audacity, 
suppleness and perseverance. 
Bourguiba continued that was the method of fighting which 
had always succeeded for them. By his help and 
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